Joseph Kauffman v. Park Place Hospitality Group ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1482
JOSEPH KAUFFMAN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
PARK PLACE HOSPITALITY GROUP, d/b/a Holiday Inn; RIVERVIEW
HOSPITALITY LLC,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (2:09-cv-01399-MBS)
Submitted: February 21, 2012 Decided: March 8, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Neil A. Morris, ARCHER & GREINER, P.C., Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Amanda Morgan Blundy, J. Bennett
Crites, III, MCANGUS GOUDELOCK & COURIE, LLC, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Kauffman appeals the district court’s orders
granting Appellees’ motion in limine and motion for summary
judgment on Kauffman’s negligence claim. Kauffman suffered a
shoulder injury when he fell walking down a ramp at a Holiday
Inn owned by Riverview Hospitality LLC and managed by Park Place
Hospitality Group. On appeal, Kauffman argues that the district
court erred in granting Appellees’ motion to exclude an
architect’s testimony and in granting Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 398 (2011). Summary judgment
shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A district court should grant
summary judgment unless a “reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party” on the evidence presented.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Under South Carolina law, “[a] cause of action for
negligence requires: (1) the existence of a duty on the part of
the defendant to protect the plaintiff; (2) the failure of the
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defendant to discharge the duty; [and] (3) injury to the
plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s failure to perform.”
S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 346
S.E.2d 324, 325 (S.C. 1986). A property owner has a duty to
exercise reasonable care for the safety of an invitee, who
enters the property at the express or implied invitation of the
owner. Sims v. Giles, 541 S.E.2d 857, 861-63 (S.C. Ct. App.
2001). Because we conclude that the 1955 International Building
Code was the code applicable to the Holiday Inn at the time of
Kauffman’s fall, that code did not require handrail extensions,
and Kauffman did not show that Appellees otherwise had a duty to
alter the ramp’s handrail, we hold that the district court did
not err in finding that Appellees did not breach their duty to
exercise reasonable care for Kauffman’s safety.
We review a district court’s evidentiary decisions for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286,
292 (4th Cir. 2010). To be qualified as an expert pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a witness “must have specialized
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact, and the knowledge,
skill, experience, training and education that qualifies [him]
on the subject of [his] testimony.” Id. at 294. Expert
testimony is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact and
(1) is “based on sufficient facts or data,” (2) is “the product
of reliable principles and methods,” and (3) the principles and
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methods have been applied reliably to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702; see PBM Products, LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
639 F.3d 111, 123 (4th Cir. 2011). “The competency and
qualifications required of expert witnesses is a matter
committed to the broad discretion of the trial judge.” Ludlow
Corp. v. Textile Rubber & Chem. Co., 636 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th
Cir. 1981).
We conclude that Kauffman’s proffered expert did not
evince specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education in the application of the building codes for which
Kauffman intended to introduce his testimony. Accordingly, we
hold that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion
in granting Appellees’ motion in limine.
We therefore affirm the district court’s orders. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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