United States v. Levi , 313 F. App'x 571 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5088
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GWENDOLYN MARIA LEVI, a/k/a Gwendlyn Levi, a/k/a Bernice
Carter, a/k/a Edna Dawson, a/k/a Gwendlyn Maria Levi, a/k/a
Gwen,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:04-cr-00235-RWT)
Submitted: May 13, 2008 Decided: June 4, 2008
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Fischer, Glen Burnie, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Deborah A. Johnston, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gwendolyn Maria Levi appeals from her conviction for
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one
kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000).
Levi pleaded guilty to the charge pursuant to a plea agreement with
the Government; however, she subsequently breached the agreement by
refusing to testify at the trial of three of her co-defendants, one
of whom was her son. While Levi concedes she breached the terms of
the plea agreement by refusing to testify, she claims the district
court erred by permitting the Government to be relieved of its
reciprocal obligations under the agreement.1 Levi contends the
Government waived its right to seek relief for her breach by
continuing to operate “as if the plea agreement was status quo
ante,” as the Government obtained a continuance of her sentencing
hearing while representing to her co-defendants that she was still
a cooperating witness. Finding no error, we affirm.
In evaluating a claim alleging breach of a plea
agreement, the district court’s factual findings are reviewed for
clear error, while legal principles as applied to those facts are
reviewed de novo. United States v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 189 (4th
1
After the Government was released from its obligations under
the plea agreement to request certain offense level reductions, the
district court calculated Levi’s offense level at 40, with a
criminal history category of III. Based on a sentencing guidelines
range of 360 months to life imprisonment, the district court
sentenced Levi to 400 months’ incarceration.
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Cir. 2000). Plea agreements are interpreted according to contract
law; each party to the agreement should receive the benefit of its
bargain. United States v. Chase, 466 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir.
2006). The Government is responsible only for those promises
actually made to the defendant, and its duty in executing those
obligations is no greater than that of “fidelity to the agreement.”
United States v. Peglera, 33 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting
United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 1986)).
When a defendant has committed a material breach of the plea
agreement, she forfeits any right to its enforcement and thereby
relieves the Government of its obligation to abide by the terms of
the agreement. United States v. West, 2 F.3d 66, 69-70 (4th Cir.
1993); see also United States v. Scruggs, 356 F.3d 539, 543 (4th
Cir. 2004).
While the terms of the plea agreement expressly permitted
the Government to seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing,2
Levi claims the Government was aware of her breach and continued to
operate under the plea agreement, thereby obtaining a benefit by
representing to Levi’s co-defendants that she was still available
2
In her plea agreement, Levi agreed that sentencing “may be
delayed until her cooperation has been completed so that at
sentencing the Court will have the benefit of all relevant
information.” At the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, the district
court made note of this particular aspect of the plea agreement,
stating that it was “likely - if not almost certain - that th[e]
sentencing date will be moved because of the agreement that you’ve
made to cooperate with the prosecution.”
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to testify at their trials. In light of the Government’s
representations to Levi’s co-defendants and its almost nine-month
delay before asking to be relieved from its obligations under the
plea agreement, Levi asserts the Government waived its right to
assert any breach on her part.
In its motion seeking a continuance of the sentencing
date, the Government noted that while Levi had refused to testify
at her son’s trial, it was unclear “what will happen during the
trial of the remaining codefendants.” The continuance provided the
Government with the option to call Levi at future trials while also
giving Levi an opportunity to fulfill her obligations under the
plea agreement. A continuance for these purposes was expressly
permitted under the terms of the plea agreement, and despite Levi’s
initial refusal to testify, the Government was entitled to enforce
this provision of the agreement in an effort to remedy that
refusal. See Scruggs, 356 F.3d at 545. Furthermore, the
Government’s failure to seek to be relieved of its responsibilities
under the plea agreement until after the co-defendants’ trials were
completed did not constitute waiver of the breach, as the
Government received no further performance by Levi during this
period. Cf. United States v. Vogt, 901 F.2d 100, 102-03 (8th Cir.
1990).
While Levi conceded she was in breach of the plea
agreement, she contends the Government nevertheless benefitted by
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continuing to represent to her co-defendants that she was available
to testify against them. Levi claims the Government used the
threat of her testimony as a “bargaining chip” against her co-
defendants; however, there is no evidence the Government obtained
any substantive benefit by identifying her as a possible witness.
As the district court noted, despite the possibility of Levi
providing testimony for the Government, none of the co-defendants
entered guilty pleas. Levi’s assertion that the mere possibility
of her testimony benefitted the Government is completely
speculative, as her co-defendants proceeded to trial and were found
guilty without any testimony on her part. See Scruggs, 356 F.3d at
544 (expected benefits from plea agreement are not based on
defendant’s subjective beliefs regarding utility of their
cooperation).
Furthermore, even assuming the Government obtained some
marginal benefit by having Levi listed as a possible witness, the
fact remains that the Government did not obtain the performance for
which it had bargained — namely, Levi’s testimony against her co-
defendants at trial. Levi thus failed to fulfill a core term of
her plea agreement, as she was required to give testimony against
her co-conspirators at trial, not merely to be identified as a
possible witness. See United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 427
(3d Cir. 2007) (defendant is not permitted to receive benefits of
the plea agreement while avoiding its costs). Therefore, Levi’s
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claim that the Government waived its right to pursue remedies for
her breach of the plea agreement is meritless.
Accordingly, we affirm Levi’s conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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