Martin Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC , 729 F.3d 381 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •                               PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    _______________
    No. 12-1790
    _______________
    MARTIN WHITEMAN; LISA WHITEMAN,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, L.L.C.,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    _______________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.     Frederick P. Stamp,
    Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:11-cv-00031-FPS)
    _______________
    Argued:   March 21, 2013               Decided:   September 4, 2013
    _______________
    Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, SHEDD, Circuit Judge, and David A.
    FABER, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern
    District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
    _______________
    Affirmed by published opinion.     Senior Judge Faber wrote the
    opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Shedd joined.
    _______________
    ARGUED: Joseph Mark Lovett, APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN ADVOCATES,
    Lewisburg, West Virginia, for Appellants. Timothy Minor Miller,
    ROBINSON & MCELWEE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for
    Appellee. ON BRIEF: Isak J. Howell, LAW OFFICE OF ISAK HOWELL,
    Lewisburg, West Virginia, for Appellants.   Joseph K. Merical,
    ROBINSON & MCELWEE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for
    Appellee.
    _______________
    FABER, Senior District Judge:
    The plaintiffs below, Martin and Lisa Whiteman (Whitemans),
    appeal from a final order of the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of West Virginia that granted summary
    judgment    to     the    defendant,     Chesapeake         Appalachia,        L.L.C.
    (Chesapeake), upon the Whitemans’ claim for common law trespass.
    We find no error in the district court’s decision and affirm for
    the reasons that follow.
    I.
    A.
    The Whitemans own the surface rights to approximately 101
    acres in Wetzel County, West Virginia, pursuant to a general
    warranty deed dated March 2, 1992.             See JA at 93-94.           Chesapeake
    owns lease rights to minerals beneath the Whitemans’ surface
    property.    See JA at 608.            The property rights of both the
    Whitemans   and     Chesapeake    ultimately         flow   from    two     severance
    deeds that originally split the surface and mineral estates of
    the 101 acres relevant here.           The two severance deeds effected
    severance by granting the respective surface estates to grantees
    while   “reserving       and   excepting”     the     mineral      estate    to   the
    grantor.         Specifically,    both       deeds    contain      the    following
    language:
    THERE IS RESERVED AND EXCEPTED unto the said Ellis O.
    Miller, the grantor, all of his interest in and to the
    oil and gas within and underlying the above-described
    2
    parcels as well as all of the coal not heretofore
    conveyed, and all other minerals within and underlying
    the above described property, with the necessary
    rights and privileges appertaining thereto.
    JA at 95, 99.        Notably, the severance deeds neither reserve any
    specific surface rights to the mineral estate owner nor mention
    permanent waste disposal resulting from mineral extraction.
    Today,   the    Whitemans    live       on   and   farm   their   101   acres,
    primarily raising sheep and, relatedly, using part of the land
    to produce hay for the sheep.                 See JA at 22-23.          Conversely,
    Chesapeake operates three natural gas wells on approximately ten
    acres of the Whitemans’ property that was formerly used for hay
    production.    JA at 22, 417.       The Whitemans can no longer produce
    hay on those ten acres because Chesapeake’s well operations and
    permanent drill waste disposal on the surface have rendered that
    portion of the Whitemans’ property unusable for any suitable
    purpose. 1   JA at 258, 264, 420.
    Nevertheless, for each of their gas wells located on the
    Whitemans’ surface property, Chesapeake obtained valid well work
    and   pit    waste     discharge    permits         from    the   West    Virginia
    Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP).                   JA at 227, 237,
    241, 608.      As part of the permitting process, Chesapeake gave
    the Whitemans notice of Chesapeake’s intent to drill and dispose
    1
    Martin Whiteman specifically testified in his deposition
    that any loss of use of his land for farming was limited to ten
    acres. JA at 264.
    3
    of drill waste in on-site waste pits.                    See JA at 230, 244, 246.
    Chesapeake attached its WVDEP application for well work and pit
    waste discharge permits to the notice it gave the Whitemans.                           JA
    at   232,   247.         The    permit     application        included      spaces     for
    Chesapeake to describe anticipated pit waste as well as proposed
    disposal methods.         Id.      On each permit application, Chesapeake
    listed anticipated pit waste to include drill water, frac blow
    back, and various formation cuttings. 2                      Id.    Chesapeake also
    noted    that    it     intended      to   dispose      of   pit    waste    by    “land
    application,”      or     in    the    case       of   the   pits   located       on   the
    Whitemans’ property, by treating water, applying waste to the
    land, and burying cuttings.            Id.
    After the permitting process was complete, Chesapeake began
    drilling.       While drilling on the Whitemans’ property, Chesapeake
    used a water-based drilling fluid, known in the oil and gas
    industry as “mud,” 3 to remove drill cuttings during the drilling
    2
    Drill cuttings consist of earth, rock, and other debris
    necessarily removed from the ground when the drill bores the
    well.
    3
    Drilling mud comes in many varieties, ranging from water-
    based fluid mixed with minerals to oil-based fluid with a
    composition similar to diesel fuel to synthetic oil-based fluid
    with a composition similar to food-grade mineral oil. Whatever
    variety is used, however, mud engineers nevertheless apply
    “additives” to the mud to ensure efficient and effective use of
    the mud. JA at 573.
    4
    process. 4    See JA at 142, 592.          Once removed from the wells’
    boreholes, Chesapeake disposed of the drill cuttings in accord
    with the waste disposal method listed on their well work and pit
    waste discharge permit applications, namely by depositing the
    drill cuttings into open pits located near the wellheads on the
    Whitemans’ surface property. 5       See JA at 608.      At the conclusion
    of the drilling process, Chesapeake removed the plastic liners
    from the waste pits, mixed the drill waste with clean dirt, and
    compacted    and   covered   the   pits.     Sediment    control     barriers
    surround the pits.     See JA at 235.
    The pit or “open” system of drill waste disposal was the
    common method employed in West Virginia at the time the wells
    were drilled on the Whitemans’ property, although alternative
    disposal methods were used in other areas of the country.                See
    JA at 119-20, 322, 703.      One such alternative is a “closed-loop”
    system.      The closed-loop system of drill waste disposal is a
    relatively    recent   development    in    the   oil   and   gas   industry.
    Under the closed-loop system, drill cuttings and other waste are
    4
    Mud is expensive and operators preserve and recycle as
    much of it as possible; in some cases, operators will rent
    drilling mud rather than purchase it. See JA at 115, 116, 572.
    Consequently, only a small amount of mud remains mixed with
    drill cuttings that have been removed from a well. JA at 572.
    5
    In return for valuable consideration, the Whitemans gave
    Chesapeake a release for any damages caused by Well Number
    625599. See JA at 276, 693. That well is not implicated in the
    Whitemans’ lawsuit.
    5
    removed from the well site and placed in off-site landfills.
    See JA at 116.          Closed-loop systems have some advantages over
    on-site disposal.          They better preserve expensive drilling mud
    for future drilling operations, eliminate the possibility of a
    pit failure, and create a smaller drilling operation footprint
    at a well site.         See JA at 116, 120, 572.            Nevertheless, closed-
    loop systems are expensive and often cost $100,000 or more per
    well than open systems, depending on the well location.                            See JA
    at 120, 130.          Chesapeake began using the closed-loop system in
    some of its Oklahoma and Texas operations in 2004 and 2005, and,
    in December 2009, began preparing to implement the system in
    West Virginia.        See JA at 112, 119.
    The   Whitemans       have     admitted      that,     at     present,        their
    monetary damages are “trivial” and “not real significant.”                             JA
    at 628.     Indeed, the only expert testimony offered in the case
    regarding       the    value    of   the       Whitemans’      land       opined     that
    Chesapeake’s drilling operations caused no diminution in value
    thereto.        See JA at 267.        Rather, the core of the Whitemans’
    prayer    for    relief    is   vindication       of   their      right    to   exclude
    others    from    their    land    and   affirmative       injunctive       relief     to
    remove the waste pits in order to alleviate the Whitemans’ fears
    of   possible     future   liability       that   might     stem    from    the     waste
    pits.    See JA at 421, 628, 629.
    6
    B.
    This civil action was filed originally in the Circuit Court
    of Wetzel County, West Virginia, and removed to federal district
    court on the basis of diversity of citizenship under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    (a).    The   Whitemans    are   citizens   and   residents    of    West
    Virginia;   Chesapeake    is   an    Oklahoma   corporation       with   its
    principal place of business in Oklahoma.         JA at 21.    The amount
    in controversy exceeds $75,000. 6
    6
    We note that although the Whitemans have essentially
    abandoned monetary damages as a remedy in this case, it is
    generally    held    that   whether     the   amount    in    controversy
    requirement has been met is an issue determined “on the basis of
    the facts and circumstances as of the time” the case is removed
    to federal court from state court. 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
    R. MILLER, AND EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3702.4,
    p. 457-58 (4th ed. 2011).       At that point, no question arose as
    to whether the amount in controversy requirement had been met,
    perhaps because of the numerous amount of claims the Whitemans
    originally alleged against Chesapeake and the damages associated
    therewith.    Nevertheless, an affirmative injunction carries its
    own price tag, and for purposes of determining whether that
    amount satisfies the amount in controversy requirement, this
    court “ascertain[s] the value of an injunction for amount in
    controversy purposes by reference to the larger of two figures:
    the injunction's worth to the plaintiff or its cost to the
    defendant.”    JTH Tax, Inc. v. Frashier, 
    624 F.3d 635
    , 639 (4th
    Cir. 2010). Here, the Whitemans present no evidence supporting
    the requested injunction’s value to them in dollar terms.
    However, Chesapeake presented evidence that, for a traditional
    12,000 cubic foot pit, measuring forty feet by fifty feet with a
    six foot depth and a seventy percent fill ratio, removing such a
    pit would cost, at a minimum, $50,000. JA at 605. The two pits
    here have much larger dimensions than a “traditional” pit and,
    therefore, removing them would easily cost Chesapeake more than
    $75,000, based on Chesapeake’s undisputed testimony related to
    pit removal costs.      See JA at 250.      Accordingly, the amount in
    controversy requirement for subject matter jurisdiction in this
    case is satisfied.
    7
    In their complaint, the Whitemans asked for an injunction
    and   damages    based      on   claims       arising   from   the    drilling   and
    operation by Chesapeake of three natural gas wells on surface
    property owned by the Whitemans.                   JA at 33.          The complaint
    alleged    claims     under      West   Virginia     common    law    only,   namely
    nuisance, trespass, negligence, strict liability, recklessness
    or    gross     negligence,       intentional       infliction        of   emotional
    distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.                      JA at
    25-32.     Cross motions for summary judgment were filed.                      JA at
    90, 211.      By order entered on June 7, 2012, the district court
    denied the Whitemans’ motion and granted Chesapeake’s motion on
    the trespass claim only.            JA at 760, 765.        Thereafter, with the
    court’s approval, the Whitemans voluntarily dismissed all their
    other claims.       JA at 770-71.            A final order was entered on June
    11, 2012, from which the Whitemans took a timely appeal to this
    court pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .                JA at 773.        The only issue
    on appeal is whether the district court erred when it granted
    summary    judgment    in     favor     of    Chesapeake   upon      the   Whitemans’
    claim for common law trespass.
    II.
    A.
    In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply de novo
    the same standard that the district court was required to apply
    for granting the motion for summary judgment.                         Ray Commc'ns,
    8
    Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 
    673 F.3d 294
    , 297 n. 1
    (4th Cir. 2012).           Specifically, summary judgment is warranted
    if,   from    the    totality      of   the       evidence,   including    pleadings,
    depositions,        answers   to    interrogatories,          and   affidavits,     the
    court     believes    no   genuine      issue      of   material    fact   exists   for
    trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law.      See Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
    Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., Md., 
    48 F.3d 810
    , 817 (4th
    Cir. 1995).          When an appeal arises from a grant of summary
    judgment, the reviewing court must view the evidence, and draw
    all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable
    to the non-moving party.            See Laing v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 
    703 F.3d 713
    , 714 (4th Cir. 2013). 7
    7
    This court has held that Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure does not allow a court to simply determine that
    “the moving party has the winning legal argument.”    Podberesky
    v. Kirwan, 
    38 F.3d 147
    , 156 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Charbonnages
    de France v. Smith, 
    597 F.2d 406
    , 414 (4th Cir. 1979)). Rather,
    a court “must also ensure that there is no genuine issue as to
    any material fact before a grant of summary judgment is proper.”
    
