United States v. Sampler ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4102
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENNETH EUGENE SAMPLER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Lynchburg. Norman K. Moon, District
Judge. (6:07-cr-00031-nkm-1)
Argued: January 29, 2010 Decided: March 3, 2010
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Davis joined.
ARGUED: Sidney Harold Kirstein, Lynchburg, Virginia, for
Appellant. Donald Ray Wolthuis, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Julia C.
Dudley, United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, Jean B.
Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Kenneth Eugene Sampler (“Sampler”) appeals his conviction
and sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine on
sufficiency of the evidence and related grounds. He admits
participating in methamphetamine distribution on separate
occasions but claims that this is legally insufficient to
support the jury’s conclusion that he conspired to join a single
distribution conspiracy. We reject each of Sampler’s arguments
and affirm.
I.
In August 2007, a grand jury indicted Sampler on one count
of conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of a mixture or
substance containing methamphetamine, under 21 U.S.C. § 846(2006). The indictment charged several other individuals, none
of whom Sampler had met or even known of prior to his
indictment, and identified several unnamed co-conspirators as
being part of the plot. The government’s theory at trial was
that Sampler was a middleman in a drug-distribution chain, with
a group of Mexican drug dealers based in the Atlanta area at the
top, and the other named co-defendants, mostly low-level
methamphetamine distributors in Virginia, at the bottom. Prior
to trial, Sampler’s co-defendants all pled guilty to their
charges.
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To support its theory, the government introduced the
testimony of two men, Dennis Martin (“Martin”) and Thomas
Jamerson (“Jamerson”), who were arrested shortly after
purchasing methamphetamine from a man named “Oscar” in a
transaction arranged by Sampler in Atlanta. Both testified that
Sampler was paid $5,000.00 for his assistance, which included
arranging a location for the sale and providing transportation
for Martin, Jamerson, and the drugs they purchased. Martin and
Jamerson admitted to frequently driving from Virginia to Atlanta
to purchase methamphetamine, which they would then distribute to
dealers in Virginia. Both testified that they typically would
use Martin’s cousin to find an intermediary who could arrange
the methamphetamine purchase from an upper-level dealer, but
that Sampler had only arranged the transaction immediately
preceding their arrests. Martin testified, however, that he had
discussed potential, future drug transactions with Sampler.
Likewise, Jamerson testified that while he and Sampler were
in jail together following their arrests, Sampler had explained
the process by which he located methamphetamine for the drug buy
and his role in the distribution hierarchy. According to
Jamerson, Sampler described a man named “Carlos” as the head
methamphetamine manufacturer and distributor in Atlanta and
admitted to trafficking significant quantities of
methamphetamine for Carlos to a corrupt federal agent in South
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Carolina. Jamerson also claimed that Sampler told him about his
continuing work with other dealers who worked below Carlos,
including the man from whom Sampler arranged for Martin and
Jamerson to buy methamphetamine.
Sampler took the stand in his own defense. During his
testimony, he admitted to trafficking methamphetamine for Carlos
to South Carolina on at least five separate occasions, as well
as to facilitating the transaction involving Oscar, Martin, and
Jamerson. He insisted, however, that he knew nothing about
Martin and Jamerson’s distributing methamphetamine in Virginia
and that his prior distribution for Carlos in South Carolina was
unrelated to the Atlanta transaction.
At the conclusion of the defense’s case, the district court
instructed the jury on conspiracy law and told the jury that it
was to acquit Sampler if it found that the government proved the
existence of separate conspiracies, rather than one, overarching
crime. The jury then convicted Sampler of the sole conspiracy
count, and the district court subsequently sentenced Sampler to
151-months imprisonment, finding that Sampler had trafficked 120
kilograms of methamphetamine, in total, during the conspiracy.
Sampler appeals.
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II.
Sampler raises three, interrelated issues on appeal.
First, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence under which
he was convicted of conspiring with the named co-defendants in
the indictment. Next, he argues that the district court erred
by allowing the government to introduce evidence of Sampler’s
prior drug-trafficking activities and drug crimes committed by
other alleged conspirators and by allowing the government to use
an illustrative chart featuring Sampler in its opening
statement. Finally, he argues that the district court erred in
including the amount of methamphetamine that he admitted to
previously trafficking in determining his sentence. We address
each issue in turn.
a.
We will uphold a defendant’s conviction following a jury
trial so long as there is substantial evidence to support it
when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
government. United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir.
2006). Whether there is a single conspiracy or multiple
conspiracies is a factual question for the jury, whose
conclusion must be upheld “unless the evidence, taken in the
light most favorable to the government, would not allow a
reasonable jury to so find.” United States v. Harris, 39 F.3d
1262, 1267 (4th Cir. 1994).
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It is well-settled that “[w]hether there is a single
conspiracy or multiple conspiracies depends upon the overlap of
key actors, methods, and goals.” United States v. Nunez, 432
F.3d 573, 578 (4th Cir. 2005). The existence of “parallel
suppliers, or middlemen, or street dealers” does not itself mean
that there are multiple conspiracies. United States v. Harris,
39 F.3d 1262, 1267 (4th Cir. 1994). This is particularly so
where the defendant is a key link between what he alleges to be
the separate conspiracies. Nunez, 432 F.3d at 578. Finally, a
defendant need not know about the participation or even
existence of co-conspirators so long as the government proves
“the essential nature of the plan” and the defendant’s
connection to it. United States v. Blumenthal, 332 U.S. 539,
557 (1947).
