United States v. Sylvester , 232 F. App'x 303 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4851
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ALAN SYLVESTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (1:04-
cr-00156-JFM)
Submitted: May 30, 2007 Decided: July 9, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Fred Warren Bennett, Gary E. Bair, BENNETT & BAIR, LLP, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Richard C. Kay, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alan Sylvester appeals his conviction and sentence for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more
of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846
(2000). As a result of his conviction and prior criminal history,
Sylvester received a mandatory sentence of life in prison pursuant
to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000). On appeal, Sylvester contends
that: (1) the district court erred in refusing to strike a juror
for cause; (2) the district court erred by admitting testimony
regarding events outside of the period charged in the indictment;
(3) the district court plainly erred by incorrectly instructing the
jury as to the charged dates of the conspiracy; (4) his life
sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment; and (5) the district court erred by increasing his
sentence based on prior convictions that had not been proven to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Finding no error, we affirm.
I
Sylvester contends that the district court should have
dismissed juror 163 for cause after that juror disclosed that his
stepdaughter was on probation for possession of crack cocaine. A
trial judge’s decision on whether to remove a juror for cause will
not be overruled except for a “manifest abuse of discretion.”
Poynter v. Ratcliff, 874 F.2d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 1989). A district
court’s determination to excuse a juror for cause is entitled to
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“special deference.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984).
The critical issue in deciding a challenge for cause is whether the
juror “could be fair and impartial and decide the case on the facts
and law presented.” United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1105
(4th Cir. 1995). A challenge to a juror for cause is usually
limited to demonstrations of actual bias, with the doctrine of
implied bias applying only to “extreme situations” where the
circumstances make it highly unlikely that the average person could
remain impartial. United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 117 (4th
Cir. 2004).
Sylvester first argues that this court should adopt a per
se rule of disqualification when a juror or close family member has
been convicted of the same crime as the one at issue in the trial.
However, this court has noted its resistance to “manage jury
selection from the court of appeals through promulgating rules of
automatic disqualification.” Turner, 389 F.3d at 115. Sylvester
has failed to present a persuasive argument that a per se rule of
disqualification should now be crafted by this court.
Even without a per se rule, Sylvester contends it was
clear that the juror could not be impartial, as the juror was at
first unsure as to his own impartiality and there was a “very
strong likelihood of implied bias” under the circumstances.
However, this assertion is not supported by the record, as the
juror simply answered “I don’t think [so]” when the district court
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inquired as to whether his impartiality would be affected. When
the juror was subsequently asked if he had any question as to
whether he could be fair and impartial, he unequivocally answered
“no.” In light of the juror’s answers, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in seating the juror.
II
Sylvester next asserts that the district court erred by
admitting testimony regarding criminal acts that occurred outside
of the period charged in the indictment. A district court’s
determination of the admissibility of evidence under Fed. R. Evid.
404(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1997). Evidence of other crimes
is not admissible to prove bad character or criminal propensity.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence is admissible, however, to
prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. Rule 404(b) is
inclusive, allowing evidence of other crimes or acts except that
which tends to prove only criminal disposition. Queen, 132 F.3d at
994-95; United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir.
1988). Evidence of prior acts is admissible under Rules 404(b) and
403 if the evidence is: (1) relevant to an issue other than the
general character of the defendant, (2) necessary, (3) reliable,
and (4) if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Queen, 132 F.3d at 997.
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At trial, Sylvester objected to testimony provided by
Kevin Miller, who stated that he had taught Sylvester how to
manufacture crack cocaine, and that he personally saw Sylvester
cook crack cocaine at some point in 2000 or 2001. The district
court allowed the testimony to be admitted into evidence,
concluding that the statements related to Sylvester’s “knowledge.”
Sylvester contends that Miller’s statements constituted evidence of
prior bad acts under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) that were not relevant to
an element of the offense. Sylvester notes that the indictment
charged him with being involved in a drug conspiracy that occurred
between June 2002 and June 2003, but that Miller’s testimony
regarded events that occurred, at the latest, in 2001. Sylvester
contends that Miller’s testimony was not relevant or necessary to
demonstrate knowledge, and that, in fact, knowledge was not in
dispute.