    Id.
     This situation typically arises, as it does here, where the
    parties file cross-motions for summary judgment.   Nevertheless,
    we believe, given the discovery conducted below, the joint
    stipulations entered into, and the further development of the
    record at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, that
    Chesapeake has satisfied its burden of showing the absence of
    any genuine issues of material fact, and the Whitemans have
    either failed or declined to rebut that showing.     See Celotex
    Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322-23 (1986); Anderson v.
    Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1986).
    9
    B.
    The substantive legal issue before the court on appeal is
    whether Chesapeake’s permanent disposal of drill waste upon the
    Whitemans’ surface property is “reasonably necessary” for the
    extraction of minerals. 8   Here, the only relevant substantive law
    stems from West Virginia common law.      Accordingly, we look to
    that state’s law for a controlling principle.      See Erie R. Co.
    v. Tompkins, 
    304 U.S. 64
    , 78 (1938).
    1.
    As noted above, the district court below granted summary
    judgment in favor of Chesapeake as to the Whitemans’ common law
    trespass claim only. 9   In West Virginia, common law trespass is
    8
    After oral argument, and pursuant to Rule 28(j) of the
    Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Whitemans notified
    this court of a decision from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of West Virginia.    Specifically, in
    the case Cain v. XTO Energy, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-111
    (N.D.W. Va. March 28, 2013), that court certified a question to
    the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals essentially asking
    whether horizontal drilling far below the surface, a drilling
    method now popular in the oil and gas industry, meets the
    “reasonable necessity” standard under West Virginia law.   That
    is not this case; it presents a broader question that only
    marginally overlaps with the narrower one presented here and we
    see no benefit to certification in this case.   Accordingly, to
    the extent the Whitemans moved this court to certify the
    question in this case to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
    Appeals, that motion is denied.
    9
    In the complaint, the Whitemans styled their     common law
    trespass claim as “Trespass (Including Willful and       Bad Faith
    Trespass).”   For our purposes, treating that claim      as simple
    trespass of a continuing nature is sufficient and       we proceed
    10
    “an entry on another man's ground without lawful authority, and
    doing     some    damage,      however       inconsiderable,          to     his       real
    property.”       Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 
    127 W. Va. 586
    ,
    591-92,    
    34 S.E.2d 348
    ,    352     (1945)     (emphasis      added).           A
    continuing trespass occurs, for example, when one person leaves
    on the land of another, with a duty to remove it, “a structure,
    chattel,    or    other    thing.”         RESTATEMENT (SECOND)   OF       TORTS   §    160
    (1965).    Regarding remedies for actions in trespass, the general
    rule in West Virginia is that “a mere trespass to real estate
    will not be enjoined when the injury . . . is susceptible of
    complete pecuniary compensation and for which the injured person
    has an adequate legal remedy.”               Wiles v. Wiles, 
    134 W. Va. 81
    ,
    91, 
    58 S.E.2d 601
    , 606 (1950).               Nevertheless, in West Virginia,
    “[a] court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin a continuing
    trespass.”       Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 
    137 W. Va. 272
    , 278-79,
    
