Maria Agelli v. Kathleen Sebelius ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2083
MARIA AGELLI, M.D., M.S.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:09-
cv-01077-RWT)
Submitted: January 31, 2012 Decided: February 16, 2012
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jerry R. Goldstein, BULMAN, DUNIE, BURKE & FELD, CHTD, Bethesda,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Neil R. White, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maria Agelli, M.D., appeals the district court’s
opinion and order granting summary judgment for the U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services in her employment
discrimination action. On appeal, Agelli contends that she
established a prima facie case that Defendant discriminated
against her on the basis of national origin, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (“Title
VII”). Agelli also alleged retaliation, in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (2006), and hostile
work environment and retaliation, in violation of Title VII.
Finding no error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, “viewing the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). If the moving party sufficiently supports its motion for
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate “that
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there are genuine issues of material fact.” Emmett, 532 F.3d at
297.
Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to [her] compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s . . . national origin.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2(a)(1). Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of
discrimination, “a plaintiff may proceed under the McDonnell
Douglas[ *] ‘pretext’ framework, under which the employee, after
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, demonstrates
that the employer’s proffered permissible reason for taking an
adverse employment action is actually a pretext for
discrimination.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). It is well established that, even under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme, the ultimate burden of
persuasion remains on the plaintiff at all times. Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
We conclude that the district court properly found
that Agelli suffered two adverse employment actions —
nonselection for a vacancy and imposition of a three-day
suspension. See James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d
*
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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371, 375 (4th Cir. 2004) (“An adverse employment action is a
discriminatory act which adversely affects the terms,
conditions, or benefits of the plaintiff’s employment.”)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). However,
Agelli has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of
discriminatory discipline based on her three-day suspension.
See Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993)
(stating elements of prima facie case of discriminatory
discipline). Additionally, while we are of the opinion that
Agelli has demonstrated a prima facie case of discriminatory
nonselection, see Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc.,
354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating elements of prima
facie case of discriminatory nonselection), we conclude that
Agelli has failed to demonstrate that Defendant’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for her nonselection were pretextual.
Turning to Agelli’s retaliation claims, we conclude
that she has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case under
Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act. See Ziskie v. Mineta, 547
F.3d 220, 229 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating elements of prima facie
case of retaliation). Likewise, we conclude that Agelli has
failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of hostile work
environment. See Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 565 (4th
Cir. 2009) (stating elements of prima facie case of hostile work
environment); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
4
17, 21-23 (1993) (explaining that courts must look to totality
of circumstances to determine whether conduct is subjectively
and objectively hostile).
Finally, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Agelli’s motion for discovery
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). See Strag v. Bd.
of Trs., 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995) (providing standard of
review).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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