United States v. Donald Boston , 501 F. App'x 235 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4417
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DONALD RAY BOSTON, a/k/a D Ray,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (7:11-cr-00097-BO-1)
Submitted: December 5, 2012 Decided: December 20, 2012
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Byron C. Dunning, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Donald Ray Boston appeals his 151-month sentence for
possessing with intent to distribute a quantity of heroin, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). On appeal, Boston
contends both that his sentence is substantively unreasonable
and that it is procedurally unreasonable in two respects:
because the district court declined to hear evidence relevant to
his motion for downward departure and because the district court
assertedly inadequately explained its chosen sentence.
“[T]he rigorous plain-error standard applies to
unpreserved claims of procedural sentencing error.” United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010). To establish
plain error, Boston must show that “(1) an error was made;
(2) the error is plain; and (3) the error affects substantial
rights.” United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342–43 (4th
Cir. 2009). “If all three of these conditions are met, an
appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a
forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Carr, 303 F.3d 539, 543 (4th
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
In the sentencing context, an error affects substantial rights
if the defendant can show that the sentence imposed “was longer
than that to which he would otherwise be subject.” United
2
States v. Washington, 404 F.3d 834, 849 (4th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that it was not plain error for the district court to decline
Boston’s offer to make his expert available to the court. We
likewise discern no error in the district court’s explanation of
its chosen sentence. See Lynn, 592 F.3d at 578-79. Although
the district court “might have said more” to explain the
sentence it chose, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359
(2007), its explanation was elaborate enough “to allow [this
court] to effectively review the reasonableness of the
sentence.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 380
(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, Boston’s argument that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable is predicated upon his assertion that
it is unreasonable to sentence him as a career offender without
some explanation for that designation. Because we hold that the
district court sufficiently explained Boston’s sentence and
because Boston has unearthed nothing else to disturb the
presumptive reasonableness of his sentence, his argument on this
score is meritless. See United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278,
289 (4th Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
3
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4