United States v. Carlos Watson ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4074
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARLOS DEMONT WATSON, a/k/a Doughboy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00075-BO-1)
Submitted: June 28, 2012 Decided: July 5, 2012
Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joshua W. Willey, Jr., MILLS & WILLEY, New Bern, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Demont Watson appeals his 300-month sentence
following a guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006), distribution of five grams or
more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and
aiding and abetting in the distribution of cocaine base, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On
appeal, Watson argues that the district court erred by: (1)
applying a three-level sentencing enhancement for his role as a
manager or supervisor in the offense, pursuant to U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3B1.1(b) (2011); and (2)
applying a two-level sentencing enhancement for possession of a
firearm during the offense, pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1. Finding
no reversible error, we affirm.
We first address Watson’s challenge to the three-level
enhancement for his leadership role in the offense. We review
the district court’s factual findings regarding a sentencing
enhancement for clear error and the legal interpretations of the
Guidelines de novo. United States v. Carter, 601 F.3d 252, 254
(4th Cir. 2010). The district court’s ruling regarding a role
adjustment is a factual determination reviewed for clear error.
United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 147-48 (4th Cir. 2009).
Clear error occurs “when, although there is evidence to support
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it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 336 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A three-level sentencing enhancement under USSG
§ 3B1.1(b) is warranted if “the defendant was a manager or
supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal
activity involved five or more participants.” To qualify for
such an enhancement, the defendant must have managed or
supervised “one or more other participants.” USSG § 3B1.1, cmt.
n.2. The enhancement is appropriate where the evidence
demonstrates that the defendant “controlled the activities of
other participants” or “exercised management responsibility.”
United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 190 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citing United States v. Bartley, 230 F.3d 667, 673-74 (4th Cir.
2000)). In determining whether an enhancement under USSG
§ 3B1.1(b) is warranted, a court should consider:
(1) the exercise of decision making authority, (2) the
nature of participation in the commission of the
offense, (3) the recruitment of accomplices, (4) the
claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the
crime, (5) the degree of participation in planning or
organizing the offense, (6) the nature and scope of
the illegal activity, and (7) the degree of control
and authority exercised over others.
United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 148 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting USSG § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4).
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Watson asserts that the three-level enhancement for
his role as a supervisor or manager in the drug trafficking
business was erroneous because he did not exercise sufficient
control, direction, or supervision over his co-conspirator and
girlfriend, Brittany Williams, to make him a manager or
supervisor within USSG § 3B1.1(b). We disagree. Watson
attempts to analogize his conduct to that of the defendant in
United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185 (4th Cir. 2011), in which
this court found the district court’s enhancement to be
erroneous. In Slade, this court emphasized that, although the
defendant’s cousin, an unindicted co-conspirator, drove the
defendant to various locations to deliver drugs, there was no
indication that he did so as a result of any exercise of
managerial or supervisory authority by the defendant. Id. at
191.
However, unlike Slade, Williams did not simply drive
Watson to various location to deliver drugs; rather, Watson hid
drugs outside of Williams’ home and instructed her where to
locate the drugs, who would be picking up the drugs, and how
much she should collect. Moreover, Watson fails to address his
supervisory control over his uncle, Raymond Harris, who he
compensated with small quantities of crack cocaine in exchange
for the use of Harris’ home to conduct drug sales. Given that
Watson exercised control over both his girlfriend and his uncle,
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the district court did not clearly err in applying a three-level
sentencing enhancement for Watson’s role as a manager or
supervisor in the drug trafficking offense.
We now turn to Watson’s challenge to the two-level
enhancement for possession of a firearm during the offense.
Pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), a two-level sentencing
enhancement is appropriate if a “dangerous weapon (including a
firearm) was possessed” during the commission of the offense for
which the defendant was convicted, “unless it is clearly
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.”
Slade, 631 F.3d at 188 (quoting USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3).
The enhancement is proper when “the weapon was possessed in
connection with drug activity that was part of the same course
of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction,”
United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 628-29 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted), even in the absence of
“proof of precisely concurrent acts, for example, gun in hand
while in the act of storing drugs, drugs in hand while in the
act of retrieving a gun.” United States v. Harris, 128 F.3d
850, 852 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “[P]ossession of the weapon during the commission of
the offense is all that is needed to invoke the enhancement.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant bears the
burden to show that a connection between his possession of a
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firearm and his narcotic offense is “clearly improbable.”
Slade, 631 F.3d at 189.
Watson asserts that the two-level sentencing
enhancement for possession of a firearm during the commission of
the offense was not supported by credible evidence.
Specifically, Watson questions the credibility of witnesses who
told investigators that they saw Watson with a gun during a drug
transaction, emphasizing that his criminal history is devoid of
any firearms charges or convictions and the confidential
informant never viewed a firearm during his controlled narcotics
purchases from Watson.
We conclude that the district court did not clearly
err in applying a two-level sentencing enhancement for
possession of a firearm during the drug trafficking offense. As
determined from the respective debriefings of witnesses, the
following facts support the two-level enhancement: Angelo Cooper
sold Watson a firearm; Demetrius Whitehead saw Watson with a
handgun on his lap during a drug transaction; and Jhirmick Gray
viewed Watson in close proximity to a black semi-automatic
firearm during a drug sale, stating that Watson always carried a
gun. Although Watson questions the credibility of these
witnesses, he fails to establish that his possession of a
firearm during his drug trafficking was “clearly improbable.”
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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