United States v. Michael Locklear , 483 F. App'x 842 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-7196
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL EUGENE LOCKLEAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (7:09-cr-00021-BO-1)
Argued: March 20, 2012 Decided: June 19, 2012
Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Norman K. MOON,
Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: G. Alan DuBois, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Samuel Bowler,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public
Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G.
Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine
L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Section 4241 of Title 18 of the United States Code sets
forth a framework for district courts to use in determining if a
defendant is competent to stand trial and, if not, whether
“there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable
future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to
go forward.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). If a defendant is
incompetent and unable to be restored to competency, however,
the court must proceed to evaluate him for possible civil
commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.
There are two primary questions presented in this appeal.
The first is whether the district court actually remanded
Appellant Michael Eugene Locklear to FMC Butner for the purpose
of being reevaluated for mental competency to stand trial and,
if so, whether such decision was an abuse of discretion. And
second, in that those charged with determining if Locklear is a
candidate for civil commitment already have determined twice
that he is not, we consider whether the district court erred in
continuing to have him detained for further evaluation. For the
reasons that follow, we answer both questions in the
affirmative. Consequently, we reverse and remand the district
court’s decision.
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I.
Locklear went to the offices of United States
Representative Mike McIntyre in Lumberton, North Carolina, on
November 4, 2008, to meet personally with the congressman.
After learning that Representative McIntyre was unavailable,
Locklear allegedly became belligerent and violent. As a result,
he was charged with assault on a federal official, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), and threatening to murder a federal
official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B).
Locklear suffers from mental illness, which causes him to
experience delusions. As part of his delusions, Locklear
believed that an unknown government agency was monitoring his
computer. According to Locklear, this monitoring somehow
stemmed from the purported prominent role that he played in the
2004 John Kerry presidential campaign, for which he thinks he
never received proper credit.
Soon after Locklear’s arrest, it became evident that
Locklear might not be competent to stand trial. Thus, on
February 4, 2009, pursuant to the government’s motion and with
Locklear’s consent, the district court ordered an evaluation of
Locklear’s mental competency.
Locklear underwent several competency evaluations at the
Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina (FMC Butner),
the last of which, dated August 10, 2010, concluded that “there
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is not a substantial probability [Locklear] will regain
competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future.”
Subsequently, the district court conducted a competency hearing.
The district court then issued an order signed on September 22,
2010, stating, in relevant part, the following:
[T]he Court finds that the defendant does in fact
remain incompetent to stand trial and that there is
currently no substantial probability that he will be
restored to competency within the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, given the nature of the charges against
him and evidence supportive thereof, as well as the
delusional condition which continues to afflict him,
the Court finds that his release would create a
substantial risk of bodily harm to another person as
well as serious risk to the property of another. The
Court therefore concludes that it must proceed in
accordance with the provisions of [18 U.S.C. § 4246].
Almost four months later, however, in a report signed on
January 18, 2011, the doctors at FMC Butner informed the
district court that Locklear “does not meet the criteria for
commitment pursuant to [§ 4246].” According to these doctors,
“although [Locklear] is presently suffering from a mental
illness, Delusional Disorder, Grandiose type, his release to the
community would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury
to another person or serious damage to the property of another.”
Nevertheless, acting on a motion filed by the government
over Locklear’s objection, the district court held in a
February 9, 2011, order that the recommendation was
“dramatically at odds with the facts of the case and the
psychiatric condition of the defendant.” “In short,” stated the
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district court, “the report’s conclusion is wholly at odds with
the facts and psychiatric conclusions recited therein.”
Accordingly, the court “order[ed] the medical authorities at FMC
Butner to reconsider the matter and, at a minimum, redraft or
supplement the report.” In a July 12, 2011, report, however,
the doctors “continue[d] to opine [Locklear] does not meet [the]
criteria for commitment pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 4246].”
Locklear then filed a motion for immediate release, which
the government opposed. The district court held a hearing on
the motion on August 25 and September 2, 2011. Afterwards, in
an order signed on September 2, 2011, the district court held,
in relevant part, the following:
After full consideration of the arguments of counsel
and the reports submitted by [FMC Butner] staff, the
Court concludes that, given the nature of the crimes
for which [Locklear] has been indicted and the fact
that more than seven months have elapsed since
[Locklear’s] potential for dangerousness to the
community has been evaluated, it would be
inappropriate to release [Locklear] from custody at
this time.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that [Locklear]
again be REMANDED to FMC Butner for thirty (30) days
to receive further evaluation regarding competency to
proceed to trial, his potential for dangerousness to
the community, and his ability to be released under
conditions of confinement imposed by the U.S.
Probation Office.
This appeal followed.
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II.
The district court’s September 2, 2011, order has two parts
that we will consider here: (1) reevaluation of Locklear
regarding his mental competency to stand trial and (2)
reevaluation of his dangerousness to the community. In light of
our ruling, for purposes of this appeal, we need not consider
the third part of the order, evaluation of his ability to be
released under conditions of confinement imposed by the United
States Probation Office.
A.
Section 4241 “authorizes the commitment of a criminal
defendant who, as a result of a mental disease or defect, lacks
the mental competency to stand trial or undergo post-release
proceedings.” United States v. Broncheau, 645 F.3d 676, 682 n.8
(4th Cir. 2011). As such, it “provides a mechanism to secure a
judicial determination of a criminal defendant’s competency,
thereby protecting the defendant’s fair trial rights and the
integrity of judicial proceedings.” Id.Pursuant to this statute, a court must order a competency
hearing if it has “reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
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proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
§ 4241(a).
