United States v. Mfariji Gaskin , 474 F. App'x 923 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4771
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MFARIJI GASKIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:09-cr-00307-NCT-1)
Submitted: March 30, 2012 Decided: April 11, 2012
Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Darren Byers, LAW OFFICES OF J. DARREN BYERS, P.A.,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Albert
Jamison Lang, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mfariji Gaskin pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to possession with the intent to distribute 6.5 grams
of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). The district court
calculated Gaskin’s Guidelines range under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (2009) at 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment and
sentenced Gaskin to 209 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues
for appeal, but questioning whether Gaskin’s sentence is
substantively reasonable. The Government elected not to file a
brief and does not seek to enforce the plea agreement’s appeal
waiver. * We treat Gaskin’s pro se notice of appeal — which
raises arguments challenging his conviction — as a pro se
supplemental brief. We affirm.
This court reviews Gaskin’s 209-month sentence for
reasonableness under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007).
This review entails appellate consideration of both the
*
Because the Government fails to assert the waiver as a bar
to the appeal, we may consider the issues raised by counsel and
Gaskin and conduct an independent review of the record pursuant
to Anders. United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271
(4th Cir. 2007).
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procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
Id. at 51. In determining procedural reasonableness, this court
considers whether the district court properly calculated the
defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, selected a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failed to explain sufficiently the selected
sentence. Id. at 49-51. If the sentence is free of significant
procedural error, this court reviews it for substantive
reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. at 51. This court applies a presumption on
appeal that a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines
range is reasonable. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d
212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a presumption is rebutted only
when the defendant shows “that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the district court properly calculated
the Guidelines range and heard argument from counsel and
allocution from Gaskin. The court considered the § 3553(a)
factors and explained that a within-Guidelines sentence was
warranted in view of the nature and circumstances of Gaskin’s
offense, his history and characteristics, and the need for the
sentence to protect the public. Counsel suggests that the
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209-month sentence is greater than necessary to achieve the
purposes of sentencing in light of the drug quantity
attributable to Gaskin. We reject this argument because it
essentially asks the court to substitute its judgment for that
of the district court. We defer to the district court’s
decision that the 209-month sentence achieved the purposes of
sentencing in Gaskin’s case. See United States v. Jeffery, 631
F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.) (“[D]istrict courts have extremely
broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of
the § 3553(a) factors.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 187 (2011).
Gaskin fails to rebut the presumption that his within-Guidelines
sentence is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Gaskin.
Additionally, in accordance with Anders, we have
reviewed the issues in Gaskin’s pro se supplemental brief and
the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious
issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Gaskin, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Gaskin requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
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leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Gaskin.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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