United States v. Cartagena , 279 F. App'x 265 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-5006
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SALVADOR ANTONIO CARTAGENA, a/k/a Salvador Antonio Cartagena-
Carias,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(1:07-cr-00157-MBS)
Submitted: April 30, 2008 Decided: May 21, 2008
Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Langdon D. Long, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Aileen P.
Clare, Research and Writing Specialist, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Anne
Hunter Young, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Salvador Antonio Cartagena appeals his forty-six-month
sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to knowingly and
unlawfully reentering the United States after having been deported
subsequent to a conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), (b)(2) (2000). Finding no error, we affirm.
Cartagena asserts that his sentence was procedurally
erroneous because the district court failed to explain the reasons
for the sentence imposed on the record and did not give reasons for
overruling his objections to a sixteen-level enhancement under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006), for having
a prior felony conviction, and denying his proposed sentence.
However, there is no such procedural requirement. The district
court’s explanation of the sentence imposed should provide some
indication that it considered the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000
& Supp. 2007) factors and the potentially meritorious arguments
raised by the parties at sentencing. United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 3044 (2007).
Here, the district court clearly considered both the
statutory factors and the arguments of the parties. The court did
not overrule the objection without comment. Further, the court
stated that it considered the arguments of counsel, the advisory
guidelines range, and the relevant statutory factors and 18
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U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) in fashioning the sentence. The suggestion of
a specific sentence by the defendant does not place any further
requirements on the district court. Accordingly, there was no
procedural error.
Next, Cartagena contends that the district court’s
sentence was greater than necessary to comply with the statutory
sentencing goals set forth in § 3553. Specifically, Cartagena
asserts that the aggravated felony relied on to impose the
sixteen-level enhancement was a relatively minor offense committed
fifteen years prior to sentencing and there was no violence or
international drug trade involved. Cartagena also argues that he
will suffer a significant non-criminal penalty--deportation--in
addition to the 46-month term of imprisonment.
This court will affirm a sentence so long as it is within
the statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable. United
States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005).
Reasonableness review focuses on whether the district court abused
its discretion. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th
Cir. 2007). When sentencing a defendant, the district court must
(1) properly calculate the guideline range, (2) determine whether
a sentence within that range serves the § 3553(a) factors in light
of the arguments presented by the parties; (3) implement mandatory
statutory limitations; and (4) explain its reasons for selecting a
sentence. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596-97
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(2007). Even if the reviewing court would have reached a different
sentencing result on its own, this fact alone is insufficient to
justify reversal of the district court. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 474.
Here, the district court properly calculated the
guideline range and determined that a sentence at the bottom of
that range would serve the § 3553(a) factors. The district court
considered the 1992 drug conviction and was aware of the issue of
deportation. Based on the record as a whole, the district court
properly considered all the factors and arguments in arriving at
its sentence. Thus, there was simply no abuse of discretion.
We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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