United States v. Anthony Coleman , 473 F. App'x 223 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4989
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY COLEMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:10-
cr-00305-RWT-1)
Submitted: April 25, 2012 Decided: May 9, 2012
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan S. Skelton,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Stacy
Dawson Belf, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Coleman pled guilty to unlawful possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006), and was sentenced as an armed career
criminal to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years
prescribed by 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West Supp. 2011). Coleman
appeals his sentence, arguing that imposition of the fifteen-
year sentence was error because mandatory minimum sentences
conflict with the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) to
impose a sentence “sufficient but not greater than necessary.”
He further contends that a fifteen-year sentence is greater than
necessary in his case to achieve the sentencing goals of
§ 3553(a). We affirm.
The Sentencing Reform Act, of which § 3553(a) is part,
dictates that a defendant should be sentenced in accordance with
its provisions to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) “[e]xcept
as otherwise specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a)
(2006). Courts have generally held that mandatory minimum
sentences are “otherwise specifically provided” and thus do not
conflict with § 3553(a)’s “sufficient but not greater than
necessary” clause. See United States v. Sutton, 625 F.3d 526,
529 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289
(3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he mandatory minimum sentences [the
defendant] was exposed to pursuant to [statute] clearly fit
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within the ‘except as otherwise specifically provided’ exclusion
of § 3551(a).”). “Courts have uniformly rejected the claim that
§ 3553(a)’s ‘no greater than necessary’ language authorizes a
district court to sentence below the statutory minimum.” United
States v. Cirilo-Muñoz, 582 F.3d 54, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (listing cases); see also United States v. Franklin, 499
F.3d 578, 585 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[Section] 3553(a) factors do not
apply to congressionally mandated sentences”); United States v.
Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (although
acknowledging the tension between § 3553(a) and statutorily-
mandated sentences, holding that § 3553(a) as a “very general
statute cannot be understood to authorize courts to sentence
below minimums specifically prescribed by Congress.”). In
United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 2005), we held
that, post-Booker, except in limited circumstances not present
here, “a district court still may not depart below a statutory
minimum.” Id. at 862. Coleman’s reliance on United States v.
Raby, 575 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2009), is misplaced, as that case
provides no guidance on sentencing below a mandatory minimum.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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