James Howard v. Lakeshore Equipment Company , 482 F. App'x 809 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1772
JAMES HOWARD,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
LAKESHORE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, d/b/a Lakeshore Learning
Materials,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:10-cv-00985-RWT)
Submitted: May 17, 2012 Decided: June 6, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David A. Branch, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. BRANCH & ASSOCIATES,
PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. John M. Remy, Matthew F.
Nieman, JACKSON LEWIS, LLP, Reston, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Howard appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Lakeshore Equipment
Company (“Lakeshore”) on Howard’s employment discrimination
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006) and his breach of implied
contract claim, and denying his motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 398 (2011). Summary judgment
shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by
the existence of any factual dispute; “[o]nly disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Id. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Erwin v. United States, 591
F.3d 313, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2010).
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Because, as Howard concedes, he did not produce direct
or circumstantial evidence that race discrimination motivated
Lakeshore’s adverse action, he could avoid summary judgment only
through the burden-shifting scheme established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Hill v.
Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th
Cir. 2004) (en banc); see Gairola v. Va. Dep’t of Gen. Servs.,
753 F.2d 1281, 1285-86 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying McDonnell
Douglas approach to actions brought pursuant to § 1981). Under
the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff is first required
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, showing that
(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an
adverse employment action; (3) he suffered this adverse action
despite performing his job in accordance with the employer’s
legitimate expectations; and (4) the circumstances gave rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination. Adams v. Trustees of
the Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 558 (4th Cir. 2011).
If the plaintiff makes this showing, “the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action.” Hill, 354 F.3d at 285. If
the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s
stated reasons are a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.3
Because Howard did not show that he met Lakeshore’s
legitimate performance expectations or that the circumstances
give rise to an inference of discrimination, we conclude that he
cannot make a prima facie showing of race discrimination.
Moreover, even if Howard could make a prima facie showing of
discrimination, he cannot rebut Lakeshore’s legitimate reasons
for terminating him and declining to hire him as Vice President,
as he has not shown a relationship between the employment
decisions and any discriminatory animus. Accordingly, we hold
that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
on Howard’s race discrimination claims.
Howard next contends that statements made by a
Lakeshore supervisor constituted an implied contract under which
Howard could return to the position he held prior to his
promotion if he was unsuccessful in his new position. We
conclude that, in the face of Lakeshore’s explicit at-will
policy, * the vague and unspecific statements the supervisor
allegedly made are insufficient to give rise to an implied
contract. See McKenzie v. Comcast Cable Comm., Inc., 393 F.
*
Because the policy was included in the Regional Manager
Policy Manual, which Lakeshore’s Human Resources Director
testified applied to Howard, Howard’s conclusory allegation that
the at-will policy did not apply to him is insufficient to
create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Erwin, 591 F.3d
at 319-20.
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Supp. 2d 362, 369-70 (D. Md. 2005). Thus, we hold that the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this
claim.
Finally, Howard complains that the district court
denied him leave to amend his complaint to add a claim pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). We
review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a
motion to amend. Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602
F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010). Although leave to amend should
be “freely give[n] . . . when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2), a district court has discretion to deny a motion to
amend a complaint, so long as the court does not “outright
refus[e] to grant the leave without any justifying reason.”
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). A district court may
deny a motion to amend “when the amendment would be prejudicial
to the opposing party,” when the moving party has acted in bad
faith, or when the amendment would be futile. Laber v. Harvey,
438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Because Howard cannot succeed on a claim of race
discrimination, the addition of a Title VII claim would be
futile. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Howard’s motion.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court.
AFFIRMED
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