United States v. Terrance Richardson ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4719
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE RICHARDSON, a/k/a Squeaky, a/k/a L-Don, a/k/a Don,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-4825
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GREGORY SAULSBURY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:09-cr-00288-WDQ-1; 1:09-cr-00288-WDQ-26)
Submitted: September 6, 2011 Decided: January 6, 2012
Before KING, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. James Roos, III, Towson, Maryland; Stephanie Gallagher, LEVIN
& GALLAGHER LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Antonio J. Reynolds,
Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Terrance Richardson and Gregory Saulsbury appeal their
convictions following a jury trial. The jury found Richardson
guilty of conspiracy to participate in a racketeering
enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006), and
conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to
distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006). The district court sentenced
Richardson to life on each count. Saulsbury was found guilty of
conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to
distribute controlled substances, and was also sentenced to
life. We affirm.
On appeal, Richardson argues that the district court
violated his rights by qualifying a police officer to provide
expert testimony on the history, symbols, language, structure
and operation of the Bloods gang. Because Richardson did not
offer any specific grounds for his objection to the officer’s
certification as an expert, the court reviews this claim for
plain error. United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 157 & n.10
(4th Cir. 2006). To succeed on this claim, Richardson must
establish: “(1) error; (2) that is ‘clear or obvious, rather
than subject to reasonable dispute’; (3) that affected
substantial rights, ‘which in the ordinary case means . . . that
it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings’; and
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(4) that ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Byers,
649 F.3d 197, 213 (4th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original)
(quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S. Ct.
1423, 1429 (2009)).
The record belies Richardson’s claim that the officer
was unqualified to testify as an expert on the Bloods. The
officer testified to ten years’ experience as a police officer,
four years’ experience focused on gang investigations, extensive
training on gang crime and its investigation, and numerous
contacts with members of the Bloods. The record supports the
district court’s qualification of the officer as an expert
witness, and Richardson is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Richardson also contends that the district court erred
in denying his motion for a new trial that was based on his
claim that the Government violated his rights under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing evidence about
payments to a witness. Suppression does not occur “[a]s long as
evidence is disclosed before it is too late for the defendant to
make effective use of it.” United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d
1098, 1112 (4th Cir. 1992). Moreover, the volume and nature of
the evidence against Richardson precludes a finding that earlier
disclosure would create a reasonable probability of a different
result, undermining confidence in the trial. Lovitt v. True,
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403 F.3d 171, 183 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)). Because no Brady violation exists, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion for a new trial. United States v. Stokes,
261 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001). 1
Finally, Saulsbury contends the district court abused
its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior convictions.
The Court reviews the admission of evidence under an abuse of
discretion standard, reversing only where the decision to admit
evidence was “arbitrary or irrational.” United States v.
Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 2002). The Federal Rules of
Evidence forbid the admission of evidence of previous crimes “in
order to show action in conformity therewith,” but allow such
evidence “for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
Evidence of prior distribution-related drug offenses
can be relevant to establish knowing, voluntary, and intentional
membership in a conspiracy to distribute drugs. United States
v. Mark, 943 F.2d 444, 448 (4th Cir. 1991). Saulsbury put these
elements “directly in issue by his plea of not guilty.” Id.1
We grant Richardson’s motion to file a supplemental pro se
brief, but find no merit in his additional contentions.
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The prosecutor merely read a summary of the convictions to the
jury at the end of the Government’s case. Under the
circumstances, the probative value of Saulsbury’s prior
convictions was not “substantially outweighed by confusion or
unfair prejudice in the sense that [they tended] to subordinate
reason to emotion in the factfinding process.” 2 United States v.
Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997). Moreover, we would
affirm even if error existed because, in the context of the
trial of a whole, the evidence of Saulsbury’s prior convictions
“did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on
the result.” United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 299 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
2
To the extent Saulsbury relies on the district court’s
failure to give a limiting instruction contemporaneously, such
failure is not reversible error where, as here, counsel failed
to request the instruction be given contemporaneously rather
than during the instruction phase. Mark, 943 F.2d at 449 & n.2.
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