Matthews v. Thomas , 385 F. App'x 283 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1932
JOHN MATTHEWS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
OFFICER ARTHUR THOMAS, of the Columbia Police Department
sued individually and officially; OFFICER SCOTT E.
MCDONALD, of the Richland County Sheriffs Office sued
individually and officially; OFFICER WALTER BALES, of the
Columbia Police Department sued individually and
officially; SERGEANT EWING, of the Richland County Sheriffs
Department sued individually and officially; CAPTAIN SMITH,
of the Richland County Sheriffs Department sued
individually and officially,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
ANN SPEAR, Assistant Solicitor, All being sued
individually; INVESTIGATOR TAYLOR, of the Columbia Police
Department sued individually and officially,
Defendants,
v.
RICHARD CHARLES RICHARDSON CATHCART,
Movant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (3:07-cv-01556-JFA)
Argued: May 12, 2010 Decided: July 1, 2010
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Duncan and Judge Agee joined.
ARGUED: William Clifford Wood, Jr., NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY &
SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Peter Michael Balthazor, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, Columbia,
South Carolina; Andrew Lindemann, DAVIDSON, MORRISON &
LINDEMANN, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: Paul T. Collins, Candace C. Jackson, NELSON, MULLINS,
RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Robert D. Garfield, Joel S. Hughes, DAVIDSON,
MORRISON & LINDEMANN, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellees Officer Scott E. McDonald, Sergeant Ewing, and Captain
Smith.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
John Matthews appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to Officers Arthur Thomas and Walter Bales of
the City of Columbia Police Department, and Officer Scott E.
McDonald of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department
(collectively, “the Officers”). 1 For the reasons below, we
affirm.
I.
We view the evidence in the record in the light most
favorable to Matthews, the non-moving party. Laber v. Harvey,
438 F.3d 404, 415 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). On January 11,
2007, at approximately 6:20 p.m., Sylvia Wilson was in the
driveway of her home, unloading groceries from her car, when an
African-American man in dark clothing accosted her and demanded
her purse. Ms. Wilson complied, and her assailant fled on foot.
The next day, just before 2:00 p.m., Claire Haltiwanger was in
the parking lot of a K-Mart when an African-American man wearing
fatigues stole her purse off her shoulder. The purse-snatcher
fled in a red sedan, driven by an accomplice. Within minutes, a
1
Matthews also sued Investigator Taylor of the Police
Department and Sergeant Ewing and Captain Smith of the Sheriff’s
Department. However, these defendants are not parties to this
appeal.
3
man held-up a nearby mini-mart. As the robber and an accomplice
fled in a red sedan, the clerk called the police.
Officer Scott McDonald of the Sheriff’s Department
responded, and dispatch quickly broadcast a description of the
get-away car involved in the mini-mart robbery over the radio.
While investigating Ms. Haltiwanger’s purse-snatching, Officer
Walter Bales overheard this bulletin. Because of the
similarities between the vehicle involved in the purse-snatching
and the mini-mart hold-up, and the proximity of the K-Mart to
the mini-mart, Officer Bales proceeded to the mini-mart. The
mini-mart’s security tape revealed that, just before the culprit
entered the mini-mart, his accomplice, an African-American man
wearing a camouflage jacket, exited the red sedan, went around
the side of the mini-mart, and discarded a small bag. This bag
turned out to be Ms. Haltiwanger’s purse. Four days later the
Sheriff’s Department discovered the red sedan used in the mini-
mart robbery; it contained items belonging to Ms. Wilson and Ms.
Haltiwanger, including one of Ms. Wilson’s checks made out to
“John E. Matthews.”
Officer McDonald then searched the Sheriff Department’s
databases for the name “John E. Matthews.” Matthews (the
plaintiff-appellant) appeared in the database because of a 2005
arrest. Officer McDonald shared this information with the
Police Department, and Officer Bales created a color
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photographic line-up using the Sheriff Department’s 2005 photo
of Matthews.