    71 S.E.2d 65
    , 69-70 (1952).            Notwithstanding the above, a claim
    for trespass under West Virginia common law can only lie if
    one’s entry upon the land of another—or one’s leaving a “thing”
    upon the land of another—is “without lawful authority.”                            Hark,
    
    34 S.E.2d at 352
    .
    A common source of “lawful authority” one might have for
    either    entering    upon    another’s         land   or   leaving    something         on
    accordingly; Chesapeake’s alleged willfulness or bad faith is
    irrelevant.
    11
    another’s land is a license.                       However, at its most basic, a
    license is simply “permission, [usually] revocable, to commit
    some act that would otherwise be unlawful,” including, but not
    limited     to,    “an   agreement         .   .     .   that    it    is   lawful    for    the
    licensee to enter the licensor’s land to do some act that would
    otherwise be illegal.”             Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
    In West Virginia, however, a line of precedent informs a mineral
    estate owner’s authority to enter upon the land of a surface
    estate owner, without express license or otherwise, to extract
    minerals, beginning with Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 
    55 N.Y. 538
    ,   
    1874 WL 11019
          (1874),         the    seminal     1874   case      that
    introduced        the    concept      of       what      has    come    to    be     known    as
    “reasonable       necessity”       and     its       application       to    severance       deed
    construction. 10         In other words, in West Virginia, a mineral
    estate owner that enters upon a surface estate owner’s land does
    10
    We note that in West Virginia, assuming no dispute as to
    material facts, “it is the duty of the court to determine
    whether the use of the surface by the owner of the minerals has
    exceeded the fairly necessary use thereof.”     Adkins, 61 S.E.2d
    at 636. Moreover, this court has previously held that the West
    Virginia rule allocating the duty to determine “reasonable
    necessity” to judge, not jury, binds a federal court sitting in
    diversity.   Justice v. Pennzoil Co., 
    598 F.2d 1339
    , 1343 (4th
    Cir. 1979).     Accordingly, when we review the lower court’s
    determination   of   “reasonable   necessity,”   we   review  its
    interpretation of West Virginia’s “state property law . . .
    measured by concrete legal standards rooted in the common law.”
    
