Barr v. County of Richland , 160 F. App'x 320 ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-7002
VINCENT L. BARR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COUNTY OF RICHLAND; JOSEPH BOCHENEK, Director;
CHARLES CLARK, Chief of Police; COLUMBIA
POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
BARBARA SCOTT, Clerk of Court; BARNEY GIESE,
Solicitor; JOHN WILKINS, Public Defender;
ALVIN S. GLENN DETENTION CENTER,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (CA-04-1419-2)
Submitted: December 22, 2005 Decided: December 30, 2005
Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Vincent L. Barr, Appellant Pro Se. William Henry Davidson, II,
Andrew Frederick Lindemann, Robert David Garfield, DAVIDSON,
MORRISON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina; Robert Gordon
Cooper, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Vincent L. Barr seeks to appeal the district court’s
order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and
denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of
appeal was not timely filed.
Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the
district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal
period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period
under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory
and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434
U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S.
220, 229 (1960)).
The district court’s judgment was entered on the docket
on May 5, 2005. The notice of appeal was filed, at the earliest,
on June 13, 2005. Because Barr failed to file a timely notice of
appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period,
we grant the Appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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