The color line-up comprises six photos of African-American
men. In the line-up, Matthews is wearing a black, collared
shirt with a yellow jacket over it. As for the five other men
in the line-up, one is wearing a white t-shirt with a tan jacket
over it, two are wearing white t-shirts, another is wearing a
white t-shirt with a black jacket over it, and the final man is
wearing a sleeveless black and white t-shirt. Each face has a
discernable shadow behind it, and each photo is cropped
differently. As for facial features, Matthews has a mustache
and is bald. At least two of the other men in the line-up are
bald, and at least three others have mustaches. J.A. 502.
On January 17, 2007, Officer Arthur Thomas of the Police
Department presented this line-up to Ms. Wilson. Though Officer
Thomas made a black and white copy of the color line-up to make
it “as neutral as possible,” J.A. 344, he nonetheless presented
the color version of the line-up to Ms. Wilson. Ms. Wilson
unequivocally identified Matthews. Officer Thomas subsequently
swore out a warrant affidavit for Matthews, relying exclusively
on this identification for probable cause.
On the same day, Officer Bales showed Ms. Haltiwanger a
black and white version of the photo line-up. Initially, Ms.
Haltiwanger told Officer Bales that none of the men in the line-
5
up looked like the purse-snatcher. However, she went on to say
that photograph number two -- the photo of Matthews -- was the
closest match. Ms. Haltiwanger then signed an affidavit, which
stated: “I picked out a picture of [Matthews] which is the
person . . . who committed the crime.” J.A. 89. Ms.
Haltiwanger understood the import of the identification
affidavit, and at no time did she feel pressured by Officer
Bales to identify Matthews. Based on this identification,
Officer Bales swore out an arrest warrant that stated that Ms.
Haltiwanger “did positively identify” Matthews. J.A. 93.
After learning about Ms. Haltiwanger’s identification of
Matthews, Officer McDonald wrote in his personal notes that,
based on this identification, he and his superior officer had
“agreed that there was no probable cause for an arrest warrant
on Matthews for his participation in [the mini-mart] incident.”
J.A. 292 (emphasis added). However, in the same paragraph,
after discussing the similarities between the suspects and the
proximity of the mini-mart robbery and the K-Mart purse-
snatching, Officer McDonald wrote “it is reasonable to believe
that Matthews is involved” in the mini-mart robbery. Id.Officer McDonald then swore out a warrant that stated:
“[Matthews] has been positively identified in this incident
after being positively indentified in a photo line up by a
victim in a related robbery that occurred in . . . proximity to
6
this robbery just minutes prior to this incident in the Columbia
Police Dept. jurisdiction.” J.A. 316. Matthews was arrested
that day.
On April 4, 2007, the charges against Matthews for the
Wilson robbery were dropped after surveillance tapes revealed
that he was at work at the time of that robbery. On June 29,
2007, the state solicitor dismissed the remaining charges.
Matthews was released on July 6, 2007.
On June 7, 2007, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Matthews
filed a lawsuit against the Officers, claiming that they
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing him without
probable cause. Further, relying on state law, Matthews
asserted claims for malicious prosecution, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. The
Officers moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) they did
not violate Matthews’ constitutional rights and, even if they
did, they are protected by qualified immunity from Matthews’
§ 1983 claims and (2) the state law claims are precluded by the
South Carolina Tort Claims Act or, in the alternative, fail as a
matter of law. Matthews filed responses in opposition.
At the summary judgment hearing, the Officers’ attorneys
discussed the § 1983 claims and the state law claims. Matthews’
attorney responded to each argument, including a discussion of
Matthews’ state law claims. J.A. 588-90. The district court
7
denied the Officers’ motions, citing the existence of genuine
issues of material fact.
The Officers then moved for reconsideration, and the
district court granted their motion, noting that it was
especially interested in the qualified immunity issue.
Thereafter, the district court conducted a second summary
judgment hearing. After each side spoke regarding whether the
Officers violated Matthews’ constitutional rights, the court
raised questions about the state law claims. Matthews’ attorney
did not object to this line of questioning; rather, he answered
the court’s questions. J.A. 639-40.