    Id. at 1342
    ; see also Depeterdy v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., Civil
    Action No. 2:97-966, 
    1999 WL 33229744
    , at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Sept.
    13, 1999) aff'd, 
    230 F.3d 1352
     (4th Cir. 2000).
    12
    so    without    lawful    authority    only       if,   under       the   “reasonable
    necessity”      standard,    the    mineral    estate        owner    “exceed[s]      its
    rights . . . thereby invading the rights” of the surface estate
    owner.      Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 
    134 W. Va. 719
    , 723, 
    61 S.E.2d 633
    , 635 (1950).
    2.
    In    Marvin,   a   surface    estate       owner     sought,       among   other
    things, to enjoin a mineral estate owner from mining underneath
    the surface estate owner’s land.              Marvin, 
    1874 WL 11019
    , at *2.
    The   surface     estate    owner    complained      that     the     mineral      estate
    owner had, among other things, deposited “ore and rubbish” (from
    the mines) along the front and atop the surface estate owner’s
    land.       
    Id. at *3
    .      The lower court in Marvin concluded, as a
    matter of law, that although the mineral estate owner had a
    right to enter the surface estate owner’s land to mine, the
    mineral estate owner had “no right to deposit or keep upon [the
    surface      estate    owner’s]     lands    any    .    .    .   refuse     stuff    or
    rubbish.”       
    Id. at *4
    .    Accordingly, the lower court ordered that
    the mineral estate owner be enjoined from further waste disposal
    on the surface estate owner’s land and that the mineral estate
    owner    remove    mine    waste    that    the    mineral        estate    owner    had
    already deposited on the surface.                  
    Id. at *5
    .          The New York
    Court of Appeals reversed the lower court as to this conclusion
    of law, among others, and sent the case back for a new trial
    13
    because the Court of Appeals believed the lower court failed to
    consider      whether     depositing     mine       waste     on    the    surface      was
    “necessary to be done for the reasonably profitable enjoyment”
    of the mineral estate owner’s property in the minerals.                           
    Id. at *17
    .        More    specifically,    the     Court       of   Appeals     held    that    a
    mineral estate owner may not claim, as incident to the grant of
    the mineral estate itself, “that which is convenient [but] only
    that which is necessary, but may have that in a convenient way.”
    
    Id. at *10
    .         In other words, the court indicated that a grant of
    minerals underlying a tract of land, absent a deed or lease
    provision to the contrary, carries with it a right to use so
    much    of    the    surface   as   is   fairly         necessary    to    recover      the
    mineral and preserve the mineral holder’s “reasonably profitable
    enjoyment” of the mineral. 11            Although the Marvin court went on
    to state in dicta that it would be a rare case where a mine
    owner       could    justify      leaving        mine    waste      on    the     surface
    permanently,        the   court     nevertheless         conceded        that    what    is
    necessary is a fluid concept that must be determined on a case
    by case basis.         See 
    id. at *9
     (stating that “the facts of each
    case” must determine what is necessary).
    11
    This has come to be called the “fairly necessary” or
    “reasonably necessary” standard.   We use the two phrases
    interchangeably just as the West Virginia Supreme Court of
    Appeals has for over 100 years.
    14
    If not earlier, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
    cited Marvin with enthusiastic approval in both Porter v. Mack
    Mfg. Co., 
    65 W. Va. 636
    , 
    64 S.E. 853
     (1909) and Squires v.
    Lafferty, 
    95 W. Va. 307
    , 
    121 S.E. 90
     (1924), 12 thus officially
    adopting     the   principle      that    ownership     of     a    mineral    estate
    carries with it “an implied right to use the surface in such
    manner and with such means as would be fairly necessary for the
    enjoyment” of the mineral estate.               Porter, 64 S.E. at 854; see
    Squires, 
    121 S.E. at 91
     (holding that the right to use the
    surface “in a manner and with such means as would be fairly
    necessary” to enjoy the mineral estate is incident to ownership
    of   the    mineral    estate     itself).        Unlike     the     instant       case,
    however,     neither     Porter    nor     Squires      were       trespass    cases.
    Rather, both were cases where a mineral estate owner sought an
    injunction     against    the    surface      estate    owner      for     obstructing
    various aspects of the mineral estate owner’s mining operation.
    In Porter, the mineral estate owner sought to mine clay and
    other minerals and carry them off using a tram road he proposed
    to build on the surface estate owner’s property, but the surface
    estate     owner   obstructed.      See       Porter,   64   S.E.     at    853.      In
    12
    The court in Porter indicated that the Marvin principles
    might be obvious legal underpinnings of West Virginia common law
    when it noted that “[i]t seems hardly necessary in this mining
    state to state these principles of law; but it may not be
    without benefit to do so. They are old and settled principles.”
    Porter, 64 S.E. at 854.
    15
    Squires, the mineral estate owner sought to drill test holes and
    transport      machinery         and   men    over    the     surface    estate    owner’s
    property, but the surface estate owner went so far as to lock
    the    mineral    estate      owner’s        access    gate    and    then     assault   the
    mineral estate owner’s employee that forced passage.                              Squires,
    
