United States v. Smith , 354 F. App'x 830 ( 2009 )


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  •                   Vacated by Supreme Court, June 21, 2010
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-4118
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    DESMOND JAMAR SMITH,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
    District Judge. (4:08-cr-00033-BR-1)
    Submitted:    October 30, 2009                Decided:   December 9, 2009
    Before MICHAEL and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research
    and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes,
    Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Desmond    Jamar     Smith           pled      guilty     without         a     plea
    agreement to one count of being a felon in possession of a
    firearm and ammunition, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1),
    924 (2006), and was sentenced to 210 months in prison.                                   Smith’s
    sole argument on appeal is that the district court erred in
    sentencing him as an armed career criminal because he alleges
    that:   (i)     his    four     prior    North          Carolina    felony     breaking         and
    entering convictions were not proper predicate offenses under
    the    Armed    Career    Criminal        Act       (“ACCA”),       
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)
    (2006),    since       they   allegedly        do       not   involve    conduct         that    is
    purposeful, violent and aggressive and were not punishable by
    more than twelve months’ imprisonment; and (ii) his Fifth and
    Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the district court
    enhanced       his    sentence    based        on       uncharged      facts    about         prior
    convictions neither admitted to by Smith, nor proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt.         Finding no error, we affirm.
    Smith    contends        that       we    should    review      the     district
    court’s decision that his prior convictions for breaking and
    entering      are     violent    crimes        under      the   ACCA     in    light     of     the
    Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 1581
        (2008)        (holding     that        a        “violent    felony”       under         the
    “otherwise” clause in 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e) (2006) must be roughly
    similar to enumerated crimes), and Chambers v. United States,
    2
    
    129 S. Ct. 687
        (2009)    (holding,            in   accord       with     Begay,     that
    failure to report for penal confinement is not a violent felony
    under    §    924(e)).         Begay      was     decided         well   before          Smith   pled
    guilty or was sentenced, but he did not object to his armed
    career criminal status on this ground in the district court.
    Therefore,         this    issue     is    reviewed         for       plain    error.        United
    States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732 (1993).
    We look to our case law interpreting both the terms
    “crime       of    violence”       under     U.S.      Sentencing            Guidelines      Manual
    § 4B1.1 (2008) and “violent felony” under                              § 924(e) because the
    language          defining    these       terms       is    “nearly       identical         []     and
    materially          indistinguishable.”                United          States       v.    Roseboro,
    
    551 F.3d 226
    , 229 n.2 (4th Cir. 2009).                               Burglary of a dwelling
    is one of the crimes enumerated in                          § 4B1.2(a)(2) as a crime of
    violence.          As Smith concedes, this court has held that the North
    Carolina offense of breaking and entering is “generic burglary.”
    United States v. Thompson, 
    421 F.3d 278
    , 284 (4th Cir. 2005)
    (following         Taylor    v.    United       States,         
    495 U.S. 575
          (1990),      in
    interpreting § 924(e)).               Because the Supreme Court in Begay made
    clear      that      “a    felony     that      is     one      of     the    example       crimes”
    specifically enumerated in the statute (i.e., burglary) is a
    proper       predicate       offense,      Smith       was      properly       sentenced         as    a
    career offender.
    3
    Smith      also        asserts       that        he     lacked           the   required
    predicate     convictions           for     his       armed       career        criminal         status
    because,     under    North      Carolina’s            structured          sentencing          scheme,
    his particular prior convictions were not punishable by a term
    of imprisonment exceeding one year.                         Smith nonetheless correctly
    concedes     that    his    argument        is        foreclosed          by    our    decision      in
    United States v. Harp, 
    406 F.3d 242
    , 246-47 (4th Cir. 2005)
    (holding that to determine if a crime is punishable by a term
    exceeding     one    year,      a    sentencing            court     should          consider       “the
    maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime
    upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history”).
    Last, Smith argues that the district court violated
    his   constitutional         rights       when        it    sentenced          him     as   an     armed
    career criminal because the predicate felony convictions used to
    increase     the     statutory        penalties             for     his    offense          were    not
    alleged in the indictment or admitted by him as part of his
    guilty   plea.        This      argument         fails       under        controlling          circuit
    precedent.     See Thompson, 
    421 F.3d at
    284 n.4 (holding that an
    indictment     need     not     reference         or       list     the        prior    convictions
    underlying the enhancement); see also United States v. Cheek,
    
    415 F.3d 349
    ,      352-53       (4th     Cir.          2005)    (holding           that     prior
    convictions      used      as   the       basis       for    an     armed       career      criminal
    sentence need not be charged in the indictment or proven beyond
    a reasonable doubt).
    4
    Moreover, although Smith recognizes that the Supreme
    Court has also held that the Government need not plead a prior
    conviction in an indictment or present such evidence to a jury
    in    order         to     rely        on     it   to        enhance      a     sentence,          see
    Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 226-27, 247
    (1998),        he     asserts          that     Almendarez-Torres              was    incorrectly
    decided, as suggested in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    ,
    489     (2000)        (“[I]t          is    arguable     that       Almendarez-Torres             was
    incorrectly decided.”), and Shepard v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 13
    , 27 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that “a majority
    of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly
    decided”)       (citations            omitted).          Though       many     defendants         have
    argued        that       the    prior        conviction        exception        set       forth     in
    Almendarez-Torres               may    no     longer    be     good     law,    Booker      clearly
    maintained the prior conviction exception.                              See United States v.
    Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 244 (2005) (“Any fact (other than a prior
    conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence . . . must
    be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury”).                                   Thus, while
    a sentencing court is not permitted to resolve disputed facts
    about     a    prior       conviction           that     are      not    evident      from        “the
    conclusive significance of a prior judicial record,” Shepard,
    
    544 U.S. at 25
    , a determination that a defendant is eligible for
    sentencing           under       the        ACCA   may       be    based        on    a     judge’s
    determination            that    the       predicate     convictions           are   for    violent
    5
    felonies or drug trafficking crimes if the qualifying facts are
    inherent     in    the    predicate       convictions            and    the    court    is   not
    required     to    perform       additional         fact    finding.           See    Thompson,
    
    421 F.3d at 282-83
    ; see also Cheek, 
    415 F.3d at 354
     (holding
    that, under the Sixth Amendment, the fact of a prior conviction
    need not be submitted to the jury or admitted by the defendant
    for   it    to    serve    as     the    basis      for     a    sentence       enhancement).
    Accordingly,        we    find    that    the       district      court’s       armed    career
    criminal         enhancement       to     Smith’s          offense           level    was    not
    unconstitutional.
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
    judgment.        We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal      contentions      are    adequately         presented         in     the    materials
    before     the    court    and     argument         would       not    aid    the    decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    6