The testimony of Martin, Jamerson, and Sampler all tended
to show a large conspiracy with “Carlos” at the top; Sampler and
others as intermediate facilitators and distributors in the
middle; Martin and Jamerson as traffickers; and low-level
distributors in Virginia and South Carolina at the bottom. They
all shared the same objective of profiting from methamphetamine
distribution in the south-eastern United States. Sampler’s
trafficking to “parallel suppliers” in South Carolina and
Virginia does not undermine the government’s showing that there
was a single conspiracy. Harris, 39 F.3d at 1267. And he
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cannot separate his goal of distributing methamphetamine to
Martin and Jamerson in Atlanta with their distribution in
Virginia because he was the crucial link between the two.
Nunez, 432 F.3d at 578. Because these activities encompassed
overlapping participants with the same methods and goals, a
reasonable jury was free to find Sampler guilty of being part of
this one, larger conspiracy.
Sampler also argues that even if the evidence at trial was
sufficient to prove a single conspiracy’s existence, the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he joined that
conspiracy. What the evidence shows, he submits, is that he was
only a facilitator who helped a willing drug buyer find a
willing seller; a showing that is legally insufficient to prove
that he joined a conspiracy. See United States v. Giunta, 925
F.2d 758, 767 (4th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996). The
so-called facilitator defense is inapplicable here, though,
because the evidence showed that Sampler was actively involved
in the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. See United
States v. Mills, 995 F.2d 480, 483-84 (4th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that facilitator defense is unavailable to defendant
who himself distributed and stored drugs). Not only did he
locate a seller for a willing buyer, but he physically brought
the parties together and was a necessary cog in the wheel of a
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continuing distribution scheme. Furthermore, the evidence,
including Sampler’s own testimony, showed that Sampler
trafficked drugs on several occasions as part of the same
conspiracy. The evidence therefore was sufficient to establish
that his role in the conspiracy was much greater than that of a
passive facilitator.
b.
Sampler next challenges several of the district court’s
evidentiary rulings, which he claims allowed the government to
introduce unfairly prejudicial evidence to the jury. We review
these rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).
At trial, both Martin and Jamerson testified as to
Sampler’s visits to the methamphetamine-manufacturing facility
and his prior methamphetamine trafficking to South Carolina.
Sampler objected at trial and argues on appeal that this was
prior-bad-acts evidence, inadmissible under Federal Rules of
Evidence 404(b). As this Court has previously explained,
however, “[e]vidence of uncharged conduct is not considered
‘other crimes’ evidence if it arose out of the same series of
transactions as the charged offense or if it is necessary to
complete the story of the crime on trial.” United States v.
Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994). Here, the evidence
was part of the single conspiracy for which Sampler was charged,
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not evidence of distinct crimes. Evidence that Sampler had
previously trafficked drugs for the same kingpin and with
several other players in the hierarchy illustrates that those
acts were part of the same scheme for which he was indicted.
The district court therefore did not err by admitting this
evidence.
Likewise, the court did not err by allowing Martin and
Jamerson to testify about purchasing drugs through other
intermediaries and selling those drugs to other conspirators
named in Sampler’s indictment. This testimony was clearly
relevant to the government’s proving a larger conspiracy and
helped to situate Sampler within the larger confederation.
Further, Sampler has presented us with no basis by which we
could conclude that this evidence unduly prejudiced him, beyond
its tending to show the existence of the underlying conspiracy
with which Sampler was charged.
Finally, Sampler argues that the district court erred by
allowing the government to refer to an illustrative chart
describing the conspiracy. Sampler claims that the chart unduly
prejudiced him because the government placed his name in the
center and made his picture larger than other conspirators. The
government is permitted, however, to use pictures, charts, and
other illustrative devices so long as they help jurors to
understand the evidence presented and the court ensures that
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jurors do not consider the devices, themselves, as evidence.
United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir. 1995).
Here, the pictures merely showed the structure of the
conspiracy, which the government then proved through testimony
at trial. Sampler’s picture was larger than that of the other
alleged-conspirators, but there is no reason to believe that
this misled the jury as to his substantive role in the
conspiracy, particularly in light of the district court’s
instruction that the jury could not consider the chart as
evidence. Therefore, the district court did not err by allowing
the government to use the chart during its presentation.
c.
Lastly, Sampler challenges the quantity of methamphetamine
the district court considered in calculating his sentence. We
review a district court’s legal conclusions regarding a sentence
de novo, United States v. Fullilove, 388 F.3d 104, 106 (4th Cir.
2004), and factual determinations for clear error, United States
v. Pauley, 289 F.3d 254, 258 (4th Cir. 2002).
According to Sampler, the district court wrongfully
considered the amount of methamphetamine Sampler admitted
trafficking to South Carolina when calculating his sentence,
because that trafficking was not sufficiently related to the
conviction offense and because the amount trafficked could not
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be reliably calculated. We reject these claims in light of our
conclusion that the government sufficiently proved that the
South Carolina trafficking was part of the overall conspiracy
for which Sampler was convicted and because Sampler admitted to
trafficking the amount considered by the district court in its
calculation.
III.
For the above reasons, we affirm Sampler’s conviction and
sentence.
AFFIRMED
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