United States v. Jackson ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4160
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARRICK MICHAEL JACKSON, a/k/a Abdul-Jalil Mohammed,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.
(8:07-cr-00215-DKC-1)
Argued: September 24, 2010 Decided: October 29, 2010
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Ebise Bayisa, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. David Ira Salem, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
I.
Darrick Michael Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals his conviction
for making a false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
On appeal, Jackson argues that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his conviction. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm the judgment of the district court.
II.
Jackson was charged in a superseding indictment with two
counts of making a false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. Count One arose from Jackson’s submission of U.S.
Government Standard Form 85P, “Questionnaire for Public Trust
Position,” which he was required to submit in order to continue
his employment at Andrews Air Force Base as a privately employed
security guard.
Question 2 on the Form 85P asked: “Have you ever used or
been known by another name?” (J.A. 116.) Jackson responded “No”
to this question. (Id.) It is undisputed that Jackson did not
disclose, in response to that question, an alias name that he
used, Abdul-Jaleel Mohammad. 1
1
The indictment spelled Jackson’s other name as “Abdul-
Jalil Mohammed.” Because the trial transcripts and the parties’
(Continued)
2
Count Two arose from Jackson’s subsequent interview with
Philip Kroop (“Kroop”), who was a federal investigator
responsible for conducting interviews of persons seeking
security positions related to the federal government. Kroop
conducted a follow-up interview of Jackson regarding Jackson’s
Form 85P. It was during this interview that Jackson made the
false statements charged in Count Two.
During the interview, according to Kroop’s testimony at
trial, Jackson was placed under oath. Kroop asked Jackson
whether he had ever been known by another name and in response
Jackson answered “no.” To ensure that Jackson understood the
question, Kroop rephrased and repeated the question in different
ways. Specifically, Kroop testified that he asked versions of
the following questions: “Do your friends, family members,
associates or any other individuals know you by any other name?
Have you ever used or been known by any other name by anybody?
Is there any name that you use for any other purpose?” (J.A.
153.) Jackson answered “no” to each question. Additionally,
Jackson did not ask Kroop any questions regarding his previous
answer to Question 2 on Form 85P, nor did Jackson ask any
briefs use the spellings “Jaleel” and “Mohammad,” however, we
use the latter spellings herein.
3
questions about the meaning or proper interpretation of Question
2 or the questions Kroop asked of him.
The Government also presented evidence that Jackson had an
email account with Yahoo, created in 1998, under the name
“Jaleel99@yahoo.com.” Between January 2000 and May 2007,
Jackson sent or received over 400 emails to and from his Yahoo
account. These included signing up for accounts at NBA.com and
EA.com using the name Abdul-Jaleel Mohammad, not Jackson. It is
further undisputed that Jackson had set up a Juno internet
service account using the name “Abdul-Jaleel Mohammad,” and that
he also had an email account from Excite under the name
“Jaleel99.” Additionally, one email sent from Jackson’s account
to approximately 40 people included an essay with derogatory
references to the United States government. 2
2
The essay was titled “Voting: Is It Halal or Haram?”
(J.A. 238.) According to testimony at trial, “Halal” is an
Islamic word meaning “permitted” and “Haram” is an Islamic word
meaning “forbidden.” (Id.) Part of the email included the
following passage:
But if you think about it, are you supposed to be
voting in this non-Islamic[,] corrupt[,] satanic
Government? A system made for the servitude of man to
man, not Allah, God. A system run by thieves,
sodomites, racist[s], drug dealers and those who
indulge in mass destruction against humanity and
nature.
(J.A. 239-40.)
4
At trial, the government’s theory of the case was that
Jackson purposefully did not provide his alias name because he
did not want his email addresses or his connection to a
controversial Mosque leader to be known to those investigating
him for security purposes regarding his continued employment.
The Government bolstered its position by pointing to
Jackson’s post-arrest statement to an investigator almost one
year after his OPM interview. Specifically, after the
investigator told Jackson that he was under arrest for his
failure to provide his other name on the Form 85P, Jackson
nodded his head and stated, “[O]h, that’s what this is about.
That’s what I thought.” (J.A. 322.)
