Vincent Hall v. Duron Burney ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-6566
VINCENT JOHN HALL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DURON BURNEY, Officer; MAXTON POLICE; TOWN OF MAXTON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (7:10-cv-00184-BO)
Submitted: October 31, 2011 Decided: November 18, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Vincent John Hall, Appellant Pro Se. Ronnie Monroe Mitchell,
MITCHELL, BREWER, RICHARDSON, ADAMS, BURGE & BOUGHMAN,
Fayetteville, North Carolina; Andrew James Santaniello, CLAWSON
& STAUBES, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), Vincent John Hall
filed a pro se complaint against Officer Duron Burney, the Town
of Maxton, North Carolina, and the Maxton Police Department,
alleging that he was shot by Burney on his own property. * He
claimed that the Town of Maxton had hired Burney part-time and
failed to properly train him. Hall sought damages for medical
expenses and pain and suffering. The district court granted
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that Hall failed to state
a claim against any of the Defendants. Hall timely appealed,
claiming that the district court erred by dismissing his action
and by denying his motion to amend his complaint. We affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC,
634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir. 2011). “The purpose of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.”
*
Hall, a private citizen, filed his complaint on a
standardized form ordinarily used by prisoners filing civil
actions pursuant to § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The
district court found that Hall failed to state a claim under
Bivens. Because Hall clarified in his informal appellate brief
that his complaint sought relief under § 1983, we do not address
his claims under Bivens.
2
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must give the
defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
While a pro se litigant’s pleadings are “to be liberally
construed,” id. at 94, the facts alleged must “raise a right to
relief above the speculative level,” and the complaint must
contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 570 (2007). This plausibility standard does not
equate to a probability requirement, but it requires “more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009). Where the motion to dismiss involves “a civil rights
complaint, we must be especially solicitous of the wrongs
alleged and must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to
a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the
facts alleged.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
As a preliminary matter, we agree with the district
court that the Maxton Police Department was not subject to suit
under § 1983. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
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Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). We therefore affirm the
district court’s dismissal of the claims against the police
department.
Turning to Hall’s claim against Burney, “[t]he Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures
includes the right to be free of ‘seizures effected by excessive
force.’” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir. 2006)),
petition for cert. filed (Oct. 11, 2011) (No. 11-458). We
conclude that Hall’s allegations, albeit brief, that Burney, a
police officer, entered his property and shot him was adequate
to give Defendants notice of, and was sufficient to establish a
plausible claim of, excessive force.
Regarding Hall’s claim against the Town of Maxton,
“inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983
liability,” but “only where the failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the
police come in contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 388 (1989). While mere negligence is insufficient to
expose a municipality to liability under § 1983 for failure to
train, Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 1994), a
local governing body’s failure to adequately train its officers
can be so egregious as to warrant a finding that it amounts to a
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policy or custom for which the municipality should be held
responsible. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389-90.
On the record before us, we cannot state with
certainty that Hall is not entitled to relief on his claim
against the Town of Maxton under any plausible legal theory. It
is at least possible that Hall can establish through discovery a
pattern of conduct by officers indicating a lack of training and
that such a lack of training resulted in the injuries Hall
alleges he sustained.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred
by granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against
Burney and the Town of Maxton and therefore vacate this portion
of the district court’s order. Ultimately, Hall’s claims may
not be successful, but the validity of his claims cannot be
determined until the facts surrounding his allegations are
developed. See Edwards, 178 F.3d at 243 (stating that “a Rule
12(b)(6) motion does not resolve contests surrounding the facts,
the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses”
(internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)).
In addition, Hall sought to amend his complaint to add
Maxton Police Captain Tammy Deese and Mayor Gladys Dean as
Defendants. His proposed amended pleading alleged that they
were liable for the inadequate police training. The district
court denied the motion to amend as futile.
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“A plaintiff may amend his complaint one time as a
matter of course before the defendant files a responsive
pleading.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). We review for abuse of
discretion the denial of a motion to amend a complaint. Pub.
Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 551 F.3d 305, 313
n.3 (4th Cir. 2009).
“[T]he doctrine of futility only applies when the
plaintiff seeks leave of court to amend and does not have a
right to amend.” Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 730 (4th
Cir. 2010). Because no responsive pleading had yet been filed.,
see Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d
1064, 1068 n.1 (4th Cir. 1993) (motion to dismiss is not
considered a responsive pleading), Hall had the right to amend
his complaint with or without leave of court. Galustian, 591
F.3d at 730. We therefore conclude that the district court
abused its discretion by denying Hall’s motion to amend.
For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the
claim against the Maxton Police Department, vacate the dismissal
of the claims against Burney and the Town of Maxton, vacate the
denial of Hall’s motion to amend, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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