Despite Sylvester’s claim that knowledge was not disputed
in this case, there is no evidence in the record to support such an
assertion. Knowledge and intent are “clearly elements which the
prosecution must establish to prove a conspiracy to violate 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),” and Sylvester placed these elements at issue
by entering a plea of not guilty. United States v. Mark, 943 F.2d
444, 448 (4th Cir. 1991). Additionally, the extrinsic act evidence
was relevant to the charged offense. Miller’s testimony
corroborated the accounts provided by other witnesses and was
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directly relevant to Sylvester’s knowledge regarding the
manufacturing of crack cocaine for sale, which was an integral
element of the conspiracy charge in this case. See Mark, 943 F.2d
at 448; see also United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 312 (4th
Cir. 2004). We conclude that the evidence was both relevant and
necessary, and the district court did not err in admitting the
testimony under Rule 404(b).*
III
On appeal, Sylvester challenges for the first time the
district court’s instructions to the jury at the close of his case
regarding the length of the conspiracy. The court erroneously
stated that the charged conspiracy was alleged “to have lasted at
least from [o]n or about June 2000 and continuously thereafter up
to and including June 2003.” When no objection is made to a jury
instruction, this court reviews the claim for plain error. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32
(1993). Four conditions must be met before this court will notice
*
Sylvester also claims that he was unfairly prejudiced by the
admission of this testimony, as there was no limiting instruction
and the district court incorrectly stated during jury instructions
that the conspiracy was charged as having begun in June 2000.
While the district court does not appear to have given a limiting
instruction, the court did tell the jury in its closing
instructions that Sylvester was “not on trial for any act or
conduct not alleged in the indictment.” Additionally, as explained
infra, the district court’s misstatement as to the dates of the
conspiracy does not amount to plain error, and any prejudice that
did result has not been shown to outweigh the probative value of
Miller’s testimony.
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plain error: (1) there must be error; (2) it must be plain under
current law; (3) it must affect substantial rights, typically
meaning the defendant is prejudiced by the error in that it
affected the outcome of the proceedings; and (4) the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings. Id. at 733-37.
Both Sylvester and the Government agree that while no
objection was lodged at the time of the instructions, there was an
error by the trial court. However, Sylvester has failed to carry
his burden in demonstrating that this error affected the outcome of
the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. The court provided the
jury with a copy of the indictment that provided the correct dates,
and the jury was given accurate information as to the temporal
scope of the conspiracy at other points during the trial.
Therefore, Sylvester has failed to demonstrate that the district
court plainly erred by its isolated misstatement regarding the
relevant dates of the conspiracy.
IV
Sylvester argues that his sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)
violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment. In determining whether a sentence is proportional to
the offense, three factors are considered: (1) the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed
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on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
United States v. Kratsas, 45 F.3d 63, 66 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)).
Despite Sylvester’s arguments to the contrary, we find
that his sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.
Sylvester was not simply a drug user, but rather was part of an
interstate drug distribution network that brought cocaine in from
New York in order to produce crack cocaine for sale in Maryland.
Additionally, Sylvester received a mandatory life sentence not only
because of the large drug quantity involved, but also because he
was a repeat offender, with two prior felony drug convictions on
his record. Based on these factors, Sylvester was subject to a
mandatory life sentence; however, “the mere fact that the life
sentence was mandatorily imposed does not render it ‘cruel and
unusual.’” Kratsas, 45 F.3d at 69. As to the second and third
prongs of the Solem test, this court has previously held that a
life sentence for a major drug violation is not disproportionate in
comparison with other sentences under the Guidelines or sentences
imposed by states within this Circuit. See id. at 68; see also
United States v. D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 613 (4th Cir. 1994).
Therefore, we find that Sylvester’s sentence is not
constitutionally disproportionate to his crimes.
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V
Sylvester’s final argument is that the district court
violated his Sixth Amendment rights by basing his sentence on prior
convictions that were not determined by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. However, the fact of a prior conviction need not
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224, 233-36, 243-44 (1998); United States v.
Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 351-54 (4th Cir.) (reaffirming continuing
validity of Almendarez-Torres after United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 640 (2005).
Additionally, this court has ruled that the nature and occasion of
prior offenses are facts inherent in the convictions and that the
government is not required to allege prior convictions in the
indictment or submit proof of them to a jury. See United States v.
Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 285-87 (4th Cir. 2005). Therefore, we hold
that the district court did not err in using Sylvester’s prior
convictions in calculating his sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm Sylvester’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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