United States v. Heywood Smith, IV , 456 F. App'x 223 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4154
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
HEYWOOD SMITH, IV,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:10-cr-00066-1)
Submitted: November 7, 2011 Decided: December 1, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth
Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Michael B. Hissam, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Heywood Smith, IV, pleaded guilty to possession of a
firearm after sustaining convictions for misdemeanor crimes of
domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(6) (2006),
reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
suppression motion. The district court sentenced Smith to
twenty months of imprisonment and he now appeals. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Smith argues on appeal that the district court erred
in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized after a dog
trained in narcotics detection “alerted” during an inspection of
his vehicle following a traffic stop for speeding. “In
considering a ruling on a motion to suppress, we review
conclusions of law de novo and underlying factual findings for
clear error.” United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 553 (4th
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). When the district court has
denied a defendant’s suppression motion, we construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United
States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005).
“It is well established that the temporary detention
of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police
. . . constitutes a seizure . . . [and] an automobile stop is
thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be
unreasonable under the circumstances.” United States v. Branch,
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537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “Observing a traffic violation provides
sufficient justification for a police officer to detain the
offending vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the
traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.” Id.(citations omitted). During a routine traffic stop, an officer
may request a driver’s license and registration, perform a
computer check, issue a citation, and perform a canine sniff “if
performed within the time reasonably required to issue a traffic
citation.” Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, although the
“maximum acceptable length of a routine traffic stop cannot be
stated with mathematical precision,” the inquiry is focused on
whether the detention was longer than necessary to accomplish
the purposes of the detention. Id. (citation omitted).
In order to extend a traffic stop beyond this scope, a
police officer must either ensure the driver’s consent or
possess reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.
Id. Therefore, the officer must have “at least a minimal level
of objective justification” and “must be able to articulate more
than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of
criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24
(2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts
assess whether an officer has articulated reasonable suspicion
for a stop under the totality of the circumstances, giving “due
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weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of
their experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363
F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
The Court will “credit the ‘practical experience of
officers who observe on a daily basis what transpires on the
street.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151,
154 (4th Cir. 1993)). Moreover, “[j]udicial review of the
evidence offered to demonstrate reasonable suspicion must be
commonsensical, focused on the evidence as a whole, and
cognizant of both context and the particular experience of
officers charged with the ongoing tasks of law enforcement.”
Branch, 537 F.3d at 337. With these standards in mind, we have
thoroughly reviewed the record, and conclude that even if the
traffic stop was extended beyond the scope of a routine traffic
stop, the district court did not err in concluding that the
officers articulated reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to
conduct an inspection of Smith’s vehicle using a canine officer.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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