United States v. Terry , 251 F. App'x 808 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4258
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHAD TERRY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 07-4300
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BRANDY RENEE DOWELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Chief District
Judge; Glen M. Williams, Senior District Judge.
(1:01-cr-00008-jpj; 1:03-cr-00092-gmw)
Submitted: August 27, 2007 Decided: October 24, 2007
Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Nancy C. Dickenson,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Christine Madeleine Spurell,
Research and Writing Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellants.
John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Zachary T. Lee, Assistant
United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -
PER CURIAM:
Chad Terry and Brandy Renee Dowell (“Appellants”) were
both sentenced to two years of imprisonment following their guilty
pleas to violating supervised release. On appeal, we granted the
Appellants’ unopposed motion to consolidate. Appellants argue that
their sentences, which are above the advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range but within the statutory maximum, constitute reversible
error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We do not find that Appellants’ two-year sentences are
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437
(4th Cir. 2006) (providing review standard), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 1813 (2007). Although neither district court specifically
discussed by name the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors applicable to
supervised release sentences, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), both courts
gave reasons for the sentences that fit within factors outlined in
§ 3553(a). In short, both courts explained sufficiently why the
defendants were given sentences outside their advisory sentencing
ranges. See United States v. Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (2007)
(noting that “[w]here a [sentencing] matter is . . . conceptually
simple” and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge
considered the evidence and arguments, “we do not believe the law
requires the judge to write more extensively”); United States v.
Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating district court
need not “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection” or
- 3 -
“explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record”)
(internal quotation and citations omitted)).
Accordingly, we affirm the sentences. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 4 -