United States v. Juan Garcia ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4710
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUAN JOSE JAIMES GARCIA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Martin K.
Reidinger, District Judge. (2:11-cr-00023-MR-DLH-2)
Submitted: May 13, 2013 Decided: June 6, 2013
Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
William D. Auman, AUMAN LAW OFFICES, Asheville, North Carolina,
for Appellant. William Michael Miller, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Juan Jose Jaimes Garcia appeals his conviction and
sentence of 135 months of imprisonment following his guilty plea
to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Garcia
challenges the district court’s enhancement of his offense level
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1 (2011) and
argues that his due process rights were violated by the fact
that his Guidelines range and sentence were not determined in
conjunction with the entry of his plea. The Government has
moved to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the terms of the
appellate waiver contained in Garcia’s plea agreement. We grant
the Government’s motion in part, dismiss Garcia’s appeal of his
sentence, and affirm Garcia’s conviction.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive
his appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United
States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010). A valid
waiver will preclude appeal of a given issue if the issue is
within the scope of the waiver. United States v. Blick, 408
F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). The validity of an appellate
waiver is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
“The validity of an appeal waiver depends on whether
the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the
right to appeal.” Id. at 169. This determination, often made
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based on the sufficiency of the plea colloquy and whether the
district court questioned the defendant about the appeal waiver,
ultimately turns on an evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances. Id. These circumstances include all of “the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case,
including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim. P.
11 when accepting Garcia’s plea and expressly confirmed that
Garcia understood the impact his appellate waiver would have on
his right to contest his conviction and sentence. Garcia argues
that his waiver is invalid because he expressed momentary
confusion and needed to confer with counsel at several points
during his Rule 11 hearing. Because, however, Garcia confirmed
that each of his brief conferences with counsel dispelled any
misunderstanding, we find that Garcia’s plea was knowing and
voluntary and that his waiver is enforceable.
The waiver’s broad language relinquishes Garcia’s
right to appeal his conviction and sentence, subject to
exceptions not applicable here. Accordingly, the majority of
Garcia’s claims on appeal fall within its scope; those that
arguably do not are unavailing.
First, we construe Garcia’s due process claim as
questioning the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea, which
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brings it outside the scope of his appellate waiver. A guilty
plea is not rendered invalid by the fact that a defendant’s
exact sentence or Guidelines range remains indeterminate and
unknown to him when he enters his plea. See United States v.
Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 118-19 (4th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases
and explaining that there is no requirement that the court
determine and inform the defendant of the applicable Guidelines
range before accepting his guilty plea); see also United States
v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002) (the Constitution does not
require that a defendant be apprised with exacting specificity
of the consequences of his guilty plea). Because Garcia has not
produced authority supporting his contrary position, he fails to
show error in the acceptance of his plea. United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-25 (4th Cir. 2002).
To the extent that Garcia challenges his sentence,
either on due process grounds or on the basis that his
Guidelines range was improperly calculated, such arguments are
clearly barred by the waiver. United States v. Thornsbury, 670
F.3d 532, 537-40 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 196
(2012). Garcia does not contend otherwise, and we therefore
grant the Government’s motion to dismiss Garcia’s appeal of his
sentence.
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Accordingly, we grant in part the Government’s motion
to dismiss, dismiss Garcia’s appeal of his sentence, and affirm
Garcia’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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