United States v. Charles Washington , 457 F. App'x 346 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4427
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES DENARD WASHINGTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:10-cr-00294-NCT-1)
Submitted: November 10, 2011 Decided: December 15, 2011
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Robert A. J. Lang,
Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Denard Washington appeals his conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On appeal, Washington contends that
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence produced during what he claims was an illegal seizure
of his person by police officers. He argues that his detention
violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not supported by a
reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity.
We affirm.
This court reviews for clear error the factual
findings underlying a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress and the court’s legal conclusions de novo. United
States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When
evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, the Court
construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, the prevailing party below. Id.Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
may stop a person for investigative purposes when the officer
has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that
criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Whether
there is reasonable suspicion to justify the stop depends on the
totality of the circumstances, including the information known
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to the officer and any reasonable inferences to be drawn at the
time of the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8
(1989); Foster, 634 F.3d at 246. The reasonable suspicion
determination is a “commonsensical proposition,” and deference
should be accorded to police officers’ determinations based on
their practical experience and training. United States v.
Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th Cir. 2004).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
district court correctly determined that Washington’s seizure
was supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion. When
officers encountered Washington, he was in a known high-crime
area and appeared to be attempting to conceal himself behind a
dumpster. When an officer tried to confront him, he fled and
failed to heed commands to stop. As we have previously stated,
such circumstances, considered in their totality, are sufficient
to support a reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in
criminal activity. See United States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339,
345 (4th Cir. 2010). We find no merit in Washington’s reliance
on the fact that, when taken alone, unprovoked flight or
presence in a high-crime area will not support a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Foreman, 369 F.3d at 782.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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