United States v. Shea ( 1999 )


Menu:
  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    No. 97-7292
    JOSEPH FRANCIS SHEA, a/k/a Diamond
    Joe,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
    J. Calvitt Clarke, Jr., Senior District Judge.
    (CR-93-55, CA-96-1198-2)
    Submitted: November 17, 1998
    Decided: March 30, 1999
    Before ERVIN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Dismissed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
    curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Joseph Francis Shea, Appellant Pro Se. Kevin Michael Comstock,
    OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Vir-
    ginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Joseph F. Shea appeals the district court order denying relief on his
    motion filed under 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2255
     (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
    We grant a certificate of appealability as to whether Shea was
    deprived of effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth
    Amendment upon his claim that counsel did not inform him that the
    Government conceded there was no factual basis for count four of the
    indictment that charged Shea with a violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1) (1994). We also vacate that portion of the district court's
    order denying relief on this issue and remand for further proceedings
    in the district court. We deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss
    the appeal in all other respects.
    The district court concluded that Shea's motion was barred by the
    one-year statute of limitations period of § 2255. Shea's conviction
    became final on May 31, 1994, and he filed the § 2255 motion on
    December 6, 1996. Shea filed an amended § 2255 motion and a
    motion for leave to file the amended motion on March 19, 1997,
    which the court granted on April 23, 1997, and ordered Shea to file
    a consolidated § 2255 motion including the claims raised in the initial
    and amended § 2255 motions. Shea filed his consolidated motion on
    June 30, 1997. The consolidated motion merely combined the claims
    raised in his initial and amended § 2255 motions. The court concluded
    that the statute of limitations began to run on May 4, 1994, when
    Shea's conviction became final. The court also concluded that the
    § 2255 motion was filed on June 30, 1997 and was therefore
    untimely.
    The district court did not have the benefit of our recent opinion in
    Brown v. Angelone, 
    150 F.3d 370
     (4th Cir. 1998). In Brown, this
    Court held that motions challenging convictions made final prior to
    the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
    2
    of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
    110 Stat. 1214
     (effective
    Apr. 24, 1996) are timely, so long as the motion is filed on or before
    April 23, 1997. Shea's § 2255 motion, his amended § 2255 motion,
    and the court's granting of Shea's motion to amend his § 2255 motion
    were all filed on or before April 23, 1997. The consolidated § 2255
    motion, filed on June 30, 1997, merely included claims which were
    previously filed with the court. We therefore conclude that Shea's
    § 2255 motion was filed within the one-year limitations period
    because all of his claims were filed on or before April 23, 1997.
    Notwithstanding our conclusion that Shea's § 2255 motion was
    timely, the district court did not commit reversible error in dismissing
    the motion as to all of Shea's claims but one. Shea's claims concern-
    ing the alleged error in the judgment order, the decision to order that
    the federal sentences be served consecutively to the state sentence,
    and the failure to make factual findings before ordering restitution
    should have been raised on direct appeal. See Stone v. Powell, 
    428 U.S. 465
    , 477 n.10 (1976). This Court did not consider the merits of
    Shea's appeal and dismissed the appeal because he knowingly and
    voluntarily waived his right to appeal any sentence which fell below
    the statutory maximum. See United States v. Shea , 
    1994 WL 233531
    (4th Cir. May 31, 1994) (No. 93-5850) (unpublished).
    To obtain collateral relief based on errors not raised on appeal,
    Shea must show "cause" excusing his procedural default and "actual
    prejudice" resulting from the error of which he complains. See United
    States v. Frady, 
    456 U.S. 152
    , 167-68 (1982). Shea cannot show
    cause because he waived his right to appeal. See United States v.
    Pipitone, 
    67 F.3d 34
    , 39 (2d Cir. 1995). We therefore deny a certifi-
    cate of appealability and dismiss as to these claims.
    As for Shea's claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
    guilty plea to the § 924(c)(1) charge, our review of a transcript of the
    plea hearing discloses that Shea knew he was pleading guilty as an
    aider and abettor. Furthermore, Shea's reliance on Bailey v. United
    States, 
    516 U.S. 137
     (1995), is misplaced. Bailey did not alter aiding
    and abetting liability for § 924(c)(1) violations. See, e.g., United
    States v. Wilson, 
    135 F.3d 291
    , 305 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___U.S.
    ___, 
    66 U.S.L.W. 3758
     (U.S. May 26, 1998) (No. 97-8750); see also
    Barrett v. United States, 
    120 F.3d 900
    , 901 (8th Cir. 1997) (per
    3
    curiam). Shea's challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction
    must also fail since Shea conceded at the guilty plea hearing that the
    jewels traveled in interstate commerce. See United States v. Paredes,
    
    139 F.3d 840
    , 843-44 (11th Cir. 1998) (minimal impact on interstate
    commerce is sufficient to give the court subject matter jurisdiction).
    In addition, there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. The
    Government informed Shea's counsel that there was no factual basis
    for one of the § 924(c)(1) charges as soon as it discovered the defi-
    ciency. We therefore deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss
    the appeal as to all of these claims as well.
    As for Shea's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, however, we
    find that Shea has made a substantial showing of denial of a constitu-
    tional right, and we grant a certificate of appealability as to this claim.
    Shea had a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the
    guilty plea hearing. See Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 58-59 (1985).
    Shea was indicted on numerous charges resulting from two rob-
    beries, including two violations of using a weapon during a crime of
    violence in violation of § 924(c)(1). He agreed to plead guilty to two
    charges in the indictment, including one of the§ 924(c)(1) charges,
    in exchange for the Government's dismissal of the remaining charges.
    After Shea entered into the plea agreement, but before pleading
    guilty, the Government informed his counsel that there was no factual
    basis for the § 924(c)(1) charge that was to be dismissed as part of the
    agreement.* Shea attests under penalty of perjury that his counsel
    never gave him this information. Shea explains that he believed he
    was avoiding a mandatory twenty-year consecutive sentence by
    agreeing to plead guilty to the one § 924(c)(1) charge in exchange for
    the Government's dismissal of the other § 924(c)(1) charge. Shea fur-
    ther contends that had he known that there was no factual basis for
    the dismissed § 924(c)(1) charge, he would not have pled guilty to the
    other § 924(c)(1) charge and would have insisted on a trial. In the
    § 2255 proceedings, neither the district court nor the Government
    addressed the merits of this claim.
    _________________________________________________________________
    *Specifically, the Government conceded that the weapon that was the
    basis of the § 924(c)(1) charge was a BB gun. According to the Govern-
    ment, a BB gun does not meet the definition of a firearm under 
    18 U.S.C. § 921
    (a)(3) (1994).
    4
    We therefore grant a certificate of appealability as to whether Shea
    was deprived of effective assistance of counsel in violation of the
    Sixth Amendment upon his claim that counsel did not inform him that
    there was no factual basis for the dismissed § 924(c)(1) charge. We
    also vacate that part of the district court's order dismissing Shea's
    § 2255 motion on this issue and remand that claim for further pro-
    ceedings in the district court. We deny a certificate of appealability
    and dismiss the appeal from the court's order in all other respects. We
    deny Shea's motions to correct, to amend, and to supplement the
    record. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
    and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    DISMISSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
    AND REMANDED
    5