    121 S.E. at 90
    .          In both cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court
    of Appeals ruled in favor of the mineral estate owner, finding
    the building of a tram road across the surface estate owner’s
    property “fairly necessary” to enjoying the mineral estate in
    Porter, and finding the drilling of test holes and transport of
    machinery       and   men     across     the       surface    “fairly    necessary”       in
    Squires.         Notwithstanding         their       dissimilarity       to    this   case,
    Porter    and    Squires         enshrine     the     overarching       principle     that,
    incident to mineral estate ownership, a mineral estate owner in
    West Virginia has a right to use the surface “in such manner and
    with    such    means    as      would   be    fairly       necessary”    to    enjoy    the
    mineral estate.          Moreover, both Porter and Squires demonstrate
    that the application of such a principle is necessarily fact-
    intensive, just as the New York Court of Appeals said in Marvin.
    See    Marvin,    
    1874 WL 11019
    ,      at    *9.       The    “fairly    necessary”
    standard from Porter and Squires has remained intact in West
    Virginia property law and been applied to a multitude of factual
    scenarios, including some more factually analogous to this case
    than either Porter or Squires.
    16
    3.
    In    Adkins      v.   United    Fuel       Gas,    a   surface   estate   owner
    brought a trespass claim against the mineral estate owner for
    damages     caused      by   the   mineral        estate      owner’s   gas   drilling
    operations on the surface owner’s land. 13                    Adkins v. United Fuel
    Gas     Co.,      
    134 W. Va. 719
    ,    
    61 S.E.2d 633
    ,   634    (1950).
    Specifically, the mineral estate owner drilled a gas well near
    the center of a fifty-acre tract, part of which the surface
    owner      used    to   grow    alfalfa,          corn,    and   vegetables.      
    Id.
    Additionally, the mineral estate owner constructed a road and
    pipelines through the surface owner’s corn and alfalfa fields to
    provide access to the well.              
    Id.
            Moreover, the mineral estate
    owner cut one lengthy ditch to carry water and other refuse from
    the gas well and cut another ditch to lay a gas pipe necessary
    to operate the gas well.               
    Id.
            Both ditches were cut through
    13
    An earlier case, Coffindaffer v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 
    74 W. Va. 107
    , 
    81 S.E. 966
     (1914), also involved a surface estate
    owner bringing a trespass claim against the mineral estate
    owner.    However, Coffindaffer is distinguishable from both
    Adkins and this case in that the mineral estate owner there had
    built a road upon the surface, abandoned any drilling activity
    before it ever began, but nevertheless left the road on the
    surface. Coffindaffer, 81 S.E. at 966. Although it recognized,
    under the “fairly necessary” standard from Porter, that a
    mineral estate owner generally has, "as a necessary incident to
    the enjoyment" of the minerals, the right to use the surface to
    explore for and produce oil and gas, including building a road
    to haul drilling machinery, the Coffindaffer court nevertheless
    held that where a mineral estate owner builds such a road and
    abandons drilling before it begins, such a road cannot be fairly
    necessary to enjoying the rights to the mineral estate. Id.
    17
    land the surface owner had used to grow crops.                 Id.    As a result
    of   the     mineral        estate   owner’s        drilling   and     associated
    activities,        the     surface   was        rendered   unusable     for     crop
    production.        Id.
    After it had completed drilling the gas well, the mineral
    estate     owner    removed    one   gas    pipe,    drained   the    ditches   and
    covered them over, leaving the permanent gas pipe just under the
    surface.     Id.         As to the “reasonable necessity” of the mineral
    estate owner’s use of the surface, the court in Adkins held:
    There was nothing done which was unnecessary or
    unreasonable in the construction of the road to bring
    machinery in to drill the defendant’s gas well.
    Likewise the laying of the pipe line over the surface
    of the land is not disclosed to have been unnecessary.
    The construction of the open ditch for draining sand,
    water and other refuse from the well during the
    drilling thereof seems to have been an effort on the
    part of defendant to prevent the spreading of such
    sand, water and refuse over the adjacent surface of
    plaintiff’s land, and, therefore, was a minimization
    of damages.
    Id. at 636.        In other words, the court in Adkins did not change
    the “reasonable necessity” standard.                Rather, it simply applied
    the standard, as it always had before, to a set of facts unique
    to the case in Adkins.
    Perhaps the most recent and comprehensive scrutiny of the
    “reasonable    necessity”       doctrine,       however,   occurred    in   Buffalo
    Mining Co. v. Martin, 
    165 W. Va. 10
    , 
    267 S.E.2d 721
     (1980).
    There, as in Porter and Squires, a mineral estate owner sought
    18
    to enjoin the surface owner from interfering with the mineral
    estate   owner’s      mining     operations.          Specifically,         the     mineral
    estate owner endeavored to construct a power line necessary to
    ventilate      a     coal     mine    located       under       the     surface    owner’s
    property.       Buffalo Mining, 
    267 S.E.2d at 722
    .                         However, the
    court    in    Buffalo       Mining    did    not     simply      apply     the     “fairly
    necessary” doctrine from Porter, Squires, Adkins, and others.
    Rather, the court applied the following gloss to that doctrine:
    [W]here implied as opposed to express rights are
    sought, the test of what is reasonable and necessary
    becomes more exacting, since the mineral owner is
    seeking a right that he claims not by virtue of any
    express language in the mineral severance deed, but by
    necessary implication as a correlative to those rights
    expressed in the deed. In order for such a claim to be
    successful, it must be demonstrated not only that the
    right is reasonably necessary for the extraction of
    the mineral, but also that the right can be exercised
    without any substantial burden to the surface owner.
    Buffalo Mining, 
    267 S.E.2d at 725-26
     (emphasis added).
    Although       Buffalo     Mining      involved       a   severance       deed   more
    detailed      than   those     presented      here,      its    holding     nevertheless
    harmonized the “reasonable necessity” standard as it applies to
    two divergent types of conflict between mineral estate owners
    and surface estate owners.              The first involves conflicts where
    the   mineral      estate     owner    engages      in   activity        that     disturbs,
    perhaps permanently and negatively, the surface.                          See Adkins v.
    United Fuel Gas Co., 
    134 W. Va. 719
    , 723, 
    61 S.E.2d 633
    , 635
    (1950)     (cutting         ditches    through       surface          owner’s     farmland,
    19
    permanently burying a gas pipeline used for gas drilling, and
    spilling oil and oily water on surface owner’s crops); Squires
    v. Lafferty, 
    95 W. Va. 307
    , 
    121 S.E. 90
     (1924) (drilling test
    holes on surface and transporting machinery and men across the
    surface); Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 
    65 W. Va. 636
    , 
    64 S.E. 853
    (1909)   (construction        of   tram    road    on    surface       to    transport
    minerals).       The   second      involves     conflicts      where    the   mineral
    estate owner engages in activity that “virtually destroy[s]” the
    surface or is otherwise “totally incompatible with the rights of
    the surface owner.”            Buffalo Mining, 
    267 S.E.2d at 725
    ; see
    Brown v. Crozer Coal & Land Co., 
    144 W. Va. 296
    , 
    107 S.E.2d 777
    (1959) (refusing to construe a severance deed to allow “auger
    mining,”     which     had     resulted    in     slippage      of     the    surface
    sufficient to uproot trees, toss boulders, and divert streams);
    W. Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 
    129 W. Va. 832
    , 837,
    
