Darvishian v. Geren , 404 F. App'x 822 ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-1672
    ALI DARVISHIAN,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    PETE GEREN, Secretary of the Department of the Army,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria.   T. S. Ellis, III, Senior
    District Judge. (1:08-cv-00009-TSE-TCB)
    Argued:   September 21, 2010                 Decided:   December 14, 2010
    Before GREGORY and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and James C. DEVER
    III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
    North Carolina, sitting by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion.        Judge Keenan wrote           the
    opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Dever joined.
    ARGUED: Gary M. Gilbert, LAW OFFICES OF GARY M. GILBERT, PC,
    Silver   Spring,  Maryland,   for  Appellant.    Leslie  Bonner
    McClendon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
    Virginia, for Appellee.   ON BRIEF: Thomas J. Gagliardo, Silver
    Spring, Maryland, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States
    Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    KEENAN, Circuit Judge:
    Ali Darvishian, a 23-year civil servant of Iranian descent,
    appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor
    of his former employer, the Secretary of the Army (Secretary),
    on claims brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
    VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006).                                Darvishian
    alleged that the Secretary violated Title VII by removing him
    from federal employment because he is Iranian and Muslim, and
    because       he   filed    discrimination          claims     against       his   superiors
    with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
    The    district     court       dismissed      these    claims,         holding    that
    Darvishian presented insufficient evidence that the Secretary’s
    nondiscriminatory           and       nonretaliatory     reasons       for      his    removal
    were “pretext for discrimination.”                       See        Tex. Dep’t of Cmty.
    Affairs v. Burdine, 
    450 U.S. 248
    , 253 (1981).                                   The district
    court    also      affirmed       a    final    decision       of    the    Merit      Systems
    Protection Board (the Board) upholding Darvishian’s removal from
    federal service.
    We    review    the    summary        judgment    decision         on   Darvishian’s
    Title VII claims de novo, applying the same standard as the
    district       court.         See      Fed.    R.     Civ.     P.    56(c);      Holland    v.
    Washington         Homes,     Inc.,     
    487 F.3d 208
    ,    213    (4th      Cir.    2007).
    Under that standard, summary judgment is appropriate when “there
    is no genuine issue as to any material fact.”                              Fed. R. Civ. P.
    2
    56(c)(2); Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 
    601 F.3d 289
    , 295 (4th Cir. 2010).                Therefore, summary judgment may be
    granted when there is insufficient evidence for a jury to return
    a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.                            See Holland, 
    487 F.3d at 213
    .
    In our separate review of the Board’s decision, we must
    affirm      the   Board       unless    the        decision      is   “(1)     arbitrary,
    capricious,       an    abuse     of    discretion,         or      otherwise    not    in
    accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by
    law,     rule,     or     regulation      having        been        followed;    or     (3)
    unsupported by substantial evidence.”                   
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c).            Upon
    our    review     of    the    record,    we       affirm     the     district    court’s
    judgment in both the Title VII action and the court’s review of
    the Board’s decision.
    I.
    We   present      the    facts    in       the   light     most    favorable     to
    Darvishian, and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
    Holland, 
    487 F.3d at 213
    .                 The record before us shows that
    before his removal from the federal service on July 7, 2006,
    Darvishian was a General Engineer at the level of GS-14 working
    for the Army Contracting Agency (the Agency), Capital District
    Contracting       Center      (CDCC).         In    November      2005,      Acting    CDCC
    Director Lieutenant Colonel Craig DeDecker announced an office-
    3
    wide    reorganization          intended       to    streamline       CDCC      operations.
    DeDecker sent an email to all CDCC employees providing a broad
    outline      of    this     plan.          He       told     employees       that      a     new
    organizational division, Construction and Engineering (C&E), was
    being created and that William E. Campbell would become “Chief”
    of     the   division.           The     email       identified       three      employees,
    including Darvishian, who were scheduled to be assigned to C&E.
    DeDecker     attached       to    the    email      an    organizational        chart.
    The chart identified both Campbell and Darvishian as GS-14 level
    employees, and a line extended horizontally across the chart
    from     Campbell’s        name     to     Darvishian’s           name.          Underneath
    Campbell’s name, the chart stated, “Chief, Team 1.”
    One component of this reorganization involved placing all
    contract specialists on a single floor of the CDCC building.                                 As
    a    consequence,       certain     employees,         including      Darvishian,           were
