United States v. Lionel Wells , 484 F. App'x 756 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-4478
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    LIONEL RICHARD WELLS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
    (4:10-cr-00948-RBH-1)
    Submitted:   June 8, 2012                 Decided:   June 22, 2012
    Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
    Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles,
    United States Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United
    States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Lionel Richard Wells pled guilty to possession of a
    firearm by a convicted felon.                 The district court concluded that
    Wells’   base      offense          level    should     be    calculated          under     U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2010) based upon
    his prior conviction for a “crime of violence,” namely a South
    Carolina    conviction             for   Assault    and      Battery       of    a   High    and
    Aggravated Nature (“ABHAN”). *                The court imposed a thirty-seven
    month sentence, and Wells appeals, contending that his prior
    conviction       was     not       categorically        a    crime        of    violence.        As
    explained       below,    we        vacate    Wells’        sentence       and    remand     for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    A    defendant          convicted      of   unlawful          possession        of    a
    firearm is given a base offense level of 20 if he committed the
    crime “subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either
    a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.”                                     USSG
    § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).              A    “crime    of   violence”         is    defined     by    the
    Guidelines as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for
    more than one year and (1) “has as an element the use, attempted
    use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
    *
    Wells was actually convicted of both ABHAN and Assault of
    a High and Aggravated Nature.    The district court analyzed the
    two convictions as one ABHAN conviction.          Neither party
    objected.
    2
    another,”       or     (2)    “is        burglary         of    a     dwelling,            arson,       or
    extortion,      involves       use       of    explosives,          or      otherwise        involves
    conduct       that    presents       a    serious         potential           risk     of    physical
    injury    to    another.”          USSG        § 4B1.2(a).            Here,      the       Government
    concedes that an ABHAN conviction does not satisfy subsection
    (1)     and     instead       contends             only      that      ABHAN         categorically
    “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
    risk of physical injury to another.”
    To    decide    whether         a     prior     conviction            constitutes         a
    crime    of    violence,       the       district         court     generally             must    use   a
    categorical approach.               United States v. Jenkins, 
    631 F.3d 680
    ,
    684   (4th      Cir.    2011).           This        approach       “look[s]         only        to   the
    elements of the offense . . . . [and] examin[es] [the offense]
    in terms of how the law defines it and not in terms of how an
    individual      offender       might          have     committed         it    on     a    particular
    occasion.”            Id.    (internal          quotation           marks      and        alternation
    omitted).           “For an offense to constitute a crime of violence
    under    this       approach,      the     offense’s           full    range         of    proscribed
    conduct, including the least culpable proscribed conduct, must
    fall within the applicable Guidelines definition of that term.”
    United    States       v.    King,       
    673 F.3d 274
    ,       278      (4th       Cir.     2012)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    However,       in    a     “narrow         range       of      cases”       where      the
    offense defined by the relevant law includes conduct such that
    3
    some commissions of the offense constitute crimes of violence
    and others do not, the court is to “look beyond the generic
    elements of the offense to the specific conduct underlying that
    prior offense.”          Id.    This approach is known as the modified
    categorical approach.           Id.   In applying the modified categorical
    approach, the court is limited to considering “the record of
    conviction,      which     includes    the      charging   document,         the    plea
    agreement,     and   the    transcript     of    the    plea    colloquy,     and    any
    explicit factual findings made by the trial court.”                    Id.
    Employing the categorical approach, the district court
    concluded     that     Wells’    conviction      for    ABHAN    was   a     crime    of
    violence under USSG § 4B1.1(a).                 Without expressing an opinion
    on whether a conviction for ABHAN so qualifies, we vacate Wells’
    sentence and remand this case to the district court for further
    proceedings to allow that court to determine if the modified
    categorical      approach       supports       the     conclusion      that        Wells’
    conviction for ABHAN constitutes a crime of violence under USSG
    § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).          See Anderson v. United States, 
    417 U.S. 211
    ,
    218 (1974) (“We think it inadvisable . . . to reach out . . . to
    pass    on    important     questions    of      statutory      construction        when
    simpler, and more settled, grounds are available for deciding
    the case at hand.”).           We dispense with oral argument because the
    facts   and    legal     contentions     are    adequately      presented      in    the
    4
    materials   before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-4478

Citation Numbers: 484 F. App'x 756

Judges: Motz, Gregory, Keenan

Filed Date: 6/22/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024