United States v. Byrd , 208 F. App'x 206 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5270
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
SAMUEL DAVIS BYRD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (CR-05-10)
Submitted: October 31, 2006 Decided: December 5, 2006
Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David G. Belser, BELSER & PARKE, P.A., Asheville, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States
Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Samuel Davis Byrd pled guilty to possession of 500 grams
of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000).
Because he had a prior felony drug conviction, Byrd was subject to
an enhanced statutory minimum sentence of ten years. 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 841(b)(1)(B), 851 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006). Byrd appeals his
ten-year sentence, contending that the district court clearly erred
in determining that he did not qualify for a sentence below the
mandatory minimum under the safety valve provision. U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5C1.2 (2005). We affirm.
In December 2004, Byrd was stopped by a state trooper on
the interstate in North Carolina for erratic driving. Byrd was
driving a car that had been rented two days earlier in Charlotte,
North Carolina, but he told the trooper he had been working in Ohio
for several days. Byrd seemed nervous, but not otherwise impaired,
and his story was inconsistent, so the trooper asked to search his
car. When Byrd declined to give his consent, the trooper called
for backup and a drug dog alerted twice on the car. In the trunk
of the car, the trooper discovered four packages of cocaine with a
total weight of 4.03 kilograms. After his guilty plea in May 2005,
Byrd was interviewed by two federal agents in the presence of his
attorney. In the presentence report, the probation officer
recommended a base offense level of 30 under USSG § 2D1.1, and a
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two-level reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(7),1 noting that Byrd
“appear[ed] to meet the criteria set forth in subdivisions (1) -
(5) of § 5C1.2,” the safety valve provision. With a three-level
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, the final offense
level was 25. Byrd was in criminal history category I,2 which gave
him a recommended advisory guideline range of 57-71 months. The
probation officer noted that Byrd was subject to a ten-year
mandatory minimum sentence, but could be sentenced below the
mandatary minimum if he met the five criteria for sentencing under
the safety valve provision.
Neither Byrd nor the government filed objections to the
presentence report. At the sentencing hearing, when Byrd’s
attorney asked the court to clarify whether Byrd qualified for a
sentence under the safety valve provision, the government asserted
that Byrd did not qualify because he had not given a complete and
truthful statement of all information he had concerning the offense
to comply with the fifth criteria.
1
The probation officer cited § 2D1.1(b)(6) because he used the
2004 Guidelines Manual in preparing the presentence report. When
Byrd was sentenced in December 2005, the 2005 Guidelines Manual
applied. See USSG § 1B1.11.
2
Byrd did not receive any criminal history points for the 1994
felony drug conviction. The conviction was over ten years old, and
Byrd’s sentence of six months confinement apparently concluded more
than ten years before the instant offense occurred. See USSG
§ 4A1.2(e).
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The government reminded the court that Byrd’s offense
involved his possession of four kilograms of cocaine in a bag in
the trunk of his car, and that Byrd initially claimed the bag was
not his, although Byrd had the key for the locked bag on his
person. In his interview with the agents following his guilty
plea, Byrd said he did not know who the cocaine in his trunk came
from or where it was going.
The government then informed the court that Byrd was
stopped on the interstate near Spartanburg, South Carolina, six
months earlier, in July 2004, for driving too closely to another
car. Because Byrd and the driver of the other car gave conflicting
accounts of why they were traveling together, Byrd’s car was
searched and a bag containing $22,000 in cash was found in the
trunk of his car. Byrd denied ownership or knowledge of the
money.3 The government pointed out that Byrd’s conduct in the
instant offense was similar.
At the court’s request, Matt Barden, one of the Drug
Enforcement Administration agents who had interviewed Byrd,
testified. He said that Byrd told them he simply received
information in a cell phone call about where to pick up the car and
where to drop it off, but that “he had absolutely no idea who it
was that he dropped the car off to, [or] how to get a hold of
3
Byrd was not charged with any crime in connection with this
incident.
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them.” Barden said that was not how the dope business was
conducted currently. Barden said he and the other agent thought it
highly unlikely that Byrd would be transporting four kilograms of
cocaine worth about $80,000, but would be unable to provide any
names (even nicknames) or telephone numbers for the people who told
him to pick up the drugs or the people to whom he intended to
deliver the drugs, even though Byrd possessed several cell phones
and pagers when he was arrested. Barden testified that he did not
believe Byrd had provided all the information he had concerning the
offense.
The district court made the following findings:
After considering the evidence presented about the
circumstances involved in the case, the stop, the amount
of drugs involved, the common practice in the drug
business described by the agent, the value of the drugs,
the circumstances under which the defendant related to
the officers how the drugs were obtained, the distances
traveled and so forth, the Court finds that the defendant
has not, in fact, complied with the limitation or
applicability of statutory minimum sentences in certain
cases set out in Section 5C1.2 . . . and as a result
thereof, the sentence to be imposed is the statutory
minimum of 120 months.