    required      to   relocate       their    offices         to   another    space    in      the
    building.
    DeDecker     left     his       position       with      the   CDCC      before      the
    reorganization was completed.                  However, his successor, Christine
    Thompson, continued to implement the changes when she became the
    permanent director of the CDCC in December 2005.
    On    February     22,   2006,     the       Deputy      Director   of    the       CDCC,
    Brenda Jackson-Sewell, approached Darvishian in his office to
    discuss a work-related matter.                      Darvishian asked her about a
    4
    “rumor” circulating in the office that Darvishian would have to
    move from his fixed office space to a cubicle.                     Jackson-Sewell
    told Darvishian that this information was “not a rumor.”
    That same day, Campbell personally directed Darvishian to
    relocate to a cubicle so that a new division chief could move
    into his office.        Darvishian told Campbell that he would not
    move, because he did not think that Campbell was “his boss.” 1
    After he left Darvishian’s office, Campbell sent the following
    email to Darvishian: “As your supervisor[,] it is not required
    that any additional direction to mine be given.                    Therefore you
    are directed to move to the last cubical [sic] in room 204.
    This move has to [be] completed by [the close of business] 1
    March 2006.”      Campbell sent a carbon copy of this email to
    Thompson and to Jackson-Sewell.
    The following day, February 23, 2006, Darvishian approached
    Thompson to express his concerns about Campbell’s order to move
    Darvishian’s office.          The parties dispute the details of this
    conversation,   but    it   is   clear       from   the   record   that   Thompson
    confirmed to Darvishian that he needed to vacate his office.
    Darvishian       later      lodged       various      complaints      against
    DeDecker, Campbell, and Thompson by sending an email, stating a
    subject of “Discrimination,” to the head of the Agency.                    In the
    1
    Before this encounter, Campbell spent little or no time
    supervising    Darvishian   because,    in   Campbell’s    words,
    “[Darvishian] was a senior civil servant and he knew his job.”
    5
    email,    Darvishian         expressed          his   concern       that       he     was    being
    marginalized       by    his    superiors        and,      under    the    guise        of   being
    ordered    to   move      his   office,         actually      was    being          pressured    to
    leave the CDCC.            Darvishian provided the following examples of
    his superiors’ conduct toward him.
    Darvishian explained that Thompson’s predecessor had sought
    Darvishian’s        advice      in    planning        the    layout       of    cubicles        and
    office spaces.           Darvishian stated that Thompson, however, had
    excluded     him    from     similar       planning,        and     had   carried        out    the
    office reorganization without consulting him.
    Darvishian          recounted         an   incident      in     November         2005     when
    DeDecker     made    certain         inappropriate          comments      about       people     of
    Middle    Eastern        descent.           Darvishian        recalled         that     DeDecker
    bragged    that     he     would      be    able      to    kill     Muslims         during     his
    upcoming     deployment         to     Iraq.          During       the    same        encounter,
    Darvishian alleged, DeDecker asked, “Why [are you] all radical
    Muslims[?]”         Darvishian        also      accused      DeDecker          of    threatening
    Darvishian that if he “wasn’t gone” before DeDecker left the
    CDCC, Jackson-Sewell and Bill Campbell would “finish[] the job”
    for him. 2      Finally, Darvishian alleged that DeDecker improperly
    had promoted a friend to a GS-14 level position.
    2
    Darvishian also described “rumors” that confirmed his
    suspicion that he was being pressured to leave the CDCC.
    According to these “rumors,” Darvishian was being ordered from
    6
    Darvishian        next     accused       Campbell     of       improprieties      in
    awarding Army contracts.               Darvishian complained that even though
    Campbell was not his superior, Jackson-Sewell and Thompson had
    confirmed       Campbell’s      order    that       Darvishian     relocate     from    his
    office to a cubicle.              Darvishian maintained that Thompson had
    “backed [Campbell] up” without considering Darvishian’s “side of
    the story.”
    On receipt of the email, the Director of the Agency for the
    Northern     Region       initiated      an        investigation       of   Darvishian’s
    allegations.       The assigned investigator observed an ambiguity in
    CDCC      hiring        procedures,       but         otherwise        concluded       that
    Darvishian’s           allegations lacked merit.             The investigator also
    concluded       that    DeDecker’s      reorganization       was      “based    on    sound
    reasoning with no malicious intent,” and that “Darvishian had a
    responsibility          to     comply    with       the    lawful      orders    of    his
    superiors,” including DeDecker, Thompson, and Campbell.                               Based
    on Darvishian’s complaints, the investigator recommended certain
    changes    to    internal       operating      procedures,        including     that    all
    supervisors        should       meet    with       their   new    employees      on     the
    effective       date      of     any    reorganization           to    prevent       future
    “communication gap[s].”
