United States v. Singletary , 293 F. App'x 188 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-5000
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
AURIS GEROD SINGLETARY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:06-cr-00194-MJP)
Submitted: September 11, 2008 Decided: September 15, 2008
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
D. Craig Brown, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Stanley
Duane Ragsdale, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Auris Gerod Singletary appeals his jury conviction and
120-month sentence for unlawful possession of 500 grams or more of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (2000). Counsel
for Singletary has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), alleging that he has found no meritorious
issues for appeal, but stating as a possible ground the district
court’s denial of Singletary’s motion to suppress cocaine found in
the door panel of the rental vehicle Singletary was driving at the
time he was detained for speeding on a South Carolina highway.
Singletary has filed a pro se supplemental brief asserting the same
ground for relief, and the Government has declined to file a
responsive brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
We reject Singletary’s assertion that the district court
erroneously denied his motion to suppress. This court reviews the
factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See United States
v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2005). The evidence is
construed in the light most favorable to the Government, the
prevailing party below. See United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d
542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
First, we find that police lawfully stopped Singletary
for speeding; observation of any traffic violation, no matter how
minor, gives an officer probable cause to stop the driver. See
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United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993). A
routine and lawful traffic stop permits an officer to detain the
motorist to request a driver's license and vehicle registration, to
run a computer check, and to issue a citation. See United States
v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir. 1992). To further detain
the driver requires a reasonable suspicion on the part of the
investigating officer that criminal activity is afoot. See id. at
876-77. We find that police initially detained Singletary for no
longer than was necessary to issue him a warning ticket for his
speeding violation.
We also find that the canine sniff of the rental vehicle
was lawful because it was conducted during the lawful traffic stop
and the canine alerted to unlawful narcotics before entering the
vehicle. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). The
positive dog alert provided probable cause for the ensuing search
of the rental vehicle. See id. Accordingly, we hold that the
district court did not err in denying Singletary’s motion to
suppress the cocaine seized from the rental vehicle.*
We have reviewed the entire record in this case and find
no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel
*
Since we conclude that police had probable cause to search
the rental vehicle, we need not address Singletary’s assertions
that his consent to the search was involuntary or that the search
exceeded the scope of his consent.
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inform Singletary in writing of his right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Singletary
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Singletary. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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