Jackson did not testify at trial. His defense focused
largely on evidence that Jackson claimed showed he was not
attempting to hide his views or his alias. Because he was not
hiding his religious or political views, he argued, his failure
to include his alias name could only be viewed as unintentional.
Jackson pointed to evidence that, during his original
application process, he sent his application from his yahoo
account, communicated using his fax machine at his mosque, and
listed associates from his mosque as personal references. He
also relied on evidence that two of his co-workers (who were not
federal employees) knew of his religious and political views and
at least one of them knew he had another name.
5
After a three-day jury trial, the jury returned a not
guilty verdict as to Count One, but found Jackson guilty as to
Count Two. That is, the jury found him guilty of making a false
statement during his interview with Kroop.
The district court sentenced Jackson to two years of
probation, a fine of $2300, and 80 hours of community service.
Jackson noted a timely appeal. This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
III.
Jackson argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction. He contends that the Government failed
to present evidence that his omission of his alias, Abdul-Jaleel
Mohammad, was knowing and willful, rather than a simple mistake
based on a misunderstanding of the questions Kroop asked him.
We disagree.
A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 requires the Government
to prove: “(1) the defendant made a false statement to a
governmental agency or concealed a fact from it or used a false
document knowing it to be false, (2) the defendant acted
‘knowingly or willfully,’ and (3) the false statement or
concealed fact was material to a matter within the jurisdiction
of the agency.” United States v. Ismail, 97 F.3d 50, 60 (4th
6
Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d
1087, 1095 (4th Cir. 1993)).
Jackson contests only the second element of the crime,
willfulness, and argues that his failure to disclose the
additional name of Jaleel-Abdul Muhammad was simply an innocent
mistake or done through inadvertence.
A jury’s guilty verdict will be upheld if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a
rational factfinder could have found each element of the charged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Madrigal-
Valadez, 561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Collins, 412 F.3d 515, 519 (4th Cir. 2005). An appellate court
“may not weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the
witnesses” because “[t]hose functions are reserved for the
jury.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir.
1997). This Court “also assume[s] that the jury resolved all
contradictions in the testimony in favor of the government.”
United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (citation omitted). In short, “[a] defendant challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden.” United
States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007).
We conclude that Jackson has not met that burden.
Jackson’s primary argument before this Court is that there was
no evidence of intent because there was no evidence that Jackson
7
attempted to hide his alias name on any other occasion, and in
fact disclosed his alias and his views to others, including two
civilian co-workers. This argument, however, was made to the
jury and obviously was rejected by the jury.
Jackson, both in his brief and during argument, essentially
asks this Court to consider the same argument and reach a
different conclusion than did the jury. That we cannot do. In
this appeal, we review the jury’s verdict only to determine
whether substantial evidence supports it.
Having done so, we conclude there was more than sufficient
evidence from which a jury could have found that Jackson’s
statements to Kroop during the interview violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. Jackson’s alias name was one he frequently used, not
only in religious circles, but also as a name in establishing
website accounts and in email correspondence. There was
evidence before the jury that Jackson frequently used the alias
name before, during, and after his interview with Kroop.
Additionally, the jury was entitled to credit Kroop’s testimony
as to the version of questions he asked in the interview. Those
questions were so broadly worded that Jackson’s failure to even
inquire whether he should include his other name is evidence the
jury could have relied on to determine Jackson’s statement was
knowingly or willfully made.
8
In short, there is no “clear failure” by the prosecution
here. See Foster, 507 F.3d at 244-45. The jury’s verdict was
supported by substantial evidence. 3
IV.
For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict and therefore
affirm Jackson’s conviction and the judgment of the district
court.
AFFIRMED
3
Jackson also refers to the jury’s verdict of acquittal on
Count One as “inconsistent” with its guilty verdict as to Count
Two. (Appellant’s Br. at 19.) We reject that argument both
because Jackson failed to raise it as a separate issue and
because it is without merit. In particular, we do not find any
inherent inconsistency between the jury’s verdicts on the two
counts. Additionally, even if there were some inconsistency,
“it has long been settled that inconsistent jury verdicts do not
call into question the validity or legitimacy of the resulting
guilty verdicts.” See United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 369
(4th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also United States v.
Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defendant cannot
challenge his conviction merely because it is inconsistent with
a jury’s verdict of acquittal on another count.”).
9