    his office to “degrade” him and to make him “so unhappy that
    [he] would want to leave.”
    7
    On   March     2,   2006,   Campbell   went     to   Darvishian’s     office
    purportedly    to    deliver     a   memorandum    prepared    by    the   human
    resources    department     at    Thompson’s   request.       The    memorandum
    characterized Darvishian’s failure to move from his office by
    March 1, 2006, as “insubordination,” and stated that Campbell
    was proposing a penalty of suspension for this misconduct.                   The
    memorandum set a second deadline, 11:30 a.m. on March 3, 2006,
    by which Darvishian was required to vacate his office.                       The
    document advised Darvishian that disobeying this order “could
    result in [his] removal from the federal service.”
    An     army    lawyer,      Captain    Joshua     Drewitz,     accompanied
    Campbell to see Darvishian but stopped a short distance down the
    hallway from Darvishian’s office.           Drewitz could see Campbell in
    the office doorway, but did not hear the conversation taking
    place between Campbell and Darvishian.               Drewitz did not observe
    Campbell carrying any papers.
    That evening, Darvishian sent an email to senior officials
    in the Agency describing his exchange with Campbell.                 Darvishian
    stated that when Campbell entered Darvishian’s office doorway,
    Campbell held up a piece of paper that threatened, “Get out or
    you will be killed.” 3
    3
    In the same email, Darvishian stated, “I don’t believe I
    mentioned it in my initial email but when I had a discussion
    with Ms. Thompson on 23 Feb, prior to my contact with EEO, she
    8
    The next morning, Darvishian reported this alleged threat
    to the military police.               He also sent an email detailing the
    threat to the “head” employees of the Agency and to an EEO
    Counselor.      The subject of his email was entitled, “Reprisal.”
    The police conducted an investigation, which included interviews
    of Campbell, Darvishian, and Drewitz, but concluded there was
    “insufficient      probable      cause     to    believe    that    Mr.    Campbell
    communicated a threat.”
    On   the     afternoon      of    Friday,   March     3,   2006,     after   the
    deadline stated in the human resources department memorandum had
    passed, Thompson directed four employees to remove Darvishian’s
    belongings    from      his   office.      These   individuals      conducted      an
    inventory    of   the    items    in    Darvishian’s     office    and    moved   the
    items to a secure file room.               Campbell later sent an email to
    Darvishian, informing him that he could retrieve his belongings
    by contacting Campbell to obtain a key to the file room.                      After
    receiving this email, Darvishian sent another email to Agency
    “management” and to an EEO Counselor stating, “Bill Campbell
    continues to harass me.”
    On Monday morning, March 6, 2006, Darvishian called the
    military police to report a “property theft.”                     He later made a
    sworn statement in which he alleged that $1,000 in cash and some
    told me ‘You are nothing.              I will take care of my contracting
    people.’”
    9
    personal documents were missing.                     Darvishian stated, “[b]ecause
    [Campbell] has threatened me and now stolen my belongings I am
    afraid to go back to the office.”
    The   military         police    conducted         an    investigation      of     the
    alleged theft.             The four employees who had moved Darvishian’s
    property      attested         that     they    did        not    find     any    money     in
    Darvishian’s          desk      when    they        made    the     inventory       of     his
    belongings. 4        The military police closed its investigation of the
    incident on April 13, 2006, because of “insufficient probable
    cause” that a theft had occurred.
    On March 22, 2006, Darvishian filed a formal EEO complaint
    alleging       discrimination            against          certain        CDCC     officials,
    including Campbell, Jackson-Sewell, and Thompson.                                About five
    weeks       later,        on   April    28,     2006,       Campbell       proposed       that
    Darvishian be removed from federal service.
    In his written proposal, Campbell articulated four reasons
    for the recommended punishment: insubordination (two incidents),
    making false statements, failing to provide candid information
    to the military police, and disrupting the workplace.
    Under     the       first    charge,     insubordination,            Campbell      wrote
    that Darvishian’s refusal to comply with two orders to move from
    his   office,        by    March   1,   2006,       and    later    by    March    3,    2006,
    4
    A former CDCC Director stated in deposition testimony that
    she had personal knowledge that Darvishian kept cash in his
    desk.
    10
    constituted insubordination.                   Campbell based the second charge,
    making false statements, on Darvishian’s report to the military
    police    that     Campbell      had   threatened         Darvishian’s      life.      The
    proposal      of    removal    characterized          this   report    as     “knowingly
    false.”
    The third charge, failing to provide candid information to
    the military police, was based on Darvishian’s allegation of
    theft against Campbell.             The notice of proposed removal stated,
    “At the time you made your allegation against Mr. Campbell to
    the military police, you failed to tell the military police that
    you had not personally viewed, seen or otherwise inventoried any
    personal items you had left in your office since the previous