    42 S.E.2d 46
    , 50 (1947) (refusing to construe a severance deed
    to allow “strip mining” and reasoning that “if the owner of the
    surface has a proprietary right to subjacent support . . . he
    has at least an equal right to hold intact the thing to be
    supported, i.e., the surface.”).               Buffalo Mining’s articulation
    of “reasonable necessity without substantial burden” generally
    allows     the   first       set   of   surface        uses,    when    “reasonably
    necessary,” as implicit to a grant of a mineral estate because
    the   surface        generally       incurs       no    “substantial          burden.”
    20
    Conversely, the second set of surface uses will generally be
    disallowed       as      implicit      to   a   grant    of    a   mineral    estate;    the
    burden of such uses on the surface is generally so substantial
    that an explicit deed provision will usually be required. 14
    Before Buffalo Mining, the “reasonable necessity” doctrine
    simply did not discern between a case where a mineral estate
    owner drilled a hole into the surface and a case where a mineral
    estate owner all but removed the surface.                             Indeed, the West
    Virginia Supreme Court very recently noted that it has “often
    been    asked       to     address      disputes     between       surface     owners    and
    mineral owners,” and in some cases, it is “sometimes unclear if
    a    particular       mineral      .    .   .   is   a   ‘mineral’     or    part   of   the
    ‘surface.’”         Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery of Terra
    Alta v. Morgan, 12-0080, 
    2013 WL 2920012
    , at *5 (W. Va. June 13,
    2013).        Perhaps more to the point, however, the court noted that
    in     some     cases      mineral       extraction       temporarily        disturbs    the
    surface       and     in   other       cases    mineral       extraction     destroys    the
    surface.        See 
    id.
             No matter the degree of disturbance, the
    court added, “[a]s new minerals are discovered, and as better
    14
    See, e.g., Phillips v. Fox, 
    193 W. Va. 657
    , 665, 
    458 S.E.2d 327
    , 335 (1995) (holding that the right to surface mining
    “will only be implied if it is demonstrated that, at the time
    the deed was executed, surface mining was a known and accepted
    common practice in the locality where the land is located; that
    it is reasonably necessary for the extraction of the mineral;
    and that it may be exercised without any substantial burden to
    the surface owner.”).
    21
    techniques for harvesting those minerals become available, legal
    conflicts between owners of the surface and of the minerals will
    abound.”   Ultimately, we believe Buffalo Mining sorts the minor
    to moderate surface disturbance cases from the major surface
    destruction cases when a mineral estate owner seeks to do either
    pursuant to implied rights collateral to a grant of the mineral
    estate itself.
    III.
    The court below acknowledged that the severance deeds in
    question   did   not   address      the    issue   of   use   of   the   property
    surface to store drill cuttings and other waste but nevertheless
    found such right to be created by implication as a reasonably
    necessary incident to creation of a gas well.                      The Whitemans
    advance several arguments as to why the lower court’s conclusion
    was erroneous.    We address each separately.
    A.
    As a threshold matter, the Whitemans essentially argue that
    Chesapeake had a burden to show its use of the surface was
    reasonably necessary and did not impose a substantial burden
    upon the surface, that Chesapeake “failed utterly to develop a
    record” to support such a showing, and that the court below
    erred in granting Chesapeake summary judgment as a result.                    See
    Appellant Br. at 9, 20.        The Whitemans apparently rely, in part,
    on   Buffalo   Mining,   and   no    other     authority,     to   support   this
    22
    argument.     See id. at 21 (stating “Chesapeake is subject to
    Buffalo Mining Company’s ‘exacting’ test in which it must show
    both necessity and the absence of a substantial burden on the
    surface.”).         The       Whitemans      miss      a     fundamental        distinction
    between    this    case       and   Buffalo       Mining       concerning       which   party
    would carry the initial burden of proof at trial.                               As with any
    ordinary    tort    claim,       the      plaintiff        must    make    an   affirmative
    showing of a prima facie case; the defendant need neither affirm
    nor rebut anything.             See Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
    Co., 
    636 F.3d 88
    , 94 (4th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 499
    , 
    181 L. Ed. 2d 347
     (2011) (noting that common law trespass
    “require[s]       that    a    plaintiff      establish           that    the   defendant's
    conduct    produced       some      ‘injury’      to     the      plaintiff     or     to   the
    plaintiff's    property.”)          (citing       Hark      v.    Mountain      Fork    Lumber
    Co., 
    127 W.Va. 586
    , 
    34 S.E.2d 348
     (1945)).
    In    Buffalo       Mining,     as    noted    above,        the     plaintiff     was   a
    mineral estate owner seeking to enjoin the surface owner from
    interfering with the mineral estate owner’s mining operations.
    Buffalo Mining, 
    267 S.E.2d at 722
    .                     In other words, the mineral
    estate owner claimed the surface estate owner was interfering
    with the former’s incidental property rights associated with its
    grant of the mineral estate.                Accordingly, as the plaintiff, the
    mineral estate owner in Buffalo Mining had the initial burden of
    proving that the surface owner’s conduct “produced some injury”
    23
    to the mineral estate owner’s incidental property rights.                           See
    Rhodes, 
    636 F.3d at 94
    .               Here, as Chesapeake aptly recognizes,
    it is the other way around; the Whitemans have sued Chesapeake
    for trespass and, accordingly, the Whitemans would carry the
    burden of making a prima facie trespass claim at trial.                             See
    Appellee Br. at 13.            Moreover, no West Virginia case has treated
    a mineral estate owner’s claim to “reasonably necessary” use of
    the    surface    to     extract      minerals      as   an   affirmative     defense.
    Neither shall we.
    Relatedly, the Whitemans argue that the court below failed
    to    analyze    the     burden      that   Chesapeake’s        drilling    operations
    imposed on the surface.               Appellant Br. at 38-39.               Again, the
    burden to prove unauthorized entry or use in trespass is on the
    plaintiff.       Nevertheless, the record below supports a finding
    that the drill waste pits do not impose a substantial burden on
    the Whitemans’ surface property.                    One of Chesapeake’s experts
    opined    that     the     drill      waste       pits   have    not   affected     the
    Whitemans’ property value at all.                    JA at 267.        The Whitemans
    failed to rebut this expert opinion, offering none of their own
    to evaluate the risk that the drill waste pits in this case
    might slip or break.            See Appellee Br. at 8.            The only evidence
    the    Whitemans    presented         regarding      potential     future    liability
    arising from the drill waste pits was the subjective fear of
    Lisa   Whiteman.         See    JA    at    421.     Moreover,     counsel    for   the
    24
    Whitemans at oral argument below remarked that any pecuniary
    loss caused by the drill waste pits was minimal.                        See JA at 628.
    Martin Whiteman himself stated that any injury to the Whitemans’
    land    that    Chesapeake’s       entire      drilling     operation      might     have
    caused was limited to ten acres.                JA at 264.
    The Whitemans reply that no expert is needed to prove a
    common law trespass claim.                Appellant Reply Br. at 21.                  We
    agree.    However, sufficient evidence, at least a preponderance,
    is needed to prove trespass.                   The Whitemans simply failed to
    present    sufficient      evidence       to    show     that    Chesapeake’s       drill
    waste    pits    imposed      a    “substantial        burden”     on    the   surface.
    Absent    that     showing,       the   Whitemans      could      only    satisfy    the
    “unlawful authority” prong of common law trespass by proving
    Chesapeake’s surface use was not “reasonably necessary” to their
    gas drilling operation.            The Whitemans failed in that regard as
    well.
    B.
    Regarding     “reasonable         necessity,”       the     Whitemans        first
    contend   that     Chesapeake’s         disposal    of    waste    on-site     was    not
    reasonably necessary to operate its wells because an alternative
    method of disposal, the closed-loop system, was available.                           See
    Appellant Br. 4, 20, 23, 25.                We disagree.         There simply is no
    support    for      the    Whitemans’           implication       that     “reasonable
    25
