Hesson v. Morrison-Knudsen Co. , 117 F. App'x 857 ( 2004 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 04-1058
    CLARENCE W. HESSON,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    MORRISON-KNUDSEN COMPANY, INCORPORATED, a
    Delaware corporation; E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS
    & COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,
    District Judge. (CA-01-619-2)
    Argued:   October 28, 2004                 Decided:   December 3, 2004
    Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and MICHAEL and TRAXLER, Circuit
    Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: Harry Gustavus Shaffer, III, SHAFFER & SHAFFER, P.L.L.C.,
    Madison, West Virginia, for Appellant.     Raymond Michael Ripple,
    E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY, Wilmington, Delaware; Eric E.
    Kinder, SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, P.L.L.C., Charleston, West
    Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: H. Jerome Sparks, SHAFFER &
    SHAFFER, P.L.L.C., Madison, West Virginia, for Appellant. Edward
    W. Rugeley, III, Niall A. Paul, SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, P.L.L.C.,
    Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee Morrison-Knudsen; Donna L.
    Goodman, E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY, Wilmington, Delaware,
    for Appellee DuPont.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    Clarence   Hesson      sued      his   former    employer,    Morrison-
    Knudsen Company, Inc. (MK), and E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Company
    (Dupont) for injuries he sustained while cleaning a bag house at
    Dupont’s Washington Works facility near Parkersburg, West Virginia.
    (A   bag   house   sits     atop   a    boiler     and    functions      to    prevent
    particulate matter generated by the boiler from escaping into the
    outside air.) Hesson seriously injured his leg when he slipped and
    fell into a temporary recess in the bag house floor while removing
    empty filter-bag cages.        At the time of Hesson’s injuries, MK was
    Dupont’s    in-house   contractor         responsible       for   maintaining     and
    cleaning the facility’s bag houses.                Hesson alleges, pursuant to
    section 23-4-2(d)(2) of the West Virginia Code, that MK is not
    immune from suit under the State’s workers’ compensation scheme
    because MK acted with deliberate intention in exposing him to an
    unsafe working condition.          Hesson also alleges that Dupont, as the
    owner of the facility, violated West Virginia statutory and common
    law by maintaining unsafe premises.
    The district court awarded summary judgment to both MK
    and Dupont.     As to MK, the court concluded that Hesson could not
    establish three of the five requirements of a deliberate intention
    claim under section 23-4-2(c)(2) of the West Virginia Code.                      More
    specifically,      Hesson   could      not    establish     (1)   that    MK    had   a
    subjective realization and appreciation of the existence of a
    3
    specific unsafe working condition, (2) that the specific unsafe
    working condition constituted a violation of state or federal law,
    or (3) that MK had exposed Hesson to a specific unsafe working
    condition. See Hesson v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., No. 2:01-0619
    (S.D.W.Va. Dec. 12, 2003) (mem. order granting summary judgment to
    MK).   The district court concluded that Dupont is not liable under
    West Virginia statutory or common law because Hesson could not
    establish that the bag house was unsafe or that Dupont exercised
    sufficient control over MK to permit MK’s employment practices to
    be attributed to Dupont. See Hesson v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc.,
    No. 2:01-0619 (S.D.W.Va. Dec. 12, 2003) (mem. order granting
    summary judgment to DuPont).
    We affirm the orders awarding summary judgment to both MK
    and Dupont, and we do so on the reasoning of the district court
    with one exception.    As to the deliberate intention claim against
    MK, we decline to conclude that Hesson could not establish that the
    specific unsafe working condition constituted a violation of OSHA
    regulations, 
    29 C.F.R. § 1910.23
    (a)(5) and (a)(7), which set safety
    standards for pits, trap door floor openings, and temporary floor
    openings.    These regulations require either railings around an
    opening or the assignment of an employee to attend the opening.
    The district court concluded, and Hesson’s expert witness agreed,
    that railings around the temporary openings or recesses in the bag
    house floor were not feasible. According to the district court, no
    4
    violation of these regulations occurred when Hesson entered the bag
    house by himself and began removing cages because he was attending
    the temporary openings or recesses in the bag house floor at the
    same time he was removing the cages.    We disagree with the court’s
    conclusion, on summary judgment, that Hesson could simultaneously
    attend the openings and work around them.      Nevertheless, Hesson’s
    deliberate intention claim against MK still fails because, as the
    district court determined, he cannot establish the two other
    requirements   of   section   23-4-2(c)(2)   noted   in   the   preceding
    paragraph.
    The orders of the district court are therefore affirmed.
    AFFIRMED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-1058

Citation Numbers: 117 F. App'x 857

Judges: Wilkins, Michael, Traxler

Filed Date: 12/3/2004

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024