    week,    or   that      you   had   any    personal       knowledge    that    Mr.    Bill
    Campbell had removed anything from your office.”                       With regard to
    the   charge       of   disrupting     the      workplace,    Campbell      noted     that
    various CDCC employees were forced to leave their regular work
    duties to participate in the two police investigations of the
    charges Darvishian had filed.
    Darvishian         responded        to    these     charges     orally    and    in
    writing.      Thompson issued a five-page memorandum sustaining the
    removal charges as supported by the evidence, and Darvishian was
    removed from federal service on July 7, 2006.
    Darvishian        timely      appealed        the   Agency’s    action    to    the
    Board,    raising       discrimination          and   retaliation     as   “affirmative
    11
    defenses.”   See 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7513
    , 7701.                 An Administrative Judge
    upheld the removal in a lengthy written decision, finding that
    the Agency had proved all four charges by a preponderance of the
    evidence,    and    that       Darvishian         had    failed    to    demonstrate
    discrimination or retaliation by preponderant evidence.
    Darvishian     timely       filed      a    petition   for    review    of     this
    initial decision, which a panel of three Board members denied in
    a Final Order.      Darvishian also requested a review by the EEOC,
    Office of Federal Operations, which issued a decision concurring
    with the Board.     See 
    29 C.F.R. § 1614.303
     et seq.
    After   receiving         the   EEOC       decision,   Darvishian      filed    the
    present action in the district court.                    See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
    16(c)   (2006).     He   alleged       that       the   Agency    removed   him     from
    federal   service   as     a    result      of    discrimination     based    on     his
    religion and national origin, in violation of Title VII, and in
    retaliation for protected EEO activity, also in violation of
    Title VII.   Darvishian additionally sought review of the Board’s
    final decision.     The district court granted summary judgment for
    the Secretary on the Title VII claim, and upheld the Board’s
    decision.
    The district court concluded that even if Darvishian could
    present a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation, he
    could not demonstrate that the Agency’s proffered reasons for
    his removal were pretextual, because it was beyond dispute that
    12
    Darvishian’s         conduct          constituted             “insubordination.”                  The
    district court did not address the other nondiscriminatory bases
    for   removal       articulated        by    the       Agency,      because          the    district
    court     found     that    the      removal       decision         was    supported         by   the
    insubordination           incidents        alone,       and    that    Darvishian           had   not
    presented        sufficient          evidence          of    pretext       to        overcome     the
    Agency’s stated ground of insubordination.                                Darvishian appeals
    from the district court’s judgment.
    II.
    A.
    We first consider the district court’s award of summary
    judgment in favor of the Secretary on the Title VII claims.
    Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate
    against       any   individual        on    the    basis       of    religion         or    national
    origin.        42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).                       It is also unlawful
    for     an      employer        to    retaliate             against       an        employee      for
    participating        in     a   Title       VII    investigation               or    for    opposing
    discriminatory workplace practices.                         Id. § 2000e-3(a).
    A       plaintiff    alleging        discrimination            under          Title   VII   may
    avert     a    summary     judgment        ruling       in    favor       of    an    employer     by
    presenting either of two theories of proof.                               First, a plaintiff
    may offer direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimination
    that raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
    13
    an     impermissible     factor      motivated     the     employer’s       adverse
    employment decision.        See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident
    Ins. Co., 
    416 F.3d 310
    , 318 (4th Cir. 2005).                     Second, when a
    plaintiff     lacks      direct       evidence        of    discrimination        or
    retaliation, he or she may proceed using the burden-shifting
    proof scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    41 U.S. 792
    , 802-05 (1973).
    The present case has proceeded under the McDonnell Douglas
    analysis.       Under     that    framework,      a    plaintiff     first     must
    establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.
    See Burdine, 
    450 U.S. at 252-53
    .               After the plaintiff has met
    this evidentiary burden, the burden of production shifts to the
    employer to set forth, through the introduction of admissible
    evidence, a legitimate nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory basis
    for the employment action.           
    Id. at 253
    ; see Bd. of Trustees v.
    Sweeney, 
    439 U.S. 24
    , 25 n.2 (1978).
    If the employer satisfies this burden of production, the
    plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
    the neutral reasons offered by the employer are merely pretext