    necessity”         amounts       to     “necessity,”          otherwise       the     modifier
    “reasonable” would be meaningless. 15
    The       two     wells    on     the     Whitemans’      property       were       drilled
    between 2007 and 2009.                 At that time, the closed-loop system was
    a relatively new method of drill waste disposal.                              Chesapeake had
    begun      to    use    the     closed-loop        system      in    Texas     and    Oklahoma
    beginning        in    2004     and    2005,     but    did    not    employ    it    in     West
    Virginia        until    December       2009.         When    the    Whiteman       wells    were
    drilled, the open pit system was the common and ordinary method
    of disposal in West Virginia and was consistent with permitting
    requirements           in     the      state      and    approved        by     the       WVDEP.
    Nevertheless,          the    Whitemans        apparently      believe       that    comparing
    drill      waste      disposal        methods    between      Texas    and     Oklahoma          gas
    drilling        operations       on     the     one    hand    and    West     Virginia          gas
    drilling operations on the other hand ought to inform whether
    Chesapeake’s drill waste disposal used on the Whitemans’ surface
    was   “reasonably           necessary.”          See,   e.g.,       Appellant       Br.     at    24
    (citing Chesapeake’s use of the closed-loop disposal system in
    Dallas/Fort Worth as an example of why the open pit system is
    purely optional).             Such comparison amounts to false equivalency.
    15
    Chesapeake similarly attempts to precisely define
    “reasonable necessity.”   See Appellee Br. 17-18.  Nevertheless,
    no West Virginia law exists to support Chesapeake’s construction
    of “reasonable necessity,” even if sound reasoning otherwise
    supports it.    Accordingly, we decline to adopt Chesapeake’s
    definition of “reasonable necessity” as well.
    26
    Indeed, even comparing drill waste disposal methods within all
    of    West    Virginia         would      likely        not     comport      with     what     a
    “reasonable necessity” inquiry requires.                          As noted earlier, we
    trace the genealogy of West Virginia’s “reasonable necessity”
    standard at least as far back as Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining
    Co., 
    55 N.Y. 538
    , 
    1874 WL 11019
     (1874).                           There, the New York
    Court of Appeals clearly stated that determining the scope of a
    mineral      estate        owner’s       implicit       surface     use      rights     is     a
    factually intensive process and each case should be evaluated
    accordingly in light of the fact that what is “necessary” is a
    fluid concept.             See Marvin, 
    1874 WL 11019
    , at *9.                        No West
    Virginia     case      law    has    changed      the    fact-based       nature      of     the
    analysis.         Accordingly, the Whitemans wrongly fault Chesapeake
    for employing its own case-by-case determination regarding drill
    waste disposal methods when this court is compelled to do the
    same to adequately determine whether Chesapeake’s surface use
    was    “reasonably           necessary”      for        mineral     extraction.              See
    Appellant Br. at 24 (noting that when Chesapeake decided whether
    to    use    an     open     pit    or    closed-loop          system   of    drill     waste
    disposal,         it   “simply      performed       a    ‘case-by-case’        analysis.”)
    (citing      Chesapeake        representative           Mark    Bottrell’s      deposition
    testimony at JA 127). 16
    16
    We note that Bottrell’s deposition testimony regarding
    Chesapeake’s decision-making process as to whether to use open
    27
    Third, the Whitemans argue that the trial court confused
    the      requisite         “reasonably         necessary”       standard         with     a
    “reasonableness” standard, thereby applying a less rigorous rule
    than the law requires.                See Appellant Br. at 9, 18.                We need
    only refer to the specific language of the trial court’s opinion
    to conclude that this argument of the Whitmans is misplaced.
    The trial court articulated the correct standard as follows:
    Thus, in determining whether the language of the
    severance deed and leases creates an implied right to
    construct drill cuttings pits, this Court must return
    to the question of whether that right is reasonably
    necessary for the extraction of the mineral and
    whether the pits substantially burden the surface.
    JA at 754.
    Fourth,        the    Whitemans     contend      that     the    district     court
    relied    on     irrelevant       state    regulations         and    statutes.         See
    Appellant Br. at 9, 28-30.                While the Whitemans are correct in
    their assertion that West Virginia’s regulatory scheme does not
    create    a    right       of   the   lessor     to   commit    a     trespass    if    the
    specific       use    is    not   granted      or     implied    in    a   lease,       they
    or closed drill waste disposal is more sophisticated than the
    Whitemans   suggest.      See  Appellant   Br.  at   24    (claiming
    Chesapeake’s decisions to use pits in certain areas in Texas
    were   based   “purely   [on]   the   proximity   of   a    person’s
    residence.”).   Among other things, Bottrell listed well depth,
    drilling   method,   surface  topography,   potential    impact   on
    livestock, potential for pit failure or “slippage,” and site
    distance to landfill as factors Chesapeake considers before
    deciding which waste disposal method to use at any given gas
    well site. See JA at 120, 122, 123, 128, 605.
    28
    misinterpret       the   lower    court’s       reliance   thereon.        The     court
    below simply referred to the statutes and regulations in order
    to   “inform   this      Court    of    the   practices     of   the    oil   and    gas
    industry in West Virginia.”                JA at 754.       Moreover, the court
    below expressly acknowledged that a permit granted by a state
    agency     pursuant      to   a   regulatory      scheme    cannot      immunize    the
    permit holder from civil tort liability for actions arising out
    of use of the permit.               
    Id.
           Accordingly, the lower court’s
    reliance on various West Virginia statutes and regulations, and
    the manner in which it so relied, was not an improper way to
    adduce some evidence of reasonable necessity. 17
    Finally, the Whitemans claim the court below quoted and
    emphasized     a    2008      mineral     lease   between    the       Whitemans    and
    17
    While decided under a slightly different legal standard
    than the one we apply here, the United States District court for
    the District of North Dakota recently addressed the same issue
    in a case whose facts are remarkably similar to those of the
    case at bar. In that case, Kartch v. EOG Resources, Inc., 
    2012 WL 661978
     (D. N.D. 2012), the surface estate owner contended
    that drill pit waste left on the surface by the mineral estate
    owner amounted to trespass.    The surface estate owner argued
    that availability of a closed loop system for deposit of waste
    off the surface property rendered unnecessary the use of
    permanent on-site waste storage.   The court disagreed and held
    that, at the time the well was drilled, reserve pits were
    commonly used in North Dakota.         The availability of an
    alternative, said the court, did not make storage of waste on
    the land unreasonable.    The court also noted that the North
    Dakota Industrial Commission had issued a permit for the surface
    waste disposal under appropriate regulations. Compliance with a
    state regulatory scheme, as in the case here, was deemed to be
    evidence of reasonableness.
    29
    Chesapeake    that    is   not    relevant        to   this     case.      That    lease
    covered a separate one-acre tract from the ten acres involved
    here   and   gave    Chesapeake        “such      exclusive     rights     as    may     be
    necessary     or    convenient”        in   its    gas    production      activities.
    While the court below did refer to that lease in its opinion,
    the court also made clear that the one-acre lease, including its
    expansive language, is not relevant to the present case.                               The
    standard applied by the trial court, as noted above, was one of
    reasonable necessity; convenience did not enter into the court’s
    calculation.
    IV.
    For all these reasons we conclude the district court was
    correct to hold that creating drill waste pits was reasonably
    necessary    for    recovery     of    natural      gas   and    did    not     impose    a
    substantial    burden      on    the    Whitemans’        surface      property,    that
    creation of the pits was consistent with Chesapeake’s rights
    under its lease, was a practice common to natural gas wells in
    West Virginia, and consistent with requirements of applicable
    rules and regulations for the protection of the environment.
    Accordingly the decision of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    30
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-1790

