United States v. Timothy Hickson ( 2012 )


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  •                                           Filed:   December 20, 2012
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4439
    (4:11-cr-00769-TLW-1)
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    TIMOTHY CHAMEL HICKSON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    O R D E R
    The Court amends its opinion filed December 13, 2012,
    as follows:
    On page 2, line 10 of text -- the word “the” is added
    before the word “sentence.”
    For the Court – By Direction
    /s/ Patricia S. Connor
    Clerk
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4439
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    TIMOTHY CHAMEL HICKSON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Florence.   Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
    (4:11-cr-00769-TLW-1)
    Submitted:   October 31, 2012             Decided:   December 13, 2012
    Before WYNN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
    South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea,
    Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina,
    for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Timothy Chamel Hickson pleaded guilty to possession of
    a firearm after sustaining a prior conviction for an offense
    punishable    by    a   term    exceeding           one    year       of    imprisonment,    in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2006).                             The district court
    sentenced    Hickson     to    188       months      of    imprisonment,          and   he   now
    appeals.      Appellate        counsel      has          filed    a    brief      pursuant   to
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), questioning whether
    the district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11,
    whether the court erred in finding that Hickson was an armed
    career     criminal,     and     whether            the    sentence         was   reasonable.
    Hickson    has   also    filed       a    pro       se    supplemental        brief     raising
    additional issues. *      Finding no error, we affirm.
    Counsel     first     questions              whether      the    district     court
    complied with Rule 11.           The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is
    to ensure that the plea of guilt is entered into knowingly and
    voluntarily.       See United States v. Vonn, 
    535 U.S. 55
    , 58 (2002).
    Accordingly, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court,
    through colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant
    of, and determine that he understands, the nature of the charges
    to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the
    *
    We have considered the issues raised in Hickson’s pro se
    brief and conclude they lack merit.
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    maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is
    relinquishing by pleading guilty.               Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).               The
    court also must determine whether there is a factual basis for
    the plea.     Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 120 (4th
    Cir. 1991).
    In addition, as Hickson did not move in the district
    court to withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11
    hearing is reviewed for plain error.              United States v. Martinez,
    
    277 F.3d 517
    , 525 (4th Cir. 2002).               We have thoroughly reviewed
    the record and conclude that the district court fully complied
    with the requirements of Rule 11.               We conclude, therefore, that
    Hickson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
    Counsel        next   questions     whether       the   district     court
    correctly   concluded        that    Hickson    qualified       for    the    enhanced
    penalties of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e) (2006).           We review a district court’s determination of
    whether prior convictions qualify as predicate convictions for
    purposes of the ACCA de novo.                 United States v. Brandon, 
    247 F.3d 186
    , 188 (4th Cir. 2001).                Under the ACCA, if a defendant
    is convicted of violating § 922(g) and has sustained three prior
    convictions     for    violent       felonies    or   serious         drug    offenses
    committed on occasions different from one another, the defendant
    is subject to a statutory mandatory minimum of fifteen years of
    imprisonment.         
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1).       A    violent       felony   is
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    defined as a “crime, punishable by a term exceeding one year of
    imprisonment, . . . that . . . has as an element the use,
    attempted use, or threatened use of force against the person of
    another.”        
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).                   A serious drug
    offense    is    any     offense      under       state   law   that      involves    the
    distribution of a controlled substance for which a maximum term
    of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.
    In     addition,       to     determine       whether      offenses       were
    committed on occasions different from one another, a court must
    consider:
    (1) whether the offenses arose in different geographic
    locations; (2) whether the nature of each offense was
    substantively different; (3) whether each offense
    involved different victims; (4) whether each offense
    involved different criminal objectives; and (5) after
    the defendant committed the first-in-time offense, did
    the defendant have the opportunity to make a conscious
    and knowing decision to engage in the next-in-time
    offense.
    United    States    v.      Leeson,     
    453 F.3d 631
    ,    640   (4th    Cir.     2006)
    (citing United States v. Letterlough, 
    63 F.3d 332
    , 335-37 (4th
    Cir. 1995)).       Here, Hickson had sustained prior convictions for
    assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature and two
    counts of distribution of cocaine base.                      The district court did
    not err in determining that the controlled substance offenses
    were   committed       on    occasions        separate     from     one    another     and
    qualified as two predicate offenses for purposes of the ACCA.
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    Finally,           counsel     questions    whether      the      sentence   is
    reasonable.          We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying
    an abuse of discretion standard.                       Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 
    564 F.3d 330
    , 335 (4th Cir. 2009).                  In so doing, we examine the sentence
    for     “significant             procedural     error,”        including      “failing     to
    calculate      (or     improperly          calculating)        the    Guidelines        range,
    treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
    [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence
    based    on    clearly           erroneous    facts,     or    failing     to    adequately
    explain the chosen sentence.”                    Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    .               We will
    presume on appeal that a sentence within a properly calculated
    advisory      Guidelines           range   is    reasonable.          United     States     v.
    Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    , 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see Rita v. United
    States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 346-56 (2007) (upholding presumption of
    reasonableness             for     within-Guidelines           sentence).          We     have
    thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence
    was procedurally and substantively reasonable.
    We have examined the entire record in accordance with
    the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
    for appeal.        Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.        This    court        requires     that   counsel       inform     Hickson,   in
    writing,      of     the    right     to   petition      the    Supreme      Court   of    the
    United States for further review.                      If Hickson requests that a
    5
    petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
    would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
    leave to withdraw from representation.          Counsel’s motion must
    state that a copy thereof was served on Hickson.               We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately   presented   in   the   materials   before   the    court   and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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