    for discrimination or retaliation.               See Burdine, 
    450 U.S. at 253
    .     A plaintiff may prove such pretext by demonstrating that
    the    defendant’s     explanation    is     “unworthy     of   credence”    or   by
    offering circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of the
    issue of discrimination or retaliation.                See Reeves v. Sanderson
    14
    Plumbing    Prods.,       Inc.,      
    530 U.S. 133
    ,   148   (2000);       Price    v.
    Thompson,    
    380 F.3d 209
    ,     212    (4th   Cir.   2004);      EEOC    v.     Sears
    Roebuck & Co., 
    243 F.3d 846
    , 853-54 (4th Cir. 2001).
    In    practice,       the      McDonnell      Douglas      analytical         burden
    shifting ends at this stage, and the “pretext” inquiry merges
    with the plaintiff’s ultimate burden to prove that he or she was
    the     victim     of     intentional        discrimination       or     retaliation.
    Burdine, 
    450 U.S. at 256
    ; see Merritt, 
    601 F.3d at 294-95
    .                               A
    plaintiff is entitled to a trial on the merits of a Title VII
    claim if he or she establishes a factual record permitting a
    reasonable finder of fact to conclude that it is more likely
    than not that the adverse employment action was the product of
    discrimination or retaliation.                Burdine, 
    450 U.S. at 254
    ; Ennis
    v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc, 
    53 F.3d 55
    , 58 (4th
    Cir. 1995).      Therefore, “[b]y the time of appeal especially, the
    issue    boils     down    to   whether       the   plaintiff     has    presented       a
    triable      question           of         intentional      discrimination              [or
    retaliation].”          Merritt, 
    601 F.3d at 295
    .
    In     considering          Darvishian’s         Title      VII         claim     of
    discrimination, we assume, without deciding, that Darvishian has
    established a prima facie case of discrimination.                          This prima
    facie case includes the comments allegedly made by Campbell and
    DeDecker to Darvishian.
    15
    We conclude that the Agency met its burden to articulate a
    legitimate,      nondiscriminatory          basis       to    remove      Darvishian      from
    federal    service.           As    described      above,      the      Agency     gave   four
    lawful reasons why Darvishian should be removed, as stated in
    Thompson’s       Notice    of       Decision      to    Remove.           First,    Thompson
    concluded    that      Darvishian       disregarded          Campbell’s       February     22,
    2006 email to relocate to a cubicle by March 1, 2006.                               Thompson
    further     found      that        Darvishian      ignored        the     March     2,    2006
    memorandum, which directed him to move his belongings by 11:30
    a.m. on March 3, 2006.                  Thompson stated that Darvishian had
    received    and     disobeyed        both   orders,         and   that     these    acts   of
    noncompliance constituted insubordination.
    Second,    Thompson          determined     that      Darvishian’s         accusation
    that    Campbell       threatened       Darvishian’s          life      was    unsupported.
    Thompson also concluded that Darvishian made this accusation to
    retaliate against Campbell for ordering Darvishian to move from
    his office to a cubicle.
    Third, Thompson determined that Darvishian gave incomplete
    information       to    the        police   when       he    reported      that     Campbell
    allegedly had stolen some of Darvishian’s                          property.        Finally,
    Thompson determined that as a result of Darvishian’s actions, at
    least five CDCC employees were required temporarily to leave
    their    work     duties      to     participate        in    police      investigations.
    Thompson     summarized            Darvishian’s        conduct       as       exhibiting     a
    16
    disregard      for         authority          that       “deminish[ed]        [sic]         his
    supervisor’s confidence in being able to continue to task or
    assign duties to Mr. Darvishian.”
    To     rebut     these       legitimate          reasons      for     his     removal,
    Darvishian was required to produce a record that would permit a
    reasonable     fact-finder          to     conclude        that    the     justifications
    stated by the Agency were merely a pretext for discrimination.
    See Burdine, 
    450 U.S. at 253
    .                   We conclude that Darvishian has
    failed to satisfy this burden.
    Darvishian argues that the Agency lacked a legitimate basis
    for   removing       him   from    the     federal       service,        rather    than     for
    merely     suspending       him.         He     relies     on     the     March     2,    2006
    memorandum,      which      indicated         that   a    suspension       was     the    only
    penalty being considered by the Agency for the first act of
    insubordination.                 Darvishian          contends       that,         therefore,
    Thompson’s choice of a more severe penalty was suggestive of
    pretext.
    This     argument,         however,       is       unavailing.          The        record
    establishes      that       at     least       three      Agency     officials           having
    supervisory authority over Darvishian directed that he vacate
    his office.          Even if we accept Darvishian’s argument that he
    reasonably doubted Campbell’s supervisory authority on February
    22, 2006, there is no doubt that by February 23, 2006, two other
    individuals      with      unquestioned         authority         over    Darvishian       had