Citation Numbers: 729 F.3d 381, 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20205, 179 Oil & Gas Rep. 888, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18359, 2013 WL 4734969

Judges: Traxler, Shedd, Faber, Southern, Virginia

Filed Date: 9/4/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (19)

Marvin v. . Brewster Iron Mining Co. , 1874 N.Y. LEXIS 45 ( 1874 )

daniel-j-podberesky-v-william-e-kirwan-president-of-the-university-of , 38 F.3d 147 ( 1994 )

Squires v. Lafferty , 95 W. Va. 307 ( 1924 )

Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co. , 127 W. Va. 586 ( 1945 )

Wiles v. Wiles , 134 W. Va. 81 ( 1950 )

Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co. , 134 W. Va. 719 ( 1950 )

Erie Railroad v. Tompkins , 58 S. Ct. 817 ( 1938 )

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of ... , 106 S. Ct. 2548 ( 1986 )

Phillips v. Fox , 193 W. Va. 657 ( 1995 )

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 106 S. Ct. 2505 ( 1986 )

Brown v. Crozer Coal & Land Company , 144 W. Va. 296 ( 1959 )

Buffalo Min. Co. v. Martin , 267 S.E.2d 721 ( 1980 )

sylvia-development-corporation-karel-dohnal-individually-and-as-agent-for , 48 F.3d 810 ( 1995 )

Charbonnages De France v. Frank B. Smith, Juanita Smith, ... , 597 F.2d 406 ( 1979 )

roma-mckinney-justice-glen-justice-fred-mckinney-betty-mckinney-murrel , 598 F.2d 1339 ( 1979 )

Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co. , 137 W. Va. 272 ( 1952 )

JTH Tax, Inc. v. Frashier , 624 F.3d 635 ( 2010 )

Ray Communications, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, ... , 673 F.3d 294 ( 2012 )

Rhodes v. EI Du Pont De Nemours and Co. , 636 F.3d 88 ( 2011 )

View All Authorities »