At the conclusion of this hearing, in an oral opinion, the
district court granted the Officers’ motions for summary
judgment on the § 1983 claims because Matthews had failed to
demonstrate a constitutional violation, and it granted the
Officers’ motions for summary judgment on Matthews’ state law
claims because there was insufficient evidence to support them.
This appeal followed.
II.
Matthews argues that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment on his § 1983 claims in favor of the Officers
on the basis of qualified immunity. Specifically, he argues
that the Officers violated his clearly established
8
constitutional right to be free from seizure without probable
cause because they had him arrested based on warrant affidavits
containing material misstatements and omissions. We review the
district court's order granting summary judgment de novo.
Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2007) (en
banc).
“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing
discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2007)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). When a
government official asserts qualified immunity, we must
determine: (1) whether the facts alleged show that the officer’s
actions violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the
right asserted was clearly established at the time of the
challenged actions. Id. at 377 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001)). Both questions must be answered in
the affirmative to defeat an official’s claim of qualified
immunity, and the plaintiff “bears the burden of proof on the
first question -– i.e., whether a constitutional violation
occurred.” Henry, 501 F.3d at 377.
To carry this initial burden, Matthews must show that each
officer “deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth
9
made material false statements in his affidavit or omitted from
that affidavit material facts with the intent to make, or with
reckless disregard of whether they thereby made the affidavit
misleading.” Miller v. Prince George’s County, 475 F.3d 621,
627 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). “Reckless disregard” requires a showing that an
officer, in light of all of the evidence, had “serious doubts as
to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt
the accuracy of the information he reported.” Id. With respect
to omissions, Matthews must establish that the officer failed to
inform the magistrate of facts that the officer knew would
negate a finding of probable cause. Id. Evidence of negligence
or honest mistake, however, is insufficient. Id. at 627-28.
Further, “the false statements or omissions must be material,
that is, necessary to the neutral and disinterested magistrate’s
finding of probable cause.” Id. at 628 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). With these standards in mind, we
review each warrant affidavit in turn.
Matthews argues that Officer Thomas acted with reckless
disregard for the truth by stating in his warrant affidavit that
Ms. Wilson picked Matthews out of the line-up because Officer
Thomas believed the line-up to be improperly suggestive and,
therefore, knew that Ms. Wilson’s identification was invalid.
However, even in the light most favorable to Matthews, there is
10
no evidence that Officer Thomas believed that the color line-up
was suggestive. Though he testified that he copied the color
line-up into black and white to make it “as neutral as
possible,” J.A. 344, there is no testimony that Officer Thomas
actually believed that the color line-up was suggestive.
Officer Thomas, therefore, did not make a statement or omission
in reckless disregard for the truth in his warrant affidavit. 2
Matthews next argues that Officer Bales’ warrant contains a
material misstatement made in reckless disregard for the truth
because it states that Ms. Haltiwanger “positively identified”
Matthews even though her identification was equivocal at best.
Regardless of her initial (or subsequent) equivocation, Officer
Bales did not make a materially false statement in reckless
disregard for the truth in his warrant because she unequivocally
identified Matthews in her affidavit, and it was reasonable for
Officer Bales to rely on it. There is no dispute that Ms.
2
The parties cite to United States v. Saunders, 501 F.3d
384, 389-93 (4th Cir. 2007), and other related cases to argue
whether the color line-up is suggestive. This line of cases
addresses whether a line-up is suggestive for purposes of
introducing identification evidence at trial, a context very
different from that presented by this case. Even assuming that
this precedent applies here, we find that the line-up is not
suggestive. Matthews may be wearing a black shirt with a
yellow jacket, but he does not stand out. J.A. 502. Further,
there is no evidence that the process was unfairly suggestive or
that Ms. Wilson’s identification was otherwise unreliable.
Saunders, 501 F.3d at 389-90.
