United States v. Shaun Grier ( 2015 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-4054
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    SHAUN ORLANDO GRIER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt.      Alexander Williams, Jr., District
    Judge. (8:13-cr-00243-AW-1)
    Submitted:   September 30, 2015           Decided:   October 13, 2015
    Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Marnitta L. King, KING LAW P.A., Largo Maryland, for Appellant.
    Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Thomas P. Windom,
    Deborah   A.  Johnston,   Assistant United   States  Attorneys,
    Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Shaun Orlando Grier appeals his convictions on charges of
    possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine (“PCP”) and
    cocaine base, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
    trafficking offense, and possession of a firearm by a person
    previously convicted of a felony offense.                   The district court
    sentenced Grier to an aggregate of 350 months’ imprisonment.                          On
    appeal, he challenges a number of evidentiary rulings by the
    district court, and he asserts that the district court abused
    its discretion by limiting the time for his closing argument to
    the jury.     Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
    Grier    first    contends   that        the   district     court   erred       in
    denying his motion to suppress the contents of a package he
    placed in the mail intended to be sent to an address in San
    Francisco, California, and his motion to suppress evidence of
    the   drugs    and    firearms   recovered        during    the    search   of    his
    residence     and    vehicles.     When       considering   the    validity      of    a
    search pursuant to a warrant, the district court must determine
    whether the magistrate judge issuing the search warrant had a
    “substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”
    United States v. Blackwood, 
    913 F.2d 139
    , 142 (4th Cir. 1990).
    We conclude that the district court did not err in determining
    that the search warrants were valid.                 Accordingly, the district
    court did not err in denying the motions to suppress evidence
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    recovered pursuant to the warrants.                       See United States v. Jones,
    
    667 F.3d 477
    , 481-82 (4th Cir. 2012) (providing standard).
    Next, Grier contends that the district court abused its
    discretion      with     respect       to    a    number    of     evidentiary       rulings,
    specifically,       by        limiting      Grier’s       cross-examination          of     the
    postal inspector as to the legality of the seizure of a package
    that he intended to mail to California, allowing the Government
    to introduce evidence of his prior conviction for possession
    with intent to distribute PCP, overruling his objection to the
    Government’s use of leading questions during its questioning of
    Grier’s mother who was called as a Government witness, allowing
    the    Government        to     introduce         hearsay    evidence          of   his    bank
    balances, excluding the testimony and report of the Government’s
    forensic chemist, and denying Grier’s request to call his own
    expert    to    testify        as     to    the       contents     of    the    Government’s
    expert’s report.              We have reviewed the arguments presented by
    the parties and find no abuse of discretion by the district
    court’s rulings.          See United States v. Cole, 
    631 F.3d 146
    , 153
    (4th     Cir.   2011)         (reviewing          court     will        only   overturn      an
    evidentiary     ruling         that    is   arbitrary       and     irrational);          United
    States v. Johnson, 
    617 F.3d 286
    , 292 (4th Cir. 2010) (district
    court has discretion to admit or exclude evidence).
    Lastly, Grier contends that the district court abused its
    discretion and prejudiced his defense by cutting short counsel’s
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    closing argument.        The court agreed to the parties’ request for
    45   minutes      each   for    closing       arguments.        Prior        to   closing
    arguments, the court reminded the parties of the time limit.
    During     the    closing      arguments,        the   court    advised       both      the
    Government       attorney    and     Grier’s       attorney    when    they       had   ten
    minutes remaining and also when five minutes remained.                             At the
    end of the 45 minutes, Grier’s counsel requested an additional
    five minutes.        The court acquiesced, and then allowed Grier’s
    counsel to continue her summation for ten minutes.                                At that
    time, Grier’s summation was 55 minutes, and the court informed
    counsel that her time was up.               We find no abuse of discretion by
    the district court in imposing and enforcing this time limit.
    See United States v. Alaniz, 
    148 F.3d 929
    , 935 (8th Cir. 1998)
    (providing standard); United States v. Moye, 
    951 F.2d 59
    , 63
    (5th Cir. 1992) (same); see also United States v. Collins, 
    372 F.3d 629
    , 634 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding defendant’s challenge
    to 45-minute limitation on closing argument “unpersuasive”).
    Having found no error and no abuse of discretion by the
    district court, we affirm Grier’s convictions.                     We dispense with
    oral     argument    because        the    facts    and   legal    contentions          are
    adequately       presented     in    the    materials     before      this    court     and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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