United States v. Castrellon , 208 F. App'x 211 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4073
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MIGUEL CASTRELLON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:05-cr-00009-2)
Submitted: November 17, 2006 Decided: December 5, 2006
Before MICHAEL and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curium opinion.
Scott Gsell, LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT GSELL, Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney,
Keith Michael Cave, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Miguel Castrellon pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
and to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). The district
court sentenced Castrellon to sixty months in prison. Counsel has
filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), raising one claim but stating that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal. Castrellon was advised of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief, but did not file such a brief. We
affirm.
Castrellon’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered. Further, the record discloses compliance with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11. There was a factual basis for the plea, and
Castrellon readily admitted his guilt. We therefore affirm the
conviction.
Castrellon’s probation officer assigned a base offense
level of 26, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(7)
(2004). Three levels were subtracted for acceptance of
responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1. His total offense level was 23,
and his criminal history category was II. Ordinarily, his
guideline range would have been 51-63 months; however, because of
the statutory minimum five-year sentence to which he was subject,
see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2000), the guideline range became 60-
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63 months. See USSG § 5G1.1. There were no objections to the
presentence report.
At sentencing, the court considered the advisory
guideline range as well as the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). The court sentenced
Castrellon to sixty months in prison. In the Anders brief,
Castrellon contends that the court erred in imposing the statutory
minimum sentence.
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
sentencing courts are no longer bound by the guideline range
prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). Instead, courts must calculate
the appropriate guideline range, consider that range in conjunction
with other relevant factors under the guidelines and § 3553(a), and
impose a sentence. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 456 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). A post-Booker
sentence must be “within the statutorily prescribed range and . . .
reasonable.” Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546-47 (citations omitted). “[A]
sentence imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines range .
. . is presumptively reasonable.” Green, 436 F.3d at 457 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Castrellon was sentenced to the statutory minimum of
sixty months, and the sentence falls within the correctly
calculated guideline range of 60-63 months. Because the district
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court appropriately treated the guidelines as advisory and
considered the guideline range in conjunction with the § 3553(a)
factors in imposing sentence, we conclude that the sentence is
reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm. This court requires counsel to inform his
client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If the client requests that
a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy of the motion was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately set
forth in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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