United States v. Jose Mercado ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4530
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSE SALAZAR MERCADO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00300-WO-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2011 Decided: January 12, 2012
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra Jane Hairston, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Salazar Mercado pled guilty, with the benefit of
a written plea agreement, to distributing fifty grams or more of
a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011), and possession of a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). The district court sentenced
Mercado to the sixty-month mandatory minimum sentence for each
offense, to be served consecutively. Mercado’s attorney
submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether Mercado’s sentence is
reasonable. Although Mercado received notice of his right to
file a pro se supplemental brief, he did not do so. Because we
find no meritorious grounds for appeal, we affirm the district
court’s judgment.
This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness
applying an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In determining the procedural
reasonableness of a sentence, we consider whether the district
court properly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the
Guidelines as advisory, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties,
and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. Finally,
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we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances.” United
States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
Because Mercado did not request a sentence different
than the sentence ultimately imposed, our review is for plain
error. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir.
2010); see United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43
(4th Cir. 2009) (discussing plain error standard). Here, the
district court followed the necessary procedural steps in
sentencing Mercado, properly calculating the Guidelines range,
considering the § 3553(a) factors, and sentencing Mercado to the
very sentence he requested — the mandatory minimum sentence on
each count. As to substantive reasonableness, “[a] statutorily
required [mandatory minimum] sentence . . . is per se
reasonable.” United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th
Cir. 2008). Hence, we conclude that the 120-month sentence
imposed by the district court was reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Mercado in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Mercado requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
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counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Mercado.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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