United States v. Sheldon Hampton , 458 F. App'x 295 ( 2011 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-4590
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    SHELDON HAMPTON, a/k/a Shells,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.    Irene M. Keeley,
    District Judge. (1:10-cr-00066-IMK-JSK-2)
    Submitted:   November 28, 2011            Decided:   December 15, 2011
    Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    William L. Pennington, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant.
    William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney, John C. Parr,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Sheldon Hampton appeals the ninety-two-month sentence
    imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute
    more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than twenty-eight grams
    of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C.A. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1)
    (2006), and tampering with a witness, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1512
    (a)(2)(A) (2006).           Counsel for Hampton filed a brief in
    accordance    with     Anders   v.       California,     
    386 U.S. 738
        (1967),
    questioning     whether     the      district      court       erred      in     denying
    Hampton’s motion for a variant sentence and whether the district
    court   erred     in   imposing      a    sentence      in   the    middle       of   the
    Guidelines range.       Counsel states, however, that he has found no
    meritorious grounds for appeal.                Although notified of his right
    to file a pro se supplemental brief, Hampton did not do so.                            We
    affirm.
    We review a sentence imposed by a district court under
    a   deferential    abuse   of   discretion        standard.        Gall     v.   United
    States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007); United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 575-76 (4th Cir. 2010).              We begin by reviewing the sentence
    for   significant      procedural        error,   including        such    errors     as
    “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
    range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
    the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence
    based   on   clearly    erroneous        facts,    or    failing     to    adequately
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    explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any
    deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    . If
    there are no procedural errors, we then consider the substantive
    reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality
    of the circumstances.           United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 
    597 F.3d 212
    , 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
    “When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must
    make    an    individualized       assessment          based       on     the   facts
    presented.’”     United States v. Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 328 (4th
    Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 50
    ) (emphasis omitted).
    Accordingly,     a    sentencing     court          must   apply        the   relevant
    § 3553(a) factors to the particular facts presented and must
    “‘state in open court’” the particular reasons that support its
    chosen sentence.       Id.    (quoting 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (c) (West 2000
    & Supp. 2011)).       The court’s explanation need not be exhaustive;
    it must be “sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court that the
    district court has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
    reasoned     basis    for    exercising       its    own   legal    decisionmaking
    authority.’”     United States v. Boulware, 
    604 F.3d 832
    , 837 (4th
    Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356
    (2007)) (alterations omitted).
    We conclude that the sentence imposed by the district
    court   was    both     procedurally          and   substantively         reasonable.
    Hampton’s within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable, and
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    there is nothing in the record to rebut that presumption.                                   See
    United    States     v.    Montes-Pineda,             
    445 F.3d 375
    ,       379   (4th   Cir.
    2006)     (“A     defendant           can      only    rebut       the        presumption    by
    demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
    against the § 3553(a) factors.” (internal quotation marks and
    alteration       omitted)).              The     district         court       calculated    the
    Guidelines        range         and     understood          that     it       was    advisory.
    Furthermore, it is apparent that the court had a reasoned basis
    both for denying Hampton’s requested variant sentence and for
    imposing a sentence in the middle of the Guidelines range.                                   The
    court made an individualized statement explaining the sentence
    imposed.     We conclude the sentence was reasonable.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
    and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.                                 We therefore
    affirm the district court’s judgment.                        This court requires that
    counsel inform Hampton, in writing, of the right to petition the
    Supreme     Court    of    the        United    States      for    further       review.      If
    Hampton requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
    that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
    in   this    court        for     leave     to       withdraw      from       representation.
    Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
    Hampton.        We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions        are       adequately       presented         in    the   materials
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    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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