David Bacchus v. Lt. Scarborough ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-7254
DAVID BACCHUS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LT. SCARBOROUGH; LT. RICHARDSON; LT. ROGERS; LT. GOODMAN;
SGT. JOHNSON; LT. MIMS; SGT. ROACH; SGT. ANDERSON; SGT.
SCARBOROUGH; OFC. EPPS; OFC. GERBODE; OFC. SILIMON; OFC.
SIMON; OFC. M. WILLIAMS; OFC. YORK; MS. S. ROBERTS; MR.
CARTER; MR. POLIETMAN; LT. JUNE; SC DEPT OF CORRECTIONS;
ROBERT WARD; DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF OPERATIONS; INSPECTOR
GENERAL DAN MURPHY; IGC A. HARDIN; DR. STAHL; NURSE LORIMER;
WARDEN PADULA; A-W BELL; A-W BROOKS; MAJOR DEAN; CAPTAIN R.
JOHNSON; CAPTAIN THOMAS; LT. HANCOCK; LT. COMMANDER; LT.
STEWART, in their official and individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:10-cv-02857-HMH)
Submitted: February 6, 2012 Decided: February 16, 2012
Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
David Bacchus, Appellant Pro Se. Walker Heinitsh Willcox,
WILLCOX BUYCK & WILLIAMS, PA, Florence, South Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
David Bacchus, a South Carolina state inmate, appeals
the district court’s order adopting the recommendation of the
magistrate judge and granting the defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a) motion for summary judgment. Bacchus’ complaint, filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), alleged numerous violations
of his Eighth Amendment rights, including excessive use of
force, deliberate indifference to his safety, and deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. Bacchus’ claims stem from a
confrontation with prison officials spurred by his violent
attack on one of the defendant corrections officers, Lieutenant
Cedric June. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for
further consideration.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment and draw all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Robinson v. Clipse,
602 F.3d 605, 607 (4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment “shall” be
granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate unless a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party
on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
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I. Excessive force claim.
In the prison context, the Eighth Amendment “protects
inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while
imprisoned.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir.
1996). Eighth Amendment analysis necessitates inquiry as to
whether a specific prison official “acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind (subjective component) and whether the
deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate was
sufficiently serious (objective component).” Id.In a claim for excessive application of force, a
claimant must meet a heavy burden to satisfy the subjective
component. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
He must show that a correctional officer applied force
“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm” rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
objective component of an excessive force claim is not as
demanding, however, because “[w]hen prison officials maliciously
and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards
of decency always are violated[,] whether or not significant
injury is evident.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178
(2010) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
To satisfy the subjective component, a claimant must
show that a prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable
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state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). In
a claim for excessive force, that state of mind is “wantonness
in the infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Seiter, 475 U.S. at 322.
In determining whether a prison official has acted with
“wantonness,” we consider: the necessity for the application of
force; the relationship between the need for force and the
amount of force used; the extent of the injury inflicted; the
extent of the threat to the safety of the staff and other
prisoners, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials
based on the facts known to them at the time; and the efforts,
if any, taken by the officials to temper the severity of the
force applied. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
Here, Bacchus’ claim of excessive force levies
allegations solely against Lieutenant June. After careful
evaluation of the record, we conclude that material issues of
fact exist regarding the nature of the force June used during
the altercation with Bacchus. Construed in a light most
favorable to Bacchus, the evidence permits a finding that June,
while verbally taunting Bacchus, repeatedly used his knee to
apply force to Bacchus’ head after other officers had
incapacitated the inmate. The district court, however, premised
its findings on the defendants’ assertion that any application
of force by June occurred during efforts to subdue Bacchus.
Because the version of the incident proffered by Bacchus could
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be credited by a reasonable factfinder, we conclude that the
district court erred by resolving the differing descriptions of
the role played by June in June’s favor. We further conclude
this error undermines the propriety of the district court’s
analysis regarding the subjective component of Bacchus’
excessive force claim. We accordingly vacate the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim as to Lieutenant
June, and remand for further proceedings. 1
II. Deliberate indifference to safety.
Bacchus’ deliberate indifference claim turns on his
allegation that prison officials failed to protect him from
Lieutenant June. To establish a claim for failure to protect,
an inmate must show: (1) “serious or significant physical or
emotional injury,” and (2) that prison officials exhibited
deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. De’Lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To be deliberately indifferent, a prison
official must “know of and disregard an objectively serious . .
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By this disposition, we do not suggest that Bacchus’ claim
is meritorious. Rather, on this record, we conclude that it is
sufficiently plausible that summary judgment was inappropriate.
We do not foreclose the possibility that further proceedings may
allow for summary judgment, either on the merits or based on
qualified immunity. These determinations, however, are left in
the first instance for the district court.
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. risk of harm.” Id. A showing of mere negligence does not
qualify as deliberate indifference. Davidson v. Canon, 474 U.S.
344, 347 (1986); Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir.
1999).
Here, neither Bacchus nor the record indicates that
any prison official knew of a meaningful risk to Bacchus’ safety
prior to his attack on Lieutenant June. Bacchus’ complaints to
prison officials regarding his verbal conflicts with Lieutenant
June failed to offer a credible indication that June posed a
physical threat to Bacchus. Furthermore, the record indicates
that the other officers involved in restraining Bacchus after he
attacked June acted appropriately to separate the men and
provide medical treatment to Bacchus. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Bacchus’ claim
of deliberate indifference to his safety.
III. Medical indifference claim.
Bacchus failed to raise any objection to the portion
of the magistrate judge’s report that recommended granting
summary judgment on his claim of medical indifference.
Therefore, he has waived appellate review of the district
court’s disposition of this claim. United States v. Midgette,
478 F.3d 616, 621-22 (4th Cir. 2007).
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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
order granting summary judgment on each of Bacchus’ claims
except for his claim against Lieutenant June of excessive use of
force. As to that claim, we vacate the grant of summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART;
AND REMANDED
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