United States v. August Kreis, III ( 2012 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4004
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff -Appellee,
    v.
    AUGUST BYRON KREIS, III,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
    Judge. (3:11-cr-00646-JFA-1)
    Submitted:   June 26, 2012                    Decided:   July 6, 2012
    Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Allen B. Burnside, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
    South Carolina, for Appellant.      William N. Nettles, United
    States Attorney, Dean A. Eichelberger, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    August Byron Kreis, III, pled guilty pursuant to a
    plea agreement to one count of knowingly falsifying an Improved
    Pension    Eligibility    Verification          Report,      in    violation   of    
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    (a)(3) (2006), and was sentenced to time served and
    two years’ supervised release.                 Kreis was also ordered to pay
    $192,837 in restitution.           Kreis asserts that the district court
    erred when it calculated the loss amount attributable to his
    crime and, thus, he argues that the district court erroneously
    calculated his restitution amount.              We affirm.
    Although     the       district       court’s         “[d]iscretion      in
    ordering   restitution        is   circumscribed        by   the     procedural     and
    substantive       protections         of        the        statute       authorizing
    restitution[,]” United States v. Leftwich, 
    628 F.3d 665
    , 667
    (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
    where an identifiable victim has suffered pecuniary loss, the
    district court must order restitution in the full amount of the
    victim’s      loss,    regardless       of        the      defendant’s      economic
    circumstances.        See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663A, 3664(f)(1)(A) (West
    2000 & Supp. 2011).           We review a district court’s restitution
    order for abuse of discretion.             See United States v. Llamas, 
    599 F.3d 381
    , 387 (4th Cir. 2010).
    However,     we    review      “for    clear     error    the   district
    court’s factual determination of the amount of loss attributable
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    to [Kreis], mindful that the [district] court need only make a
    reasonable estimate of the loss.”                   United States v. Cloud, 
    680 F.3d 396
    ,    409    (4th    Cir.    2012)       (construing     United     States   v.
    Miller, 
    316 F.3d 495
    , 503 (4th Cir. 2003), and USSG § 2B1.1 cmt.
    n.3(C)), pet. for cert. filed, June 8, 2012.                        This deferential
    standard of review requires reversal only if this court is “left
    with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
    committed.”      United States v. Stevenson, 
    396 F.3d 538
    , 542 (4th
    Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 
    470 U.S. 564
    , 573
    (1985)).         We        nonetheless       review       the     district       court’s
    interpretation        of     the     term        “loss”   under     the    Sentencing
    Guidelines under a de novo standard of review.                      See Miller, 
    316 F.3d at 498
    ; United States v. Parsons, 
    109 F.3d 1002
    , 1004 (4th
    Cir. 1997).
    We have reviewed the record and have considered the
    parties’ arguments and conclude that the district court did not
    err in calculating the amount of loss to attribute to Kreis and,
    thus, did not err in calculating Kreis’s restitution amount.
    Accordingly,     we    affirm      the      district      court’s    judgment.        We
    dispense      with    oral     argument       because      the    facts    and    legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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