United States v. Christopher Dighton , 457 F. App'x 215 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5049
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER RICHARD DIGHTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:09-cr-00047-MR-1)
Submitted: September 14, 2011 Decided: December 2, 2011
Before DAVIS, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Denzil H. Forrester, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Richard Dighton appeals the 121-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to conspiracy to manufacture and possess
with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006). Counsel for Dighton filed
a brief in this Court in accordance with Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no non-frivolous
issues for appeal, but questioning whether: (1) the district
court erred in accepting Dighton’s guilty plea; and (2) the
court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Dighton was informed of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done
so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Prior to accepting a defendant’s guilty plea, Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(1) requires the district court to address the
defendant in open court and ensure he understands: the nature of
the charge against him; any mandatory minimum sentence; the
maximum possible sentence, including imprisonment, fine, and
term of supervised release; the mandatory special assessment;
the applicability of the Guidelines and their advisory nature;
his right to an attorney at all stages of the proceedings; his
right to plead not guilty; his right to a jury trial with the
assistance of counsel; his right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses; his right to testify on his own behalf, as well as
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his right against self-incrimination; any waiver provision in
the plea agreement; the court’s authority to order restitution;
any applicable forfeiture; and the government’s right to use any
of his statements under oath in a perjury prosecution. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(1). Additionally, the district court must
“determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The district court must ensure the
defendant’s plea was voluntary and did not come about as a
result of force, threats, or promises. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(2). The defendant may not withdraw his guilty plea once
the court accepts it and imposes a sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(e).
Because Dighton did not move to withdraw his guilty
plea in the district court or raise any objections to the Rule
11 colloquy, we review the plea proceeding for plain error.
United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-27 (4th Cir. 2002).
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that:
(1) there was an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the
error affected his “substantial rights.” United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). A defendant’s substantial
rights are affected if the court determines that the error
“influenced the defendant’s decision to plead guilty and
impaired his ability to evaluate with eyes open the direct
attendant risks of accepting criminal responsibility.” United
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States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Martinez, 277 F.3d at 532(holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not
have pled guilty but for the error).
A review of the record reveals that the district court
fully complied with the requirements of Rule 11. The court
ensured that Dighton’s plea was knowing and voluntary, that he
understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty and
the sentence he faced, and that he committed the offense to
which he pled guilty. Dighton’s counsel questions whether
Dighton understood his stipulation to the drug amount in his
plea agreement, but the district court sufficiently questioned
Dighton about his understanding of the terms of the agreement,
and Dighton repeatedly stated that he understood. Accordingly,
we hold that the district court did not err in conducting the
plea colloquy.
Because Dighton did not request a different sentence
than the one ultimately imposed, we review his sentence for
plain error. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578-79
(4th Cir. 2010). We begin by reviewing the sentence for
significant procedural error, including such errors as “failing
to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) (2006) factors, selecting a sentence based
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on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). If there are no procedural errors, we then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account
the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Pauley, 511
F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
We conclude that the district court’s sentence was
both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Dighton’s
sentence is within the correctly calculated applicable
Guidelines range. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table) (2009). The court
adequately explained its chosen sentence and had a reasoned
basis for its decision. Counsel questions whether Dighton was
entitled to a sentence reduction for playing a minor role in the
offense; however, the district court did not clearly err in
finding that Dighton did not meet the requirements of USSG
§ 3B1.2. See United States v. Sayles, 296 F.3d 219, 224 (4th
Cir. 2002) (standard of review).
In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire
record and find no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny counsel’s motion
to withdraw as counsel. This Court requires that counsel inform
Dighton, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Dighton requests
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that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may renew his motion
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Dighton. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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