United States v. Shamblin ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4571
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
RONALD CLAYTON SHAMBLIN, II,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph Robert Goodwin,
District Judge. (CR-03-217)
Argued: October 28, 2005 Decided: November 23, 2005
Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: William Chad Noel, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Donald Lee Stennett, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kasey Warner, United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
This appeal was initiated by the Government and challenges the
twelve-month prison sentence imposed on defendant Ronald Shamblin
II in the Southern District of West Virginia on his conviction for
conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. Shamblin’s sentence was
imposed on June 30, 2004, following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and
before the Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005). The Government contends that resentencing is mandated
under Booker and its progeny. As explained below, we vacate
Shamblin’s sentence and remand.
I.
On September 16, 2003, Shamblin was indicted for conspiring to
manufacture an unspecified quantity of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On October 28, 2003, Shamblin
pleaded guilty, without any plea agreement with the prosecutors, to
the conspiracy offense charged. During his plea colloquy, Shamblin
admitted guilt to the drug conspiracy by acknowledging his
involvement in purchasing over-the-counter cold medicine he knew
others would use to manufacture methamphetamine.
Shamblin’s initial sentencing hearing was conducted by the
district court on June 21, 2004. In accordance with the
presentence report (the “PSR”), the court attributed to Shamblin
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quantities of controlled substances sufficient to establish a base
offense level of 34 under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (the “Guidelines”). After imposing various sentencing
enhancements and a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the
court arrived at a final offense level of 45, which was then
reduced to 43, the maximum offense level provided for under the
Guidelines. Although offense level 43 prescribed a life sentence
for Shamblin, the governing statute for sentencing purposes, 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), provided that he could receive a maximum
sentence of twenty years.1 The court accordingly sentenced
Shamblin to twenty years in prison.
On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Blakely v. Washington, holding that the enhancement of Blakely’s
state sentence beyond the statutory maximum on the basis of a
judicial finding of deliberate cruelty contravened his Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury. See 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct.
2531, 2537-38 (2004). In so ruling, the Court re-affirmed the
principle that “‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
1
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846, the statute under which Shamblin
was charged, the penalties spelled out in § 841(b), applicable to
any person who commits a substantive controlled substances offense,
apply also to a person who conspires to commit such an offense.
See § 846 (“Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same
penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of
which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”).
3
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). On June 29, 2004, Shamblin
filed a motion in the district court, pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, seeking to correct his
sentence, asserting therein that his twenty-year sentence was
unlawful under Blakely.
On June 30, 2004, the sentencing court conducted a second
sentencing hearing and issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Shamblin’s motion and imposing a corrected sentence of
twelve months. See United States v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757(S.D. W. Va. 2004) (the “Opinion”).2 In so ruling, the court
concluded that the relevant statutory maximum for Blakely purposes
was the top of the applicable Guidelines range rather than the
maximum penalty authorized by statute. Id. at 766. It further
determined that, although Blakely precluded any increase in
Shamblin’s sentence based on facts found solely by the court, the
Guidelines themselves remained the “law which binds [the] court in
sentencing matters.” Id. at 767. The sentencing court therefore
operated under the assumption that the Guidelines were mandatory
but that it was precluded from finding facts that increased
2
Pursuant to Rule 35(a), a court must correct a clearly
erroneous sentence within seven days (excluding, under Rule 45(a),
weekends and holidays). Not only did the court act within the
period prescribed (the Opinion was issued on the seventh day), its
Opinion contained a thoughtful explanation of its ruling.
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Shamblin’s sentence beyond the sentencing range established by the
admitted facts. Based solely on the facts admitted by Shamblin in
the plea colloquy — that he had purchased cold medicine in
furtherance of the § 846 conspiracy offense — the Guidelines
called for a maximum penalty of sixteen months. After awarding
Shamblin an appropriate reduction for acceptance of responsibility,
the Guidelines provided that he could receive a maximum sentence of
twelve months. Id. at 766. Although the court believed Shamblin’s
twelve-month sentence to be the result of “an artificial
application of the Guidelines” and to be “almost certainly
inadequate” in Shamblin’s case, it concluded that the twelve-month
sentence was compelled by Blakely. Id. at 767, 768.
The Government timely noted its appeal of Shamblin’s sentence,
and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
We review de novo questions of law. United States v. Bursey,
416 F.3d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 2005). A legal error is harmless only
where we can conclude “with fair assurance . . . that the judgment
was not substantially swayed by the error.” United States v.
Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 286 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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III.
By its appeal, the Government contends that the district court
erred as a matter of law in treating the Guidelines as mandatory
and in failing to make the factual findings required under the
Guidelines. As explained below, we agree.
While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). In
Booker, the Court concluded, as did the sentencing court here, that
the relevant maximum for Sixth Amendment purposes was the top of
the applicable sentencing range, not the maximum penalty authorized
by the relevant statute. Id. at 749-50. Thus, under the mandatory
Guidelines regime, a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when judicial
factfinding results in a sentence greater than the maximum
justified only by the facts admitted by the defendant. Id. at 750.
The Court’s remedy, however, differed from that utilized by the
sentencing court here. Instead of retaining the Guidelines’
mandatory character and requiring jury determinations (or defendant
admissions) of each fact supporting an enhancement, the Court
determined that the Guidelines are advisory only. Id. at 757. In
so ruling, the Court stressed that, while the Guidelines no longer
carry the force and effect of law, a sentencing court is obliged to
consider and be advised by the applicable Guidelines sentencing
range and other statutory sentencing goals. See id. at 764-65
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
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In United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005), we
elaborated on the post-Booker obligations of a sentencing court.
We explained that a sentencing court must “first calculate (after
making the appropriate findings of fact) the range prescribed by
the guidelines,” and then “consider that range as well as the other
relevant factors set forth in the guidelines and those factors set
forth in § 3553(a).” Id. at 546. Thus, Booker did not change the
method by which a sentencing court calculates the applicable
sentencing range under the Guidelines; it merely diminished the
force and impact of the Guidelines.
With these principles in mind, it is evident that the district
court committed two legal errors in sentencing Shamblin: (1) it
treated the Guidelines as mandatory; and (2) it calculated the
applicable Guidelines sentencing range based solely on the facts
that Shamblin had admitted rather than on its own findings found by
a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, these errors were not
harmless. Although the court remarked that the twenty-year
sentence prescribed by the Guidelines, which it initially imposed
on Shamblin, was too severe, it also characterized the twelve-month
sentence imposed on Shamblin at his resentencing as “almost
certainly inadequate.” Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 768. In these
circumstances, we are unable to say “with fair assurance . . . that
the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error,” United
States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 286 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal
7
quotation marks omitted), and we are obliged to vacate and remand
for resentencing.3
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate Shamblin’s sentence and
remand for resentencing.
VACATED AND REMANDED
3
Finally, Shamblin contends that any sentence imposed on him
beyond the twelve months authorized by his plea admissions would
constitute a due process violation in the form of an impermissible
ex post facto increase in his punishment. See Appellee’s Supp. Br.
2-4. Because the district court has not addressed Shamblin’s due
process contention, we decline to reach it.
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