Fulcrum International, Inc. v. Prince George Center I, Inc. , 503 F. App'x 193 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1695
FULCRUM INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PRINCE GEORGE CENTER I, INCORPORATED; WASHINGTON
METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (8:11-cv-01390-JFM)
Submitted: November 20, 2012 Decided: December 21, 2012
Before WILKINSON, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark J. Hardcastle, Columbia, Maryland; Terry B. Blair,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Carol B. O’Keeffe, General
Counsel, Bruce P. Heppen, Deputy General Counsel, Gerard J.
Stief, Senior Associate General Counsel, Tracie Dickerson,
Assistant General Counsel, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Fulcrum International, Incorporated (“Fulcrum”)
appeals from the district court’s order granting the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”)’s Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction its claim for detrimental reliance on the basis of
sovereign immunity and the court’s subsequent order denying
Fulcrum’s motion for clerk’s entry of default against the Prince
George Center I, Incorporated (“PGCI”) and closing the case.
We affirm.
Assertions of governmental immunity are properly
addressed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), which permits the
assertion of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a claim for relief. Smith v. Wash. Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2002). When an
entity such as the WMATA challenges jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. We review a
district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co.,
166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
The WMATA was established by an interstate compact
(“the Compact”) among Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia to provide a regional transportation system for the
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Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Delon Hampton & Assocs.,
Chartered v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 943 F.2d 355, 357
(4th Cir. 1991). The signatories to the Compact conferred each
of their respective sovereign immunities, including the immunity
from suit in federal court afforded to Maryland under the
Eleventh Amendment, upon the WMATA. Watters v. Wash. Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 295 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, unless the WMATA’s sovereign immunity has been
waived, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment
against it. Id. at 39-40.
Pursuant to Section 80 of the Compact, the WMATA has
waived its immunity in certain circumstances. Smith, 290 F.3d
at 206. Fulcrum contends that the terms of this section render
the WMATA subject to suit for contractual claims like the claim
for detrimental reliance it raised in this case. After review
of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reject this argument.
In Maryland, claims premised on a theory of
detrimental reliance sound in estoppel. Pavel Enters., Inc. v.
A.S. Johnson Co., Inc., 674 A.2d 521, 531-33 (Md. 1996).
Fulcrum, however, does not cite to any authority establishing
that the WMATA expressly waived its immunity for estoppel claims
in Section 80 of the Compact. We require waivers of sovereign
immunity to be “clear and unequivocal.” Lizzi v. Alexander,
255 F.3d 128, 133 (4th Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other
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grounds by Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721(2003). It is, however, neither clear nor unequivocal that the
WMATA has waived its sovereign immunity as to estoppel claims.
Martin v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 273 F. Supp. 2d 114,
119 (D.D.C. 2003). Consequently, Section 80’s partial waiver of
immunity does not aid Fulcrum.
Fulcrum’s reliance on Section 12 of the Compact fares
no better. Although Section 12 of the Compact allows the WMATA
to “[s]ue and be sued,” Md. Code Ann. Transp. § 10-204(12)(a),
Fulcrum’s argument that Section 12 of the Compact operates as an
expansive waiver of the WMATA’s sovereign immunity is foreclosed
by our decision in Lizzi, 255 F.3d at 132-33. Because Section
80 of the Compact, which “specifically and expressly delineates
the scope of [the] WMATA’s consent to be sued,” id. at 133(internal quotation marks omitted), does not waive the WMATA’s
immunity for claims of detrimental reliance, the district court
properly dismissed the claim for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Turning to the district court’s denial of Fulcrum’s
motion for clerk’s entry of default against the PGCI, we reject
as meritless Fulcrum’s argument that the court erred in denying
the motion on the basis that its complaint was not served on the
PGCI. The record before us simply fails to establish that
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Fulcrum effectuated proper service of the complaint on the PGCI,
in accordance with the provisions of Md. R. 2-124(d).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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