    17
    either instructed him to move, or confirmed the legitimacy of
    Campbell’s directive.              Thus, regardless whether Darvishian was
    given the memorandum containing the second deadline of March 3,
    2006,    his    ongoing          refusal      to     move      his       office     constituted
    insubordination.
    We also observe that the penalty imposed by Thompson was
    consistent      with     the      punishments           set    forth      in   the      Table   of
    Penalties in the Army regulations.                       According to that document,
    a   single     offense      of    insubordination             or    a    single    incident     of
    making    a    false     statement       can       be    punished        by    removal.         The
    possibility that a different decision maker may have imposed a
    less severe penalty if presented with similar circumstances does
    not     support    a     conclusion           that      Thompson         was      motivated     by
    discrimination,        or    that       her    stated         explanation         for    removing
    Darvishian was false.
    Nonetheless,        we      are   mindful         that       the   Supreme        Court   has
    cautioned that courts should not become mired in the intricacies
    of the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme.                             See    U.S. Postal Serv.
    Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 
    460 U.S. 711
    , 715 (1983); Proud v.
    Stone, 
    945 F.2d 796
    , 798 (4th Cir. 1991).                               Thus, ultimately, we
    must reverse the district court if it appears that a reasonable
    fact-finder could conclude that Thompson more likely than not
    removed Darvishian because of his religion or national origin.
    Burdine, 
    450 U.S. at 254
    .
    18
    Darvishian       argues    that      the     following      evidence       of    record
    supports a conclusion that Thompson’s employment decision was
    motivated by discriminatory animus.                    First, Darvishian points to
    Thompson’s      deposition       testimony         that    she   feared       “Darvishian’s
    irrational      behavior.”        Darvishian           infers     from     this    statement
    that Thompson’s apprehension was “based solely on her perception
    that    an    Iranian-born       man    .     .    .   was       dangerous.”           Second,
    Darvishian heavily relies on an affidavit made by a former CDCC
    employee, Tracy Fetchik.               In her affidavit, Fetchik stated that
    on March 3, 2006, the day Darvishian’s belongings were removed
    from his office, Thompson drew her finger across her neck as if
    she were slitting a throat, and stated, “I finally got rid of
    him.”        However, while the above evidence cited by Darvishian
    supports       an   inference          that        Thompson      disliked         Darvishian
    personally, this evidence does not establish a link between her
    personal dislike of Darvishian and his membership in a protected
    class.
    Our     conclusion    does        not       change     when       we   additionally
    consider the balance of Fetchik’s affidavit.                         Most particularly,
    Fetchik stated that “sometimes Ms. Thompson, [another employee,]
    and     Ms.    Brenda    Jackson-Sewell            would      make    comments         amongst
    themselves about Mr. Darvishian, like he is a crazy Muslim.”
    Notably,      however,     Fetchik’s        affidavit        fails    to      identify     any
    particular statement that Thompson made regarding Darvishian’s
    19
    religion or national origin, but only attributes the above type
    of   offensive     remark      to   general   group   conversation.           In    the
    absence of any indication which of the three individuals made a
    statement of that nature, or any other discriminatory remarks,
    we are unable to accord such remarks any probative value as
    tending to establish that Thompson, in fact, was motivated by
    discrimination         regarding     Darvishian’s     religion         or    national
    origin in her decision to terminate him from federal service.
    Absent such probative value, any remarks of this nature were not
    admissible evidence and, thus, did not create a genuine issue of
    material fact to avert an award of summary judgment.                        See Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1); Fed. R. Evid. 402.
    Based on our review of the record, we observe that Thompson
    apparently developed a dislike of Darvishian.                 It is also clear
    that    Darvishian      perceived      that   he   was    being        pressured    by
    DeDecker, Campbell, and Thompson to leave the Agency.                       But Title
    VII is not “a general civility code for the American workplace.”
    Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 
    548 U.S. 53
    , 68 (2006)
    (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 
    523 U.S. 75
    ,
    80 (1998)).      Rather, Title VII makes unlawful certain, defined
    intentional      acts     of    discrimination.          Darvishian         has     not
    demonstrated, as he must to survive summary judgment, that on
    this    record     a    reasonable      fact-finder      could        conclude     that
    Thompson    held       discriminatory     biases      based      on     Darvishian’s
    20
    religion    and   national   origin     that       motivated    her    decision   to
    remove him from federal service.
    We     recognize,         nevertheless,         that       under      certain
    circumstances, discriminatory statements by non-decision makers
    can be attributed to the ultimate decision maker.                     See Merritt,
    