“Prior to the date of the hearing, the court may order that
a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant
be conducted[.]” § 4241(b). “A psychiatric or psychological
examination ordered pursuant to this chapter shall be conducted
by a licensed or certified psychiatrist or psychologist, or, if
the court finds it appropriate, by more than one such examiner.”
§ 4247.
“[W]e review a district court’s determination of whether to
order a competency examination for an abuse of discretion.”
United States v. Martinez-Haro, 645 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir.
2011). Here, our careful review of the record leads us to the
conclusion that there is nothing in it to suggest anything has
changed since August 2010—when the doctors at FMC Butner last
determined Locklear was not competent to stand trial—that would
cause them now to find otherwise. Instead, the record
establishes that Locklear suffers from a serious mental illness,
which prevents him from working with his counsel or assisting in
his own defense. Moreover, the medical staff at FMC Butner
determined that there is no substantial probability that he will
regain competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future. The
district court accepted this finding in its September 22, 2010,
order, concluding that it would then proceed under § 4246, to
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obtain a determination of Locklear’s future dangerousness for
purposes of civil confinement.
On appeal, the government argues that the district court’s
colloquy with Locklear during the August and September 2011
hearing prompted the court to reconsider its earlier competency
rulings pursuant to § 4241. Hence, according to the government,
the district court properly ordered a competency reevaluation.
But the record belies this contention.
Although the district court stated in the August 25, 2011,
hearing, “I think [Locklear is] competent[,]” it continued the
hearing on the matter until September 2, 2011. At that time,
after all exchanges between the district court and Locklear had
occurred, the district court stated the following: “And if I
were going to release him and he was competent, I would put him
under conditions. So, releasing him while he is incompetent
would be irresponsible not to put him under conditions.” Thus,
the district court indicated that it did not think that Locklear
was competent.
And, as both parties recognize, the government’s argument
now that Locklear may be competent is at odds with its position
on September 2, 2011. Then, after all exchanges between the
district court and Locklear had occurred, the government’s
counsel stated, “I think [Locklear] is incompetent.”
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Even so, on appeal, the government attempts to establish
that there was a genuine question concerning Locklear’s
competency after the August and September 2011 hearing. And it
goes to great lengths to explain how certain of Locklear’s
answers to the district court’s questions suggest that he may be
competent. We need not, however, address each instance in the
record that, according to the government, indicates Locklear’s
potential competence. Suffice it to say that it is clear this
was not the district court’s belief after having heard from
Locklear. Moreover, it was not the reason given by the district
court in the September 2011 order for remanding Locklear to FMC
Butner for further evaluation.
In that order, although the district court directed that
Locklear “receive further evaluation regarding competency to
proceed to trial,” the court justified its decision by stating
that “given the nature of the crimes for which [Locklear] has
been indicted and the fact that more than seven months have
elapsed since [Locklear’s] potential for dangerousness to the
community has been evaluated, it would be inappropriate to
release [Locklear] from custody at this time.”
In sum, in light of the district court’s comment at the
hearing on September 2, 2011, that Locklear was incompetent, as
well as the purpose that it gave for remanding Locklear for
further evaluation, we are unpersuaded that the district court
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remanded Locklear to FMC Butner for the purpose of reevaluating
his competency to stand trial. We reject the government’s
arguments to the contrary. But to the extent that the district
court did so without support in the record or any explanation,
such decision was an abuse of discretion.
B.
Section 4246 provides, in relevant part, the following:
If the director of a facility in which a person is
hospitalized certifies that a person in the custody of
the Bureau of Prisons . . . who has been committed to
the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to
section 4241(d), . . . is presently suffering from a
mental disease or defect as a result of which his
release would create a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another person or serious damage to property
of another, . . . he shall transmit the certificate to
the clerk of the court for the district in which the
person is confined.
18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). “[N]oncompliance with th[is] statute is
not a mere technicality—it is directly contrary to Congress’[s]
command.” United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 487 (4th
Cir. 1987).
Thus, without a certificate from the director of FMC Butner
providing that Locklear “is presently suffering from a mental
disease or defect as a result of which his release would create
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
damage to property of another,” § 4246(a), the district court
was without authority to have Locklear held simply because he is
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not of the same opinion as the doctors charged with making that
determination. But this appears to be what the district court
attempted to do, as evidenced by its statement toward the end of
the hearing on September 2, 2011. Specifically, the district
court told Locklear’s counsel that he was “not comfortable” with
releasing Locklear right away and that he did not “accept the
Butner findings.”
But it is not the province of the district court to make
that decision in the first instance. Instead, as previously
noted, Congress has conferred that authority only upon the
director of FMC Butner. See id. Yet, the director of FMC
Butner has refused to make the requisite certification, despite
two opportunities to do so.
The government does not argue to the contrary. In fact,
although acknowledging that it adopted a different approach in
the court below, it appears now to agree that the district court
had no authority to remand Locklear for a third time to be
reevaluated for civil commitment pursuant to § 4246. We agree
and, for that reason, will reverse and remand.
III.
Wherefore, for the reasons stated above, the district
court’s denial of Locklear’s motion for immediate release is
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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