United States v. Garworth Williams , 474 F. App'x 938 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4144
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARWORTH WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:11-cr-02118-GRA-1)
Submitted: August 7, 2012 Decided: August 15, 2012
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Loggins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr.,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Garworth Williams pled guilty without a plea agreement
to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1708 (2006). The district court
calculated Williams’ Guidelines range under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (2011) at fifty-one to sixty months’
imprisonment and sentenced Williams to fifty-one months’
imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether
the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence.
Williams was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief, but he has not done so. The Government declined to file
a brief. We affirm.
This court reviews Williams’ sentence for
reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007).
This review entails appellate consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
Id. at 51. In determining procedural reasonableness, this court
considers whether the district court properly calculated the
defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the parties an
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, selected a sentence based on
2
clearly erroneous facts, or failed to explain sufficiently the
selected sentence. Id. at 49-51. If the sentence is free of
significant procedural error, this court reviews it for
substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality
of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. If the sentence is within
the properly calculated Guidelines range, this court applies a
presumption on appeal that the sentence is substantively
reasonable. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217
(4th Cir. 2010). Such a presumption is rebutted only by a
showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In this case, the district court correctly calculated
and considered the advisory Guidelines range, heard argument
from counsel, and gave Williams the opportunity to allocute.
The court considered the § 3553(a) factors and explained that
the within-Guideline sentence of fifty-one months’ imprisonment
was warranted in light of Williams’ timely admission of guilt
and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of
Williams’ offense, to provide just punishment, to deter future
criminal conduct by Williams, and to protect the public.
Williams does not offer any grounds to rebut the presumption on
appeal that the within-Guidelines sentence is substantively
3
reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Williams.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Williams, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Williams requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Williams.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4