    601 F.3d at 300
    ; see, e.g., Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
    Mgmt., 
    354 F.3d 277
    , 289-91 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Russell
    v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 
    235 F.3d 219
    , 226-27 (5th Cir. 2000);
    Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 
    118 F.3d 542
    , 547 (7th
    Cir. 1997).       Darvishian argues that in this case, Campbell and
    Thompson    merely    were      carrying     out    DeDecker’s        directive    to
    “finish the job” of pressuring Darvishian to leave the CDCC.
    However, based on the present record, there is no reason to
    conclude that Thompson based her decision to remove Darvishian
    on another person’s judgment.
    The Agency has given a consistent, lawful rationale for its
    removal of Darvishian, contemporaneously with the disciplinary
    proceeding and throughout this litigation.                   Further, Darvishian
    has   not   demonstrated        such   weaknesses,       implausibilities,        or
    inconsistencies      in   the     Agency’s     proffered       reasons     for    his
    removal that a reasonable fact-finder could find those reasons
    “unworthy of credence.”          See Price, 
    380 F.3d at 212
    ; Fuentes v.
    Perskie, 
    32 F.3d 759
    , 765 (3d Cir. 1994).                      Thus, we conclude
    that Darvishian has not met his burden to show that a reasonable
    21
    fact-finder      could      conclude       that      the    Agency’s      explanation        was
    pretext for discrimination, or that material factual questions
    remain regarding the Agency’s motives.                          See Merritt, 
    601 F.3d at 295
    .     Accordingly, we conclude that on this record, a reasonable
    fact-finder      could        not       say    that        Darvishian         has    presented
    sufficient facts to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
    that discrimination was more likely than not a determinative
    cause of the Agency’s employment decision.
    B.
    Darvishian     also     contends         that      he    was    removed      from    his
    employment in retaliation for complaining about the allegedly
    discriminatory conduct by his superiors.                           To establish a prima
    facie     case    of        retaliation,            Darvishian          was    required       to
    demonstrate that he engaged in “protected activity,” and that he
    was    removed    by    the     Agency        because       of    that    activity.          See
    Holland, 
    487 F.3d at 218
    .
    The record shows that when Thompson removed Darvishian from
    federal     service,         she    knew      that         he    had     complained        about
    discrimination         at    his    workplace.              Darvishian        contends      that
    because his protected activity occurred so close in time to the
    Agency’s    removal         decision,      the      simple       fact    of   this   temporal
    proximity     establishes           a    causal      connection          between     the     two
    events.
    22
    We   will    assume,       but   do     not    decide,         that   Darvishian       has
    shown a causal connection establishing a prima facie case of
    retaliation.        See Holland, 
    487 F.3d at 218
    .                        Thus, proceeding
    under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Darvishian was required
    to rebut the legitimate nonretaliatory reasons articulated by
    the agency for his removal.                    
    Id.
          Based on our review of the
    record, we hold that Darvishian failed to make this required
    showing.      We        reach    this   conclusion         for    the    same      reasons     we
    already have held that Darvishian failed to demonstrate pretext
    with respect to his discrimination claims.
    III.
    Finally,     we     consider      Darvishian’s         appeal         of   the   Board’s
    decision.       We apply an established, narrow standard of review,
    under   which      we     must    affirm       the    Board      unless,      based     on    the
    administrative           record,        the     decision          is     “(1)      arbitrary,
    capricious,        an     abuse    of     discretion,            or    otherwise        not    in
    accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by
    law,    rule,       or     regulation          having      been        followed;        or    (3)
    unsupported        by    substantial          evidence.”          
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c)
    (2006).
    In this case, the Administrative Judge determined that the
    Agency carried its burden to prove by a preponderance                                    of the
    evidence     each       charge    stated      in     the   notice       of    removal.        The
    23
    Administrative         Judge        also        made        certain     credibility
    determinations, which are “virtually unreviewable” by this court
    on appeal.      Bieber v. Dept. of the Army, 
    287 F.3d 1358
    , 1364
    (Fed. Cir. 2002); see Pope v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    114 F.3d 1144
    ,
    1149    (Fed.   Cir.   1997).         In   assessing        testimony   related   to
    Darvishian’s     conduct,       the    Administrative          Judge    determined,
    “[T]he appellant is not a reliable or credible witness in light
    of his implausible allegations and inconsistent statements.”                      In
    contrast, the Administrative Judge found that Thompson was a
    “credible witness.”
    Applying the deferential standards applicable to our review
    of the Board’s decision, and based on the evidence contained in
    the administrative record, we hold that the Board conclusions
    cannot reasonably be said to be arbitrary and capricious, an
    abuse   of   discretion,       or   unsupported        by   substantial   evidence.
    The Board had sufficient evidence before it, and made a reasoned
    decision based on that record.
    For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    AFFIRMED
    24
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-1672

