United States v. Lanaire White , 480 F. App'x 193 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4999
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LANAIRE E. WHITE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Mark S. Davis, District
Judge. (4:11-cr-00011-MSD-TEM-1)
Submitted: April 20, 2012 Decided: May 4, 2012
Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen A. Hudgins, STEPHEN A. HUDGINS, PC, Poquoson, Virginia,
for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Brian
J. Samuels, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lanaire E. White challenges the district court’s
jurisdiction over his prosecution. A jury convicted White of
sixteen federal offenses: conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1343, 1349 (West Supp. 2011) (Count
1); wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1343, 2 (West
Supp. 2011) (Counts 2-10); theft of government property, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 2 (2006) (Count 11); unauthorized
access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2), 2
(2006) (Counts 12-15); and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006)
(Count 16). He was sentenced to eighty-four months’
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release and
ordered to pay restitution and a special assessment. We affirm.
White contends that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over his prosecution because he is a Moorish
American. White’s argument seems to rest on the proposition
that his ancestors were captured, bonded into slavery, and
transported to the United States against their will and then
ostensibly (but not actually) made citizens of the United States
through emancipation from slavery. According to White,
descendants of freed slaves are not United States citizens, but
confiscated human property for which no compensation has been
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paid. His argument, however, fails to make the necessary link
between his historical recitation and the jurisdiction of
federal district courts. ∗
We review a challenge to a district court’s
jurisdiction de novo. United States v. Winfield, 665 F.3d 107,
109 (4th Cir. 2012). We find no merit in White’s jurisdictional
argument. Neither the citizenship nor the heritage of a
defendant constitutes a key ingredient to a district court’s
jurisdiction in criminal prosecutions: “The district courts of
the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the states, of all offenses against the laws of
the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2006); see also Hugi v.
United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Subject-
matter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution comes
from 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and there can be no doubt that Article
III permits Congress to assign federal criminal prosecutions to
federal courts. That’s the beginning and the end of the
‘jurisdictional’ inquiry.” (quoted in United States v. Hartwell,
448 F.3d 707, 716 (4th Cir. 2006)).
∗
To the extent that White’s opening brief obtusely refers
to other potential arguments, we find those arguments waived for
failure to develop them as required by Fed. R. App. P. 28. See,
e.g., Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 653 n.7 (4th
Cir. 2006).
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Physical presence in the United States usually
supplies the only necessary prerequisite for personal
jurisdiction in a federal criminal prosecution. See United
States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1983) (“It has
long been the general rule that a court’s power to try a
criminal defendant is not impaired by the government’s use of
even forcible abduction to bring the defendant within the
court’s jurisdiction.”); see also United States v. Burke, 425
F.3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Personal jurisdiction is
supplied by the fact that [the defendant] is within the
territory of the United States.”); United States v. Rendon, 354
F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A federal district court has
personal jurisdiction to try any defendant brought before it on
a federal indictment charging a violation of federal law.”).
The manner through which a defendant found himself within the
United States generally does not affect the jurisdiction of the
district court to preside over his prosecution. See United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992) (district
court had jurisdiction over prosecution of Mexican national who
had been forcibly kidnapped and brought to the United States
where abduction did not violate extradition treaty between
United States and Mexico); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522
(1952) (“[T]he power of a court to try a person for crime is not
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impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s
jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’” (citing
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886)); see also Kasi v.
Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 493-500 (4th Cir. 2002) (forcible
abduction of defendant from Pakistan did not divest state trial
court of jurisdiction because such abductions were not
prohibited by relevant extradition treaty); United States v.
Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1990) (district court had
jurisdiction over defendants involuntarily deported from the
Philippines to the United States); United States v. Arbane, 446
F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A] criminal defendant cannot
defeat personal jurisdiction by asserting the illegality of the
procurement of his presence in the relevant jurisdiction — here,
the United States.”).
We therefore find no merit in White’s claim that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over his prosecution because
his ancestors had been illegally seized and brought to the
United States. He was present in the district court and
prosecuted for the commission of federal offenses. In short,
“[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to
permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice
because he was brought to trial against his will.” Frisbie, 342
U.S. at 522.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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