United States v. Tealzie Randall, III , 475 F. App'x 459 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5109
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TEALZIE RANDALL, III, a/k/a Tealize Randall, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00800-PMD-8)
Submitted: August 16, 2012 Decided: August 20, 2012
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven M. Hisker, HISKER LAW FIRM, PC, Duncan, South Carolina,
for Appellant. Alston Calhoun Badger, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tealzie Randall, III, appeals the eighty-four-month
sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea
to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). On appeal,
Randall’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the
reasonableness of the sentence. Randall filed a pro se
supplemental brief. * Finding no error, we affirm.
In reviewing a sentence, we must first ensure that the
district court did not commit any significant procedural error,
such as failing to properly calculate the applicable Guidelines
range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors, or failing to adequately explain the sentence. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Once we have determined
that there is no procedural error, we must then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into
*
Randall contends that counsel was ineffective in
presenting his motion to suppress evidence. We conclude that
the record does not conclusively demonstrate that counsel was
ineffective. See United States v. Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 979
(4th Cir. 1998) (providing standard); see also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984) (providing elements of
ineffective assistance claim). Thus, we decline to consider
this claim on direct appeal.
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account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. If the
sentence imposed is within the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines
range, we presume it is reasonable. United States v. Mendoza-
Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). This presumption
may be rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Upon review, we conclude that the
district court committed no procedural or substantive error in
sentencing Randall to eighty-four months’ imprisonment, a
sentence within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. See
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 587 (4th Cir. 2010)
(providing standard of review); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Randall, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Randall requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Randall. We deny Randall’s request for new
counsel and dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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