Citation Numbers: 404 F. App'x 822

Judges: Gregory, Keenan, Eastern

Filed Date: 12/14/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (17)

ethel-louise-hill-v-lockheed-martin-logistics-management-incorporated , 354 F.3d 277 ( 2004 )

United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens , 103 S. Ct. 1478 ( 1983 )

David POPE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ... , 114 F.3d 1144 ( 1997 )

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 101 S. Ct. 1089 ( 1981 )

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White , 126 S. Ct. 2405 ( 2006 )

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 120 S. Ct. 2097 ( 2000 )

Warren A. PROUD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael P.W. STONE,... , 945 F.2d 796 ( 1991 )

Dorn B. Holland v. Washington Homes, Incorporated , 487 F.3d 208 ( 2007 )

Gladys F. WILLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARION COUNTY ... , 118 F.3d 542 ( 1997 )

William Price v. Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary, United ... , 380 F.3d 209 ( 2004 )

Rovilma Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance ... , 416 F.3d 310 ( 2005 )

Luis A. Fuentes v. Steven P. Perskie, Chairman of the New ... , 32 F.3d 759 ( 1994 )

Robert A. Bieber v. Department of the Army , 287 F.3d 1358 ( 2002 )

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. , 118 S. Ct. 998 ( 1998 )

Joan M. Ennis v. The National Association of Business and ... , 53 F.3d 55 ( 1995 )

sandra-russell-v-mckinney-hospital-venture-a-joint-venture-of-parkway , 235 F.3d 219 ( 2000 )

equal-employment-opportunity-commission-and-francisco-g-santana-v-sears , 243 F.3d 846 ( 2001 )

View All Authorities »