11
Haltiwanger: (1) signed an affidavit identifying Matthews, (2)
understood the affidavit and its legal import, and (3) did not
feel coerced to sign it. There is also no evidence that Officer
Bales acquired the affidavit through trickery. Given these
undisputed facts, we believe that, regardless of any
equivocation, Officer Bales did not have “obvious reasons to
doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.” Miller, 475
F.3d at 627.
Finally, Matthews argues that Officer McDonald’s warrant
was made in reckless disregard for the truth because (1) it
states that the mini-mart clerk “positively identified” Matthews
as the robber, when in fact, Officer McDonald never presented a
photo line-up to the mini-mart clerk, and (2) though Officer
McDonald did not believe that he had probable cause to arrest
Matthews, he sought a warrant. We disagree with Matthews on
both points.
First, when read as a whole, Officer McDonald’s arrest
warrant for the mini-mart robbery is based on Ms. Haltiwanger’s
identification of Matthews and the similarities between the
mini-mart robbery and Ms. Haltiwanger’s purse-snatching. In
fact, Officer McDonald never claimed he had shown a line-up to
anyone at the mini-mart. Though perhaps inartful, Officer
McDonald’s warrant affidavit does not contain a misstatement.
Second, there is no evidence that Officer McDonald believed that
12
he did not have probable cause to arrest Matthews. Though
Matthews points to a statement in Officer McDonald’s notes
disclaiming probable cause, this is plainly a typographical
error. To read these notes otherwise would be nonsensical
because they would renounce probable cause in the first sentence
of the paragraph and then, without hesitation, have the
remaining two sentences of the paragraph assert facts and
opinions supporting probable cause. J.A. 292. Therefore,
Officer McDonald’s affidavit does not contain a materially false
statement made in reckless disregard for the truth.
After reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Matthews, we find that the Officers did not deliberately or with
reckless disregard for the truth make materially false
statements or omissions in their warrant affidavits. The
Officers, therefore, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because Matthews failed to carry his burden of proof to
demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right. 3 Accordingly,
we affirm the district court.
3
As a result of this holding, we need not reach the issue
of whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established.
13
III.
Matthews also argues that the district court erred in
granting the Officers summary judgment on his state law claims.
Matthews does not challenge the substance of this decision;
instead, he argues that the district court abused its discretion
by ruling on these claims without providing sufficient notice.
We review the district court’s decision to rule on summary
judgment without sufficient notice for an abuse of discretion.
See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261
(4th Cir. 1998).
District courts have broad power to enter summary judgment
when it is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 316,
326 (1986). However, “that power is contingent on giving the
losing party notice that it must come forward and defend its
claim.” U.S. Dev. Corp. v. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 873
F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1989). The notice need not be formal,
but “it must, in view of the procedural, legal, and factual
complexities of the case, allow the party a reasonable
opportunity to present all material pertinent to the claims
under consideration.” Id.; see, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Fritz, 452 F.3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
presence of an argument in a motion for summary judgment alone
gave the non-movant sufficient notice for the court to rule on
it).
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Here, after denying summary judgment on all of Matthews’
claims, including his state law claims, the district court
granted the Officers’ motion to reconsider. Though the court’s
order specifically mentioned the qualified immunity issue, it
granted the Officers’ motion to reconsider their entire motion
for summary judgment, which included their arguments against
Matthews’ state law claims. The district court’s order granting
the Officers’ motion to reconsider gave Matthews ample notice
that all of the issues raised in their motion for summary
judgment, including the state law claims, would be reconsidered
at the second hearing.
Further, Matthews had a full and fair opportunity to
present all material relevant to the defense of these claims
before the court granted summary judgment. It is undisputed
that Matthews had the opportunity to respond to the Officers’
arguments in his brief in opposition to summary judgment and
that Matthews’ attorney actually defended them at the first
hearing. J.A. 588-90. In addition, at the second hearing,
Matthews’ attorney did not object to the court’s questions
related to his state law claims or ask for additional time to
respond to them; rather, he answered them. J.A. 639-40. The
district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by
ruling on the Officers’ motion for summary judgment without
further notice.
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IV.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district
court’s decisions.
AFFIRMED
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