National League of Junior Cotillions, Inc. v. Porter , 280 F. App'x 322 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1870
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF JUNIOR COTILLIONS, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTY D. PORTER; COLORADO JUNIOR COTILLION, LLC,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (3:06-cv-508-RJC-CH)
Submitted: May 28, 2008 Decided: June 6, 2008
Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael W. Reagor, PETERSON DYMOND REAGOR LLP, Greenwood Village,
Colorado, for Appellants. William E. Moore, Jr., GRAY, LAYTON,
KERSH, SOLOMON, SIGMON, FURR & SMITH, PA, Gastonia, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
National League of Junior Cotillions, Incorporated
(“NLJC”) filed a civil action against Christy Porter (“Porter”) and
the Colorado Junior Cotillion (“CJC”) alleging a breach of the
parties’ licensing agreement (“Agreement”) and related claims. The
district court granted NLJC’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
finding that Porter’s CJC activities in a neighboring county likely
violated the non-compete clause of the Agreement. On appeal,
Porter and CJC allege that the Agreement is too ambiguous to be
enforced and therefore the court erred by granting NLJC’s motion
for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
In North Carolina covenants not to compete are
enforceable. A.E.P. v. Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 302 S.E.2d 754,
761 (N.C. 1983); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 584 S.E.2d 328, 333-34 (N.C.
App. 2003). Construing the contract as a whole, State v. Corl, 293
S.E.2d 264, 267 (N.C. App. 1982), and giving the language at issue
its normal and common usage, Marcoin, Inc. v. McDaniel, 320 S.E.2d
892, 897 (N.C. App. 1984), we find the district court’s
interpretation of the non-compete clause supportable. Thus, we
find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to
grant the preliminary injunction in light of the likely breach of
the Agreement. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1055 (4th Cir. 1985) (providing review
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standard for preliminary injunction); see Direx Israel, Ltd.
v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812-14 (4th Cir. 1991)
(discussing factors to consider when ruling on motion for
preliminary injunction).
Accordingly, we affirm. We grant NLJC’s motion to submit
on briefs and dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. We
deny as moot NLJC’s motion for summary disposition.
AFFIRMED
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