United States v. Dawson , 259 F. App'x 578 ( 2007 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-4369
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    RONALD DAWSON, a/k/a Tree,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, Chief
    District Judge. (5:06-cr-00061-FL)
    Submitted:   December 20, 2007          Decided:    December 26, 2007
    Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
    Hayes, Banumathi Rangarajan, Assistant United States Attorneys,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Ronald   Dawson   was   convicted    on   a   guilty   plea   to
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
    U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2000).           The district court sentenced
    Dawson to 120 months in prison and a three-year term of supervised
    release.   Dawson appeals his conviction and sentence, asserting
    that the district court erred in sentencing him based on an
    improper factor, and that his conviction and sentence violated the
    Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.                We
    affirm.
    In imposing a sentence after United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005), a court still must calculate the applicable
    guideline range after making the appropriate findings of fact, and
    consider the range in conjunction with other relevant factors under
    the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
    United States v. Moreland, 
    437 F.3d 424
    , 432 (4th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2054
    (2006).        This court will affirm a post-
    Booker sentence if it “is within the statutorily prescribed range
    and is reasonable.”     
    Id. at 433 (internal
    quotation marks and
    citation omitted).     “[A] sentence within the proper advisory
    [g]uidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”         United States v.
    Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 341 (4th Cir. 2006); see Rita v. United
    States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2462-69 (2007) (upholding application of
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    rebuttable      presumption      of   reasonableness     to    within-guidelines
    sentence).
    The     district       court     sentenced     Dawson       only   after
    considering      and    examining     the   sentencing    guidelines      and   the
    § 3553(a) factors, as instructed by Booker, and stated that the
    sentence it imposed was based on Dawson’s extensive criminal
    record, lack of significant legitimate employment history, and
    history of probation revocation.             Dawson’s 120-month sentence is
    within the properly calculated advisory guideline range and does
    not exceed the ten-year statutory maximum authorized by 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(a)(2) (2000).         Dawson does not suggest any information so
    compelling    as   to    rebut    the   presumption     that   his   sentence    is
    reasonable. We therefore conclude that the sentence is reasonable.
    Dawson’s final claim, that his federal conviction should
    be vacated because he was prosecuted for the same conduct in state
    court, allegedly in violation of his rights secured by the Double
    Jeopardy Clause, is without merit. As Dawson himself acknowledges,
    this claim is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit
    precedents applying the duel sovereign doctrine.                 See Bartkus v.
    Illinois, 
    359 U.S. 121
    , 128-29 (1959); United States v. Alvarado,
    
    440 F.3d 191
    , 196-97 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 81
    (2006).
    Accordingly, we affirm Dawson’s conviction and sentence.
    We   dispense    with    oral    argument    because     the   facts    and   legal
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    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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