United States v. Katrina Rasul ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4424
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KATRINA RASUL, a/k/a Trinka,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:09-cr-00024-F-2)
Submitted: October 13, 2011 Decided: October 26, 2011
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Katrina Rasul appeals the judgment revoking her
supervised release and sentencing her to twenty-four months’
imprisonment. Rasul claims her sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court did not address Rasul’s
history of serious mental illness and her desire to receive
psychiatric treatment. Finding no error, we affirm.
A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release should be affirmed if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). This
court first considers whether the sentence is unreasonable. Id.
at 438. “This initial inquiry takes a more deferential
appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion than reasonableness review for guideline sentences.”
United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007)
(applying same standard of review for probation revocation as
for supervised release revocation) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This court should affirm if the sentence is not
unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Only if a sentence is
found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this court
“decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id.In reviewing for reasonableness, this court “follow[s]
generally the procedural and substantive considerations that
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[are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original sentences, . . .
with some necessary modifications to take into account the
unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences.” Id.
at 438-39 (alterations added) (internal citatation omitted). A
sentence imposed upon revocation of release is procedurally
reasonable if the district court considered the Chapter Seven
policy statements and the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2011) factors that it is permitted to consider. See 18
U.S.C.A. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. Relevant
factors include: “the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(1), and the need for the sentence “to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, . . . protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant, . . . [and] provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner . . . .” 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D). A
sentence imposed upon revocation of release is substantively
reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for
concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
The district court “ultimately has broad discretion to revoke
its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to
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the statutory maximum.” Id. at 439 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We conclude that the sentence was both procedurally
and substantively reasonable. The district court considered the
Chapter Seven policy statements and the appropriate sentencing
factors. Rasul did not seek a lower sentence based on her need
for mental health treatment. Nor did she seek a particular
sentence based on the sentencing factors. While counsel made a
reference to Rasul having received mental health treatment while
previously incarcerated and her desire to receive additional
treatment, counsel made no statements regarding why Rasul needed
such treatment and why the court should order a sentence of a
particular length because of the need for treatment. *
Finding no procedural or substantive error in Rasul’s
sentence, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
We note that the Bureau of Prisons is authorized by
statute to provide for Rasul’s safekeeping and care. See 18
U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2) (2006). Rasul may give her consent to
psychiatric treatment at an appropriate facility or to receiving
psychiatric medications if the medical staff makes a
determination that such care or treatment is needed. See 28
C.F.R. § 549.44(a), (b) (2011).
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