United States v. Arthur Crawley , 644 F. App'x 259 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4627
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ARTHUR DEJUAN CRAWLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:14-cr-00197-JAB-1)
Submitted: March 29, 2016 Decided: April 12, 2016
Before KING, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Kyle D.
Pousson, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Arthur Dejuan Crawley pled guilty, pursuant to a
conditional plea agreement, to being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)
(2012). The district court sentenced Crawley to 37 months’
imprisonment and imposed a 3-year term of supervised release.
Crawley’s plea agreement specifically permitted him to appeal
the district court’s order, which was entered prior to the
guilty plea, denying Crawley’s motion to dismiss the indictment
on speedy trial grounds. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
this ruling and the criminal judgment.
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has
rejected a bright-line test to determine whether a defendant’s
speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment has been violated
and instead has outlined four factors to be weighed in a
balancing test. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-30 (1972).
Specifically, this court is to consider the “[l]ength of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his
right, * and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 530. For his
*The district court concluded that this Barker factor
weighed in Crawley’s favor, and this determination is not
implicated in this appeal.
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claim to succeed, Crawley must “establish that on balance, the
four separate [Barker] factors weigh in his favor.” United
States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 271 (4th Cir. 2009) (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted). “The length of the delay
is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some
delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity
for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
The record reflects, and the parties do not dispute, that
the charging indictment was returned on May 27, 2014, and
Crawley’s trial was scheduled to begin on May 11, 2015.
Consistent with this court’s precedent, the district court ruled
that this delay was presumptively prejudicial and proceeded to
analyze the remaining Barker factors. See United States v.
Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that
the time frame for presumptive prejudice is flexible and
observing that a shorter time frame (there, eight months) was
appropriate because defendant’s prosecution was not complex).
Although not challenged on appeal, we note our agreement with
this threshold determination.
We also agree with the district court’s balancing of the
other Barker factors. Specifically, although the court opined
that the Government bore more responsibility for the delay than
did Crawley, it weighed the second Barker factor in the
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Government’s favor because the reasons for the delay were either
valid or neutral. We discern no error in this legal conclusion.
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (opining that “[a] more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered
since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must
rest with the government rather than with the defendant”).
Compare United States v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701, 705-06 (6th
Cir. 2011) (opining that a near three-year delay between
defendant’s indictment and his initial appearance and
arraignment, for which the district court found the Government
was solely responsible, was “rightly characterized as ‘beyond
simple negligence,’” and upholding decision to weigh the second
Barker factor in favor of defendant).
Finally, we are not persuaded by Crawley’s argument that he
was prejudiced by the delay. With regard to the prejudice
inquiry, a court is to consider: (1) whether the defendant’s
pretrial incarceration was oppressive; (2) the defendant’s
anxiety and concern; and (3) the possibility that the delay
hampered the defendant’s ability to prepare his defense.
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992). At the
most, Crawley asserted nonspecific anxiety caused by inertia and
the lack of communication between the U.S. Attorney’s Office and
the district court upon Crawley’s arrival in the Middle District
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of North Carolina, but he cites to no authority to support the
proposition that this type of generalized anxiety establishes
prejudice to the defendant.
We thus find no reversible error in any aspect of the
district court’s rationale for rejecting Crawley’s speedy trial
arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order denying
Crawley’s motion to dismiss, and we affirm the ensuing criminal
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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