Parks-El v. Fleming ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-7151
FRANCIS PARKS-EL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
RUFUS FLEMING, Regional Director; SHELLY
ROBERTSON, Treatment of Programs Supervisor;
MICHAEL W. HARRELL, Chaplain; JAMES V. BEALE,
Warden; MARVIN LEE, Major; CHARLES ALLEN,
Assistant Warden of Operation; WILLIETTE
COPELAND, Associate Warden of Programs; DAVID
CLARKE, Operation Officer; CARL E. FLOWERS,
Treatment of Programs Supervisor; SANDRA
BEALE, Institutional Ombudsman; TIMOTHY
DARDEN, Sergeant/Investigator,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:06-cv-00317-JCC)
Submitted: November 22, 2006 Decided: January 10, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Francis Parks-El, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Francis Parks-El appeals from the dismissal of his civil
rights complaint for failure to state a claim under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 804,
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000) (“RLUIPA”), and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have reviewed the record
and find no reversible error in the district court’s dismissal of
Parks-El’s equal protection claim. Accordingly, we affirm the
dismissal of that claim for the reasons stated by the district
court. See Parks-El v. Fleming, No. 1:06-cv-00317-JCC (E.D. Va.
June 13, 2006). With regard to Parks-El’s First Amendment and
RLUIPA claims, we vacate the district court’s dismissal and remand
for further proceedings.*
This court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal
for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)
(2000). Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248 (4th
Cir. 2005) (citing Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir.
2002)). A court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim unless “after accepting all well-pleaded allegations
in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and drawing all reasonable
factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it
*
No part of this opinion should be read as an indication of
our assessment of the merits of Parks-El’s claims, as we conclude
only that they were prematurely dismissed.
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appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in
support of his claim entitling him to relief.” Slade, 407 F.3d at
248 (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th
Cir. 1999)).
Parks-El alleged that on October 18, 2005, he received a
memorandum from Chaplain Michael Harrell, informing Parks-El that
he and another inmate had been suspended from attending all chapel
functions for a period of sixty days. According to the memorandum,
Parks-El was suspended from all chapel services, “including but not
limited to their religious services,” due to his involvement in the
posting of unauthorized flyers in the inmate housing units. The
flyers promoted an unauthorized gathering that had previously been
denied by the Chaplain. Parks-El alleged that he had nothing to do
with the unauthorized posting. Parks-El contends that after he was
told by prison officials that the investigation into the infraction
was ongoing, he was eventually informed by the investigating
officer that the investigation already had been completed by
October 18, 2005, and that Parks-El had been cleared of any
wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the suspension apparently continued
through December 17, 2005. While Parks-El appeared to have
exhausted his available administrative remedies in order to get the
suspension reversed, he was ultimately unsuccessful.
Parks-El contends the suspension prevented him from attending
chapel services during a period that overlapped with Ramadan, the
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Holy Month of Fasting. According to Parks-El, participation in
Ramadan is “a Divine Law from Allah” to which all Muslims must
adhere. However, because of the suspension, Parks-El was prevented
from participating in Ramadan with fellow Muslims in congregational
prayers, specifically the Eid-ul-Fitr prayer, which, Parks-El
asserts, is a “must” for all Muslims because it completes the
period of Ramadan. Parks-El contends that he was thus unable to
properly complete the period of fasting during Ramadan, which is
required for Muslims under the Qur’an.
Section 3 of the RLUIPA provides, in part, that “[n]o
government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution,”
unless the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest,”
and does so by the “least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
1(a). The petitioner has the burden of persuasion as to whether
the government action substantially burdens his exercise of
religion. Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 n.32 (5th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2549 (2005); Civil Liberties for
Urban Believers v. Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003).
Once the petitioner establishes a substantial burden, the
Government bears the burden of persuasion that its practice is in
furtherance of a compelling government interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. Adkins, 393 F.3d at567 n.32.
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The RLUIPA defines the term “religious exercise,” to
include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5(7)(A). The Supreme Court has stated that the “exercise of
religion” includes not only belief and profession, “but the
performance of . . . physical acts [such as] assembling with others
for a worship service [or] participating in sacramental use of
bread and wine.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). In the present case,
it is the act of assembling with others for the purpose of
worshiping together that is the religious exercise at issue, not
merely the act of worship generally. Accordingly, the RLUIPA
analysis in this case must focus on whether the religious practice
of a required congregational prayer was substantially burdened,
rather than on whether Parks-El’s religious profession as a whole
was substantially burdened.
In “substantial burden” determinations, the religious
practice does not have to be mandated by the religion in order for
the burden to be found “substantial,” as the text of the RLUIPA
makes clear. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); see also Adkins, 393 F.3d
at 570 (petitioner has burden of demonstrating that the religious
practice at issue is important to the free exercise of his
religion). However, the fact that a particular practice is in fact
mandated is “surely relevant” to determining whether the burden is
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substantial. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593 (2d Cir. 2003)
(defining “substantial burden” for First Amendment claims). Parks-
El explicitly professes that the Eid-ul-Fitr prayer was central to
his Muslim faith, and he asserts that such prayer had to be
performed congregationally.
Parks-El has identified a specific religious practice,
the congregational Eid-ul-Fitr prayer, and has asserted that he was
unable to perform the prayer because he was barred from the chapel.
Parks-El contended that the prohibition forced him to modify his
religious behavior, as he was unable to perform a required prayer,
and that this constituted a violation of his religious beliefs, as
this prayer is a central requirement of the Muslim faith. See
Adkins, 393 F.3d at 570. Parks-El has alleged that these burdens
are “significant,” as the inability to perform the required prayer
prevented him from properly completing his observance of Ramadan.
Id. After reviewing Parks-El’s complaint and drawing all
reasonable factual inferences in his favor, and in light of the
standards imposed for review of civil rights complaints submitted
by pro se petitioners, we find that Parks-El has alleged sufficient
facts to withstand summary dismissal of his RLUIPA claim and, by
extension, his free exercise claim, to which the district court
applied the same analysis.
In sum, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Parks-El’s equal protection claim, vacate the dismissal of his
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RLUIPA and free exercise claims, and remand for further
proceedings. We also deny Parks-El’s “Motion for Production of
Document.” We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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