United States v. Williamson ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4370
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MAURICE ALEXANDER WILLIAMSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:05-cr-00136-NCT)
Submitted: November 30, 2006 Decided: January 16, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Angela H.
Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maurice Alexander Williamson appeals the district court’s
order revoking his supervised release and imposing a twelve-month
term of imprisonment. On appeal Williamson argues that there was
insufficient evidence to support the district court’s determination
that he had violated a term of his supervised release, that his
sentence was unreasonable, and that the district court judge erred
in failing to recuse himself from the proceedings after a
Government witness allegedly died in chambers. Finding no error,
we affirm.
While on supervised release, Williamson entered an
Alford* plea to misdemeanor breaking and entering charges on
August 8, 2005, in Rockingham County, North Carolina Superior
Court, which served as the basis for the revocation proceeding.
Williamson contends that there was insufficient evidence to support
the district court’s conclusion that he violated his terms of
supervision by breaking and entering. At the revocation hearing,
he contended, through counsel, that, although he admitted to the
conviction, he was not the person involved in the breaking and
entering for which he was convicted. He argues that he only
entered an Alford plea so that he would not be charged as a
habitual felon.
*
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
- 2 -
This court reviews a district court’s revocation of
supervised release for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1995). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the court fails or refuses to exercise its discretion
or when its exercise of discretion is flawed by an erroneous legal
or factual premise. James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir.
1993). The district court need only find a violation of a
condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2000). Factual determinations
informing the conclusion that a violation occurred are reviewed for
clear error. See United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019
(8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Whalen, 82 F.3d 528, 532 (1st
Cir. 1996). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence,
including the testimony of the responding police officer and
Williamson’s probation officer, to support the court’s conclusion
that Williamson was the person who committed the breaking and
entering offense, upon which the supervised release violation was
based.
Next, Williamson suggests that the sentence imposed by
the district court after revoking his supervised release was unduly
harsh. Williamson does not assert any error in the district
court’s application of the guidelines in determining the advisory
sentencing range. In United States v. Crudup, this court held that
“revocation sentences should be reviewed to determine whether they
- 3 -
are ‘plainly unreasonable’ with regard to those § 3553(a) factors
applicable to supervised release revocation sentences.” 461 F.3d
433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). Applying the analysis articulated in
Crudup, we find that Williamson’s sentence for violating supervised
release is not unreasonable, much less plainly unreasonable.
As correctly noted by the district court, the advisory
guideline range for Williamson’s violation was eight to fourteen
months for a Grade C violation with an original criminal history
category of VI. USSG § 7B1.4(a). Williamson’s prior conviction
for mailing threatening communications was a Class C felony, so the
statutory maximum sentence on revocation of supervised release
imposed for that offense was twenty-four months. 18 U.S.C. §§ 876,
3559(a)(3), 3583(e) (2000). Williamson’s twelve-month sentence was
thus within the statutory maximum. Moreover, the district court
sufficiently articulated its sentencing deliberations to
demonstrate that it did not abuse its discretion in selecting the
term of imprisonment.
Finally, Williamson alleges that the district court judge
should have recused himself from the proceedings after witnessing
the death of a Government witness, Bronchia Bethal, in chambers.
Because Williamson did not raise this issue below it is reviewed
for plain error. United States v. Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336, 339 (4th
Cir. 2002).
- 4 -
A judge must recuse himself or herself where the party
seeking recusal files a timely and sufficient affidavit stating the
judge has a personal bias or prejudice either against the affiant
or in favor of an adverse party, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2000), or where
his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 (2000). However, because Williamson cannot show any evidence
that the district court blamed him for the witness’s death or
otherwise held an extra-judicial bias, the court properly rejected
the argument in the instant case. See Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion . . . .
[T]hey . . . can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the
degree of favoritism or antagonism required [to make fair judgment
impossible] . . . when no extrajudicial source is involved.”
(citation omitted)); Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir.
1984) (“[a]lleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem
from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits
on some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case.”). Therefore, the district court judge
did not err in failing to recuse himself from Williamson’s
revocation proceedings.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
revoking Williamson’s supervised release and imposing a
twelve-month sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
- 5 -
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 6 -