To qualify for a reduced sentence under § 5C1.2, a
defendant must truthfully disclose to the government all
information and evidence he has concerning the offense of
conviction and all relevant conduct. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(f)(5)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2006); USSG § 5C1.2(a)(5). The defendant is
obliged to reveal “all he knows concerning both his own involvement
and that of any co-conspirators.” United States v. Ivester, 75
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F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1996). Further, the defendant has the
burden of showing that he has affirmatively acted to supply
truthful information to the government. Id. at 185. The
sentencing court’s decision is a factual finding reviewed for clear
error. United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429, 432 (4th Cir. 1997).
Byrd argues first that the government waived its right to
challenge the applicability of the safety valve provision by
failing to file an objection to the presentence report, which
stated that Byrd appeared to qualify for a sentence under § 5C1.2.
Rule 32(f)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that, “[w]ithin 14 days after receiving the presentence report, the
parties must state in writing any objections, including objections
to material information, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy
statements, contained in or omitted from the report.”4 Because
Byrd did not raise this issue at sentencing, our review is for
plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993)
(unpreserved error may be corrected only if error occurred, that
was plain, and that affects substantial rights, and if failure to
correct error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings).
The sentencing court’s consideration of sentencing
enhancements raised by the government in an untimely manner
4
This requirement was added in a 1995 amendment to Rule 32.
See United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 914 n.4 (4th Cir. 1995).
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violates Rule 32. United States v. Soto-Beniquez, 356 F.3d 1, 52
(1st Cir. 2003). The error may be cured if the court grants a
continuance to allow the defendant to respond to the government’s
late objection. Id.; see also United States v. Young, 140 F.3d
453, 457 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding no error where government asserted
error four days before sentencing, district court directed
preparation of revised presentence report, and parties were
afforded fourteen days to object to revised presentence report);
United States v. Ellis, 975 F.2d 1061, 1066 (4th Cir. 1992)
(similar local rule was substantially complied with where defense
counsel had notice of government’s objections before sentencing).
If the error is not preserved, it may not meet the test for plain
error if the basis for the enhancement is so obvious that the
sentencing cannot be deemed a miscarriage of justice. Soto-
Beniquez, 356 F.3d at 53 (holding that government’s late argument
for firearm enhancement was no surprise in light of trial
testimony).
The government asserts that it did not object to the
presentence report because the probation officer “stated only that
Defendant ‘may’ be entitled to such relief [under the safety
valve], leaving the final determination to the court.” Thus,
“[t]here was no finding to which the Government needed to object
. . . .” In taking this position, the government ignores the fact
that it did not agree with the probation officer’s recommendation
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that Byrd receive a two-level reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(6) because
he appeared to meet the requirements set out in § 5C1.2.5
However, at sentencing Byrd did not ask for a continuance
so that he could prepare a response or schedule another interview
with the agents. Moreover, in this appeal, he does not claim that
he was denied the opportunity to provide additional information
that would have made him eligible for a sentence under the safety
valve provision. He argues only that the government waived its
objection by not making it in a timely manner and that the district
court erred in considering the issue at sentencing. Therefore,
while the district court’s consideration of the issue violated Rule
32, and the error is plain, we conclude that it did not violate
Byrd’s substantial rights.
Byrd next contends that the court’s findings were vague
and conclusory. Rule 32(i)(3)(B) requires only that the district
court rule on any disputed matter and append a copy of its
determination to the presentence report. The court complied with
the rule and, taken in context, considering the government’s
argument and the agent’s testimony, the court’s findings were
adequate to explain its reasoning.
Principally, Byrd argues that the court’s finding was
clearly erroneous because the government did not prove that he had
5
In addition, had the government alerted Byrd to its position
before the sentencing hearing, Byrd would have had an opportunity
to reconsider the statement he made to the agents.
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failed to disclose specific information he possessed, but rather
relied on the agent’s hunch that Byrd knew more than he disclosed.
The district court may base its decision concerning the
truthfulness of information provided by a defendant on an agent’s
testimony and “its own credibility assessments.” See United States
v. O’Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 2000). The safety valve
benefit may be denied if the district court determines that the
defendant is not credible, see United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d
631, 636-37 (7th Cir. 2004), or if the defendant refuses to
disclose the source of drugs in his possession. United States v.
Gambino, 106 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (2d Cir. 1997).
In this case, the district court heard evidence that, six
months earlier, Byrd denied any knowledge of $22,000 in cash found
in the trunk of his car. Upon his arrest for possession of four
kilograms of cocaine discovered in the trunk of his car, he first
claimed that the locked bag containing the drugs was not his,
despite having the key to the bag on his key chain. The court
found not credible Byrd’s later claim that he knew he was
transporting drugs, but did not know anyone else involved, and had
no idea how to contact anyone else involved. We are satisfied that
the court’s determination was not clearly erroneous.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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