Phyllis Parsons v. Michael Astrue ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1611
PHYLLIS DIANE PARSONS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Mary E. Stanley,
Magistrate Judge. (2:10-cv-00151)
Submitted: August 30, 2012 Decided: October 11, 2012
Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Timothy M. CAIN,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Carter Zerbe, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Eric P.
Kressman, Regional Chief Counsel, Region III, Victor Pane,
Supervisory Attorney, Jordana Cooper, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Office of the
General Counsel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Phyllis Diane Parsons filed for Social Security
disability benefits on August 18, 2006, noting an onset date of
March 1, 2005. Parsons claimed the following ailments in
support of her disability claim: neuropathy, carpal tunnel,
rheumatoid arthritis, bulging disc, arthritis in lower back,
anemia, anxiety attacks, and acid reflux. Parsons later amended
her claim to add the following ailments: pain in back and hands,
depression, tendonitis in knees and feet, mood swings, lack of
libido, bad memory, and fibromyalgia.
After her initial claim was denied, Parsons requested
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following
the hearing, the ALJ denied Parsons’ claim, concluding that she
suffered from several severe impairments, including “chronic
arthralgias, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,
carpal tunnel syndrome, peripheral neuropathy, and obesity,”
(A.R. 12), but that she was not disabled because she retained
the residual function capacity to perform a range of light work.
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ rejected testimony from
Parsons’ treating physicians as “inconsistent with the treatment
record and the objective evidence of record,” and also found
that Parsons’ testimony regarding her subjective pain lacked
credibility. (A.R. 21). Parsons appealed to the Appeals
2
Council of the Social Security Administration, which denied the
appeal.
With her administrative route concluded, Parsons filed
a civil action in federal district court in February 2010. The
parties consented to proceeding before a magistrate judge, and
on March 11, 2011, the magistrate judge upheld the ALJ’s
decision. The magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ correctly
rejected the testimony from the two treating physicians and that
the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Parsons filed a timely appeal of the magistrate’s order.
Our review of the ALJ’s decision in an action
involving disability benefits is circumscribed, and we must
uphold the ALJ’s factual findings if they are supported by
substantial evidence and reached by applying the correct legal
standard. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It “consists
of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a
preponderance.” Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir.
1996). “In reviewing for substantial evidence, we do not
undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the
[ALJ].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
3
“‘Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ
as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for
that decision falls on the [ALJ].’” Id. (quoting Walker v.
Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987)).
On appeal, Parsons contends that the ALJ failed to
properly understand her fibromyalgia and that substantial
evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision because the ALJ
incorrectly rejected her treating physicians’ opinions, found
her mental impairments to be non-severe, and found her testimony
not credible. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the
decision of the magistrate judge, and the applicable law, we
affirm substantially on the reasoning of the magistrate judge’s
thorough order. See Parsons v. Astrue, No. 2:10-CV-00151, 2011
WL 1234464 (S.D. W.Va. March 30, 2011). We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before us and oral argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4