United States v. Jorge Albarran-Rivera , 481 F. App'x 49 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5072
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JORGE ALBARRAN-RIVERA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (7:10-cr-00095-FL-3)
Submitted: July 26, 2012 Decided: August 1, 2012
Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Wayne Buchanan Eads, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jorge Albarran-Rivera pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006). The district
court sentenced Albarran-Rivera to 135 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Albarran-Rivera’s counsel filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in
counsel’s view, there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether Albarran-Rivera’s sentence is reasonable.
Albarran-Rivera was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but has not done so. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
We have reviewed the transcript of the plea colloquy
and find that the district court fully complied with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11, and that Albarran-Rivera’s plea was knowing and
voluntarily entered. We therefore affirm his conviction.
We review a sentence imposed by a district court for
reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007).
Such review requires consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. at 41; see United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
The district court followed the necessary procedural
steps in sentencing Albarran-Rivera, appropriately treated the
2
sentencing Guidelines as advisory, properly calculated and
considered the applicable Guidelines range, and weighed the
relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors. We examine the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence under the totality of
the circumstances. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473
(4th Cir. 2007). This court accords a sentence within a
properly calculated Guidelines range an appellate presumption of
reasonableness. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212,
216 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a presumption is rebutted only by
showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the [§ 3553(a)] factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445
F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We conclude that the district court’s consideration
of the § 3553(a) factors and imposition of the 135-month
sentence was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193
(4th Cir. 2007) (applying appellate presumption of
reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentence).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. This court requires that counsel inform Albarran-
Rivera, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Albarran-Rivera
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
3
